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AN ALTER KÄMPFER AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE HOLOCAUST:  
OTTO OHLENDORF BETWEEN CAREERISM AND NAZI FUNDAMENTALISM   
 
Jennifer B. Capani 
 
 On April 7th, 1951, Holocaust perpetrator Otto Ohlendorf’s death sentence 
was carried out according to the ruling of the United States Military Courts in 
Nuremberg. In The United States vs. Otto Ohlendorf, et. al., leaders of the 
Einsatzgruppen, mobile killing units, were tried for war crimes which led to the 
deaths of millions of Jews and partisans.  Under Ohlendorf’s leadership of 
Einsatzgruppen D, more than 90,000 people were liquidated in the Ukraine.  After 
this assignment, Ohlendorf resumed his positions head of Domestic Security in the 
Reich Security Main Office.  As the war ended, he surrendered, and revealed the full 
scope of Einsatzgruppen activity, which eventually led to the second set of 
Nuremberg Trials. Outside of the Holocaust and the trial, little has been written on 
Ohlendorf.  His academic career and ideology are insufficiently analyzed.  
This dissertation analyzes Ohlendorf’s life, career, and National Socialist 
ideology. The key factor in exploring his motivations is to fuse together careerism 
and ideology through his elite status as an Alter Kämpfer, “old fighter” and Nazi 
party member before 1933. From this designation, Ohlendorf enjoyed privileged 
employment, promotions, and a high level of trust within the party. Further 
explored is the placement of Ohlendorf into the historiographical debate, and how 
his ideology, career, trial, and death connected to his position as an Alter Kämpfer. 
Ultimately, analyzing the historiography reveals how memory has been fashioned in 
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Otto Ohlendorf, was part of a select group of elitist Nazi party members, the 
Alte Kämpfer (or “old fighters”), where special privileges, including employment and 
promotions, were given to the first 100,000 NSDAP (Nazi party) members.  These 
men, including Ohlendorf, were recognized as the earliest and most devoted party 
members, having joined prior to Hitler’s election to the Chancellorship in 1933.  
Ohlendorf was party number 6531.  The Alte Kämpfer were awarded with these 
three particular decorations to distinguish them from new party members.  These 
awards included the Ehrenwinkel für Alte Kämpfer (silver chevron, worn on the right 
arm of the uniform), the Goldenes Partiabzeichen (Golden Badge of Honor, a circular 
two-toned medal given by Hitler to indicate outstanding contributions to the party) 
and the Medialle zur Erinnerung an den 9. November 1923 (or the Blood Order 
Medal, given only to participants in the 1923 Munich Beer Hall Putsch).1  Ohlendorf 
was given the first two awards and he is seen in Illustration 1, wearing the Golden 
Badge of Honor, below his left pocket button.   
These awards were worn particularly on official uniforms but the Golden 
Badge was a pin that could be removed and put on a suit for everyone to see.   These 
were indicators of prestige and benefit flowed from being recognized as a veteran of 
the struggle.  Ohlendorf’s career was certainly privileged: He was continually 
promoted until he reached the highest strata possible in the Nazi party.  But Alter 
                                                          
1 Jean-Denis G.G. Lepage, An Illustrated Dictionary of the Third Reich (Jefferson, North 




Kämpfer was not just an honorific, it was a lifestyle and was a consistent reminder of 
why he joined the party.  He was a devoted National Socialist and careerist who was 
successful at every phase of his career, including when he led the murder of 90,000 
Jews and partisans with the Einsatzgruppen.2  Key to understanding how 





                                                          
2 Alter Kämpfer will be referenced throughout the dissertation. There is no definitive 
source on this subject but for some general information see Dietrich Orlow, The Nazi Party, 
1919-1945: A Complete History (New York: Enigma, 2010), Randall Bytwerk, "Und Ihr habt doch 
gesiegt: Rhetorical functions of a Nazi holiday." ETC: A Review of General Semantics (1979): 134-
146, Christoph Schmidt, "Zu den Motiven ‘alter Kämpfer’in der NSDAP," in Detlev Peukert and 
Jürgen Reulecke, eds., Die Reihen fast geschlossen. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Alltags unterm 
Nationalsozialismus (Wuppertal: Hammer, 1981), Ted Harrison, "" Alter Kämpfer" im 
Widerstand. Graf Helldorff, die NS-Bewegung und die Opposition gegen Hitler," Vierteljahrshefte 
für Zeitgeschichte (1997): 385-423, Martin Kipp, "Privilegien für „alte Kämpfer “–Zur Geschichte 
der SA-Berufsschulen," in Manfred Heinemann, hg., Erziehung und Schulung im Dritten Reich. 
Teil 1: Kindergarten, Schule, Jugend, Berufserziehung. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. 289–300, Winfried 
Süß, Der" Volkskörper" im Krieg: Gesundheitspolitik, Gesundheitsverhältnisse und Krankenmord 
im nationalsozialistischen Deutschland 1939-1945 (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003), Carl 
Friedrich Graumann, Psychologie im Nationalsozialismus (Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer-
Verlag, 1985), Ulrich Herbert, Hitler's foreign workers: enforced foreign labor in Germany under 
the Third Reich (Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
 
3 It is important to note that in Ohlendorf’s “Personal Bericht” and many other official 
files from the Bundesarchiv, indicate that he was given the Alte Kämpfer awards. His resumés 
included these accolades. Some of the references are Berlin Bundesarchiv, Nachlaβ, Personal-
Akte, Ohlendorf, Otto, SS-Nr. 880 (microfilm) pages 862, 866, 870, 889, 943, and in RG 361, 
2527, document number 126144 “Parteistatistische Erhebung 1939.”  There are many more, but 





Illustration I.  Otto Ohlendorf in 1943. 
There is no real biography written of Otto Ohlendorf. In 1951, he was 
executed by hanging at Landsberg prison in Germany, after being tried for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.  He lived imprisoned for three years after he 
was sentenced and filed appeals to his sentence.  He accepted his sentence in that he 
took responsibility for the murder of 90,000 people, but never admitted guilt, in any 
                                                          
4 Illustration I: Otto Ohlendorf, “Porträt Otto Ohlendorf in Uniform als SS-Brigadeführer,” 
November 19, 1943, Bundesarchiv, Berlin (accessed August, 2017) 
http://www.bild.bundesarchiv.de/archives/barchpic/search/_1504768780/?switch_lang
=de. Note this is the original file citation but it is watermarked. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, this photo was acquired from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_Ohlendorf#/media/File:Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-





form.  To him, and the dozens of other perpetrators tried in several sets of 
Nuremberg trials, his actions were completely justified.  Murdering the Jews and 
partisans of Europe was in self-defense of Germany where, to Ohlendorf, they held 
back the progress of the Aryan race and their elimination was necessary.  Ohlendorf 
was not alone in this defense, nor did he demonstrate any remorse.  Why should he?  
In his mind, and in the mind of many a Nazi perpetrator, the Jews were the enemy of 
Germany.  Among several other issues, this dissertation attempts to further analyze 
the transition Ohlendorf made from that of a highly professional policy-maker to the 
leader of a unit that perpetrated massive pogroms against Jews and partisans in 
Crimea, demonstrating the links between these two phases of his career. 
 Ohlendorf exemplified the ideal Nazi: the highly educated career professional 
who thrived in Nazi Germany through merit-based promotions.  Ohlendorf’s career 
was defined by his expertise in economics, law and the political economy. He headed 
trade organizations and worked for the Ministry of Economics.  For all intents and 
purposes, Ohlendorf embodied everything the Nazi party wanted:  He was 
intelligent, devoted to the party, devoted to Germany and his family, and most 
significantly, devoted to National Socialist ideology.  However, part of his life and 
career haunted Ohlendorf after he surrendered to the Allies.  He hoped to convince 
his captors he was useful to them for his insider knowledge of the Nazi system and 
the Third Reich.  Instead, it became known to the Allies that he was transferred to 
lead Einsatzgruppe D.  Under his command, 90,000 Jews and partisans were 
murdered en masse in the Soviet Union.  This part of his career defined his entire 




For decades following the end of the Second World War, historians have 
focused their research and analysis on several aspects of Ohlendorf’s life: his career 
as an economist, his role as a perpetrator in the Holocaust, and the trial.  In recent 
years, there has been a shift in what aspects of Ohlendorf’s life are researched, 
including a study of Einsatzgruppe D, itself.  However, what is missing is a 
comprehensive look at the entirety of Ohlendorf’s life and career.  What can be 
learned from a study like this is how Ohlendorf demonstrated dissent within the 
party, what his personal views were regarding anti-Semitism, on what grounds he 
claimed that his interpretation of National Socialist ideology was pure, and how this 
reflected fragmentation of beliefs within the party itself.  His work reflects a 
particular kind of radicalism, whereby he initiated policy and solutions based on 
activist politics, often at odds with officials in his own party.  A comprehensive study 
of Ohlendorf’s life and career will allow us to better understand his place in history, 
not only in the context of his trial and culpability, but of the history of Nazi Germany 
and the Holocaust.  This is the goal of this thesis. 
Biographical Sketch 
 On February 4th, 1907, Otto Ohlendorf was born in Hoheneggelsen, near 
Hannover.  His family owned a farm and he was the second of four children; two 
brothers and one sister.  Influenced by his older brother, Ohlendorf became 




and Nazi Party member number 6531.5  This made him a member of the elite class 
of Nazi party members called the Alter Kämpfer, or “old fighter.”  He joined the party 
in 1925, at the age of eighteen, and the SS a year later.  The timing of his Nazi party 
membership would benefit him throughout his career as the “Alter Kämpfer” 
enjoyed special privileges of employment and promotion.6 He was expected to 
become a farmer but instead earned a degree in jurisprudence and began graduate 
work in the field of political economy.  In 1931, he was awarded a scholarship for a 
student exchange to the University of Pavia, Italy where he became an expert on 
Fascism, learned to despise it, therefore solidifying his commitment to National 
Socialist ideology.  In 1934, Ohlendorf married Käthe Wolpers, they had five 
children together and were a typical family devoted to National Socialism.  
 Upon his return to Germany, he practiced law in the district and regional 
courts and was recruited by Prof. Dr. Jens Jessen, head of the University of Kiel’s 
Institute for World Economics and Maritime Trade, to teach economics and build up 
the new department of economics.  After less than a year, Ohlendorf and Jessen were 
driven out because of their radical economic theories, which were critical of the Nazi 
Party. Ohlendorf followed Jessen to Berlin, where their new academic stint was 
short-lived, for similar reasons.  In 1936, when Ohlendorf’s time in academia was 
over, he applied for and was employed by the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) (which in 1939 
                                                          
5 For his membership numbers, they are listed on the cover of all documents in the 
German Federal Archives. One such document set is “Personalnachweis” in Bundesarchiv Berlin 
Nachlaβ Ohlendorf, Otto, Personal-Akte, SS-nr. 880, 862, microfilm. 
 
6 Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria, 1933-
1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) index, xiii. In later sections of this thesis, Alter Kämpfer 




became the RSHA {Reichsicherheitshauptamt, or Reich Security Main Office}, in 
charge of domestic intelligence).  Here, he used spies to acquire information for 
public opinion reports.  These reports cited many aspects of the Reich including the 
economy, public attitudes toward a variety of issues, and the Nazi party itself.  He 
gained a reputation for conducting thorough research on the Reich and wrote 
weekly reports on the collected data, which often reflected on particulars of German 
life negatively.  Heinrich Himmler, Reichsführer SS, openly criticized Ohlendorf’s 
negativity and dismissed the reports.   
 Despite the grudge against Ohlendorf held by Himmler and Reinhard 
Heydrich, head of the RSHA, Ohlendorf continued to thrive in his career.  This is, 
without question, because he was an Alter Kämpfer whose loyalty to the party was 
unassailable, overriding any squabbles he had with other party members.  Also, the 
elite Alte Kämpfer club warranted privilege throughout his, and other members’, 
careers.  In 1941, in an alleged attempt to punish Ohlendorf for insubordination, he 
was ultimately transferred to the eastern front to lead Einsatzgruppe D.  Despite 
twice refusing the position, Ohlendorf conceded, and as leader of Einsatzgruppe D, 
he excelled with the same kind of dedication as in any other part of his career, 
compiling reports in similar form and tone as in other areas of his career.  He was 
driven by his commitment to National Socialist ideology and the Nazi party, but in 
this case, was not conducting public opinion polls, writing economic policy or doing 
anything academic.  Ohlendorf’s group of five hundred men were wrangling up 




 Following his time as head of an Einsatzgruppe, Ohlendorf resumed his role 
in the RSHA and assumed additional roles in the Ministry of Economics and trade 
groups.  As the end of the war became inevitable, Ohlendorf’s pragmatic nature 
tended to accept the outcome and devise a post-war economic recovery plan.  One of 
the last Nazis to remain at the headquarters in Berlin, Ohlendorf fled to Flensburg 
with the provisional government that was set up to run in lieu of Hitler (and upon 
his suicide).  On May 23rd, 1945, he surrendered himself to the Allies, thinking his 
expertise on the inner-working of the government would prove useful and that he 
might still be offered a position in whatever transitional government would be set 
up to rebuild Germany.  He was grossly mistaken and his actions with the 
Einsatzgruppen were exposed as criminal genocide. 
 Thanks to Ohlendorf’s apparent candor, frankness and willingness to offer 
information to the Allies, a second set of Nuremberg Trials was set up solely to deal 
with the activities of the Einsatzgruppen, in Case 9, The United States of America v. 
Otto Ohlendorf, et al.  Ohlendorf was the lead defendant in a trial to determine war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.  A trained lawyer himself, Ohlendorf plead not 
guilty and defended his actions by invoking the Führerbefehl (under order of the 
Führer), saying he was given orders to follow.  After three years in captivity, 
thousands of hours of interviews, interrogations and testimony given, pleas, 
affidavits and sworn statements made, Ohlendorf was charged with three counts of 
war crimes and sentenced to death by hanging.   
 He filed appeals and mobilized a group of supporters, and although most of 




least shortened, Ohlendorf was hanged on June 8th, 1951.  He was forty-three years 
old and left a wife with five young children behind.  Upon his death, Ohlendorf never 
wavered in his devotion to National Socialism and never expressed remorse for the 
crimes he committed, as he did not see the murder of innocent people as a crime.  A 
comprehensive analysis of his life and career begins here and will highlight under-
researched aspects.  Shown are patterns of behavior befitting a true loyalist Alter 
Kämpfer, with ultimate careerist drive, and a consistency in ideology throughout 
Nazi Germany. 
Searching for Clues to Ohlendorf’s Motivations 
 Historians have long studied Nazi Germany, World War II, the Holocaust, the 
Nuremberg Trials, perpetrator motivations, the Einsatzgruppen, the Nazi economy, 
and many other topics related to this dissertation.  The utopian quest to find a 
singular document, the key that answered all questions concerning Ohlendorf’s 
motivations, remorse, trial strategy, etc., one that focused on Ohlendorf’s thought-
process at various phases of his life, simply failed.  A document like this may have 
been destroyed or never existed at all. Therefore, this dissertation builds on the 
work of other historians, hoping to make a modest contribution to a vast field.  My 
work has been influenced by numerous papers, articles, books, authors, websites, 
etc., and remains incomplete.  In the future, I hope to acquire full access to more 
archival materials.  For a more detailed analysis of source materials, please see the 




 There have been considerable shifts in views on the place of the Holocaust in 
history.  Doris Bergen’s War and Genocide is significant because it forces readers to 
fuse together and think critically about historical context.7  In this case, the Second 
World War and the Holocaust were inseparable occurrences and to analyze the 
Holocaust as a singular event does not provide the appropriate framework for 
topical analysis.  This is a significant study demonstrative of new trends in the field.   
 Along with Bergen’s book, Daniel Blatman, in The Death Marches, has 
recently contributed to historiography by forcing historians to rethink the phases of 
the Holocaust, placing the death marches not as an epilogue to the events of the 
Holocaust, but as the final phase of it.8  An undetermined number of people perished 
in these marches and Blatman emphasizes the role of locals in perpetrating 
genocide.  Focusing on case studies like Majdanek, Blatman argues that the 
Holocaust was more improvised and scattered than previously thought. 
 Arguably the book that most influenced my research is Catherine Epstein’s 
Model Nazi: Arthur Greiser and the Occupation of Western Poland.9Epstein’s ability to 
                                                          
 7 Doris Bergen, War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust (Lanham, M.D.: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2016) and Doris Bergen, The Holocaust: A Concise History (Plymouth, 
U.K.: Rowman and Littlefield, Inc., 2009).  
 8 Daniel Blatman, The Death Marches: The Final Phase of Nazi Genocide (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). For more on the Death Marches see Elie 
Wiesel, Night (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), Joseph Freeman and Donald Schwartz, The Road 
to Hell: Recollections of the Nazi Death March (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 1998), Andrzej 
Strzelecki, The Evacuation, Dismantling and Liberation of KL Auschwitz (Oświęcim, Poland: 
Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, 2001), and Michael R. Marrus, ed., The End of the Holocaust 
(Westport, CT: Meckler, 1989).  
9 Catherine Epstein, Model Nazi: Arthur Grieser and the Occupation of Western Poland 





fuse together a complete account of Greiser’s career with significant issues in the 
study of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust is a model to historians of the Holocaust.  I 
am grateful that the general historiography has shifted back into a biographical 
mode.  Nazi Germany was not the well-oiled machine previously thought.  It was 
multi-dimensional and had real human beings making decisions relevant to 
humanity.  This is why we study both Nazi Germany and the Holocaust.  The 
incomprehensibly horrific decision to murder 6,000,000, one third of all the Jews of 
Europe was not a crime conducted by mindless fools.  The Holocaust was 
perpetuated by the Ohlendorfs of Germany. 
 On the subject of anti-Semitism, countless studies, articles and books have 
been written.  Even from an early age, school-aged children now read good general 
studies that analyze the history of the persecution of Jews.  The best known are Elie 
Wiesel’s Night and the Diary of Anne Frank.10  These books raise important 
questions of how to define and contextualize persecution and the Holocaust. Other 
general studies of anti-Semitism have been useful to this paper and include Robert 
                                                          
10 Anne Frank, Anne Frank: The Diary of a Young Girl (Garden City, NY:  Doubleday, 1952) 
and Elie Wiesel, Night (New York: Avon Books, 1969). Other relevant books by and about Wiesel 
are Ellen Normal Stern, Elie Wiesel: A Voice for Humanity (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication 
Society, 1996), Thomas J. Vinciguerra, ed., Conversations with Elie Wiesel (New York: Schocken 
Books, 2001), Harry J. Cargas, ed., Responses to Elie Wiesel: Critical Essay by Major Jewish and 
Christian Scholars (New York: Persea Books, 1978) and Harry J. Cargas, ed., Telling the Tale: A 
Tribute to Elie Wiesel on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday (St. Louis: Time Being Books, 1993), 
Wiesel, A Beggar in Jerusalem: A Novel (New York: Schocken Books, 1985), Wiesel, Night, Dawn, 
The Accident: A Trilogy (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004). For more on Anne Frank and related 
works see Miep Gies, Anne Frank Remembered: The Story of the Woman Who Helped to Hide 
the Frank Family (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), Jennifer Hansen, ed., Anne Frank (San 
Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2003), and Carol Ann Lee, Roses from the Earth: The Biography of 





Wistrich’s Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred, Shmuel Almog’s Antisemitism Through 
the Ages, Richard Levy’s Antisemitism in the Modern World and many more.11  These 
kinds of works show the origins of anti-Semitism, how hatred was bred and 
persecution conducted over centuries.  Important to the study of Ohlendorf is 
analyzing the origins and evolution of anti-Semitism culminating in the Holocaust.  
 The Holocaust is the ultimate example of the long-ingrained cultural, 
religious and societal persecution of the Jewish population of Europe. Numerous 
studies have been conducted concerning the Nazis’ ideological anti-Semitism.  
Taking racial hatred and transforming it into the systematic destruction of the Jews 
was the brainchild of Nazi Germany.  The actions of the Nazis in successfully 
murdering two-thirds of Europe’s Jews have been critically analyzed by historians 
and scholars from a variety of disciplines including economics, psychology, and 
sociology.  In addition, studies of racial supremacy and eugenics dominate the 
literature.  It is well-known that the Nazis were notorious for conducting 
experiments on Jews and unwanted persons: especially Dr. Josef Mengele at 
Auschwitz.12  Some of the authors writing on these topics include Yehuda Bauer, 
                                                          
11 Shmuel Almog, ed., Antisemitism Through the Ages (Oxford: Pergammon Press, 1998), 
Antisemitism in the Modern World: An Anthology of Texts (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1990), 
and Robert S. Wistrich, Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991). 
Among these mentioned, for more general books on anti-Semitism see Ron Rosenbaum, ed., 
Those Who Forget the Past: The Question of Anti-Semitism (New York: Random House, 2004), 
David I. Kertzer, ed., Old Demons, New Debates: Anti-Semitism in the West (Teaneck, NJ: Holmes 
and Meier Publishers, 2005), Michael Fineberg, Shimon Samuels, and Mark Weitzman, eds., 
Antisemitism: The Generic Hatred:  Essay in Memory of Simon Wiesenthal (London: Vallentine 
Mitchell, 2007), and Marvin Perry and Frederick M. Schweitzer, Antisemitism: Myth and Hate 
from Antiquity to the Present (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).  
 
 12 There are many books on Auschwitz, Mengele, Eugenics and Nazi medical 




Hannah Arendt, Israel Gutman, Raul Hilberg, Saul Friedländer, Richard Breitman, 
Omer Bartov, Alan Bullock, George Mosse, Michael R. Marrus, Helmut Krausnick, 
Jackson Spielvogel, Hilary Earl, Michael Wildt, Adam Tooze, Götz Aly, Daniel J. 
Goldhagen, and Christopher Browning.13  This list of authors is incredibly brief but 
                                                          
Cleansing the Fatherland: Nazi Medicine and Racial Hygiene (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1994), Ernst Klee, Auschwitz, die NS-Medizin und ihre Opfer (Frankfurt am 
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of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 1986). For Mengele see John F. Grabowski, Josef Mengele 
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Connection: Eugenics, American Racism, and German National Socialism (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), Michael Burleigh, Death and Deliverance: “Euthanasia” in 
Germany c. 1900-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and Henry Friedlander, 
The Origins of Nazi Genocide:  From Euthanasia to Auschwitz (Chapel Hill and London: The 
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each of their works, plus the writings of countless others, has directly influenced 
this thesis. 
 Central to this dissertation are three themes.  Firstly, this thesis is an analysis 
of motivation.  The key to understanding the connection between Ohlendorf’s 
National Socialist ideology and careerism is exploring his identity as an Alter 
Kämpfer.  Without this important bridge between ideology and career, the 
explanation of why he was so dedicated and why his career was so privileged 
remains superficial and speculative.  The second theme addresses historiographical 
themes of intentionalism and functionalism.  Analyzing Ohlendorf within the context 
of how historians have viewed the implementation of the Holocaust shows how 
scholars have shifted the bulk of responsibility from either Hitler or Germany as a 
whole, to a newer melding of the two positions together.  In other words, the 
polarizing debate over blame for genocide has morphed into a combination of both 
intent and function together.  The final theme addresses Ohlendorf’s level and blame 
and guilt within the context of the SS-Einsatzgruppen Nuremberg Trials.  This theme 
unpacks some critical issues concerning his own defense strategy.  But here, the key 
to better understanding Ohlendorf’s defense, career, ideology, motivation and 
actions are best seen through his identity as an Alter Kämpfer. 
Examining the Sources 
 In general, the most influential set of documents on Ohlendorf is the 
transcript from the trial.  It not only includes Ohlendorf’s own words in the 




tone and emotion from the documents, but also shows how the prosecution, judges 
and fellow defendants reacted to Ohlendorf.  I have relied on the transcripts, films, 
etc. but did so aware of the inherent bias present in court testimony, especially 
testimony where the outcome was the possibility of the death penalty.  There are 
problems that will be addressed later in this paper concerning the trial.  However, 
this part of the source material cannot and should not be ignored.  Much can be 
inferred from carefully listening to courtroom dialogue.  Testimony from the trial, 
coupled with other statements on or by Ohlendorf from different periods of his life 
provides a better understanding of the context of and reasoning behind his 
testimony. 
 Most of the transcripts are available in published books, like John 
Mendelsohn’s Trials of War Criminals, and are on good credible websites like the 
Yale University Lillian Goldman Law Library’s “The Avalon Project, “which cataloged 
the International Military Tribunal records.14 In addition, primary research for this 
dissertation was conducted at the Bundesarchiv Berlin, the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum, the National Archives and Records Administration in College 
Park, MD and in Washington, D.C. 
 Another important set of sources from the Einsatzgruppen Trial are memoirs 
from Chief Judge Michael Musmanno, and Prosecutors Telford Taylor and Whitney 
                                                          
 14 John Mendelsohn, ed., Nuernberg. War Crimes Trials Records of Case 9: United States 
of America v. Otto Ohlendorf et. al (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Special List, 
1978), 3 January, 1946. This source will be hereafter referenced as Mendelsohn, WCT, and the 
page number or date of testimony. “The Avalon Project” Documents in Law, History, and 





Harris, and Benjamin Ferencz, who is still alive today and remains vocal in 
interviews, lectures, public appearances, and on his website.  Memoirs from 
Ohlendorf’s contemporaries are also useful, describing Ohlendorf’s character and 
chronicling his conversations and viewpoints.  Felix Kersten, Himmler’s personal 
physician and masseur, is an example of an insider who knew and frequently 
conversed with Ohlendorf.  Not forgetting the inherent bias in a memoir, Kersten’s 
book is telling of the relationship between Ohlendorf and Himmler.  Kersten 
portrays Ohlendorf as misguided Nazi ideologue with whom Himmler found fault 
thanks to Ohlendorf’s notoriously stubborn, know-it-all personality.   
 I found significant material at the Federal German Archive (Bundesarchiv) in 
Berlin, including Ohlendorf’s personnel files, birth record, assorted papers such as 
awards, official documents from the Economics Ministry, the war department, 
census materials, and medical forms.  Useful materials like his promotion sheets, 
performance evaluations, personally drafted versions of his resumé, and transfer 
requests were all read, translated and utilized for this thesis. All translations of 
primary sources were completed by this author, with frequent questions, 
consultations and cross-checking by my advisor.  This archival trip also proved 
fruitful in obtaining general personnel files, original SS and Nazi party membership 
forms, medals, awards, and honors received, letters written by Jessen on 
Ohlendorf’s behalf, documents in his own handwriting, and many other documents 
in the hundreds, some on microfilm, others available in the original and 





 Through correspondence with archivists at the IFZ-München (Institut für 
Zeitgeschichte, or Institute for Contemporary History), I was able to order a number 
of documents from there.  In particular, a letter from Käthe Ohlendorf to David 
Irving is used extensively throughout the entirety of this dissertation.  However, 
although many of her husband’s personal papers, letters, etc. were bequeathed to 
the IFZ after her death in 1983, there is no index to the entire collection. Searching 
the collection for specific documents is challenging, and I was unable to visit the 
archive.  Until the materials are properly catalogued and linked to their online 
database, searching by document title is the best option.  Nevertheless, the staff 
were helpful and continue to assist with questions concerning their collection of 
Ohlendorf materials. 
 Published primary sources like The Einsatzgruppen Reports and Meldungen 
aus dem Reich were tremendously helpful, translated to English and easily 
navigable.  Robert Gellately’s edited book, based on Dr. Leon Goldensohn’s 
interviews of Ohlendorf in prison, was particularly significant to this study, 
especially the probing questions concerning Ohlendorf’s family and opinion of anti-
Semitism.  His assessment of Ohlendorf’s character is in line with my own findings 
regarding traits present from the beginning to the end of his life.   
Chapter Organization 
Throughout this paper certain themes arise involving Ohlendorf, culpability, 
Nazi Germany and the Holocaust.  Particularly addressed are themes of guilt, justice, 




historiography are extensively analyzed here.  These include careerism, activism, 
academics, Nazi economics, religion, persecution, and, most significantly, National 
Socialist ideology.  A key component to this study is to use certain under-researched 
aspects of Ohlendorf’s life to fill the historiographical gaps.  Ultimately, what I have 
found is that Ohlendorf’s life and career were not only reflective of his identity as an 
ideal Nazi careerist, but that as an Alter Kämpfer, his devotion to National Socialism 
was exponentially more fervent than that of average party members. 
This dissertation is comprised of four major parts, an introduction and 
conclusion, and is chronologically organized.  The following chapter is a 
historiographical analysis.  Aside from what is mentioned here in the introduction, 
this section of the paper focuses on what has been written about Ohlendorf and 
what directly pertains to him.  Analyzed here are the gaps in historiography where 
Ohlendorf’s life and career have either been studied or where there is a need for 
further study.  Questions that are raised in this chapter include: how participation in 
the Holocaust fits into the broader biography of the perpetrator; where in the 
historiography are there gaps in Ohlendorf’s life; what historians say about 
perpetrator intent and motivation; how Ohlendorf’s life and career have been 
interpreted; and how a comprehensive study of Ohlendorf can contribute to a 
greater understanding of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust.  This chapter also 
addresses the important intentionalist/functionalist debate in historiography which 





Chapter three is an analysis of Ohlendorf’s early life and career and how it 
was driven by his dedication to National Socialist ideology.  Chronicling Ohlendorf’s 
life and career, some of the main parts discussed are his upbringing and education, 
the solidification of his commitment to National Socialism, his Alter Kämpfer loyalty 
and dedication, his law career, his period in academia, career change to the SD 
(Sicherheitsdienst) which morphed into the RSHA (Reichsicherheitshauptamt), and 
then there is a break in the chronology: Ohlendorf’s transfer to the Einsatzgruppen.  
It was necessary to create a continuous career flow for Ohlendorf and to do so, 
removing the Einsatzgruppen section created its own chapter.  Although I argue this 
part of his career was crucial to his meteoric ascension up the party ranks, 
Ohlendorf himself described it as a blemish on his record, which is why it is 
separate.  This is most likely because it was the only part of his career in which he 
was held accountable for genocide.  Lastly discussed is his post-Einsatzgruppen 
career in the Reich until the surrender. 
What this section does is point to important aspects National Socialist 
ideology, Ohlendorf’s professional successes as a result of his transfer to the 
Einsatzgruppen in the Ukraine, and his alleged reluctance to be transferred.  Also 
analyzed are Ohlendorf’s view of the middle class (Mittelstand), where he broke 
away from the party by taking the interest of the middle-class very seriously as 
central to German society, a position that clashed with the realities of the Nazi 
system.  This is an indicator of his different interpretation of National Socialist 
ideology.  He had a sort of populist vision for German society that focused on 




direct say in how the country was run.  Significantly, Ohlendorf demonstrated 
opposition to his fellow Nazis, especially Himmler, in a very indirect way: through 
the details of the public opinion reports and by secretly designing a post-war 
economic recovery plan with a new government.  The larger implications of this 
show that he was not necessarily ideologically aligned with the Nazi party platform, 
that he lost faith in the success of the Nazi regime, and that despite his arrogance to 
challenge Himmler on many issues his status as an Alter Kämpfer prevented his 
reprimand.  The most important question addressed in this chapter deals with 
Ohlendorf’s personality.  If he and Himmler had such a personal feud, why was he 
never fired?  Instead, Ohlendorf’s career thrived.  He was an important figure in the 
Reich and the quintessential example of his generation of highly educated activist 
reformers whom the Nazis employed.  Ohlendorf shared many characteristics with 
highly educated men of his generation who became leaders of RSHA sections or 
were sent to the front to serve as Einsatzgruppen commanders and deputies. 
Chapter four deals solely with the Einsatzgruppen.  Discussed here are the 
motivations and reasons surrounding Ohlendorf’s transfer to a leadership position 
with Einsatzgruppe D.  While on trial, Ohlendorf continually stated he was opposed 
to the transfer and that Himmler was treating him unfairly.  This cannot really be 
proven without a doubt, although it can be assumed there is some truth to his 
objections. Notions of Blutkitt (blood cement), or implicating officials in the crimes 
of the Nazis by inducing them to participate, underlay attempts to manipulate men 
like Ohlendorf into accepting that enacting mass murder was part of the Nazi career 




people.  How does a man go from being an academic who criticized the Reich for not 
being more purist in ideology to become a mass murderer?  Although Ohlendorf was 
allegedly hesitant to accept this position, he performed his duties with the same 
fervor, efficiency, and distinction as his Reich desk job.  Interesting to this section, 
despite enacting mass murder, Ohlendorf was sure to take care of his “soldiers” and 
ensure that their mental health was his priority.  In other words, the psychological 
effect of performing murder was the chief concern of Ohlendorf, and he made sure 
to testify to this. He was never sorry for these tasks or for this career path. 
Chapter five begins with Ohlendorf’s surrender, leading to the trial.  This 
section deals with the issues surrounding how Ohlendorf became the lead witness in 
the second set of Nuremberg trials, also known as the Einsatzgruppen Trials or Case 
9: The United States of American v. Otto Ohlendorf, et al.  When Ohlendorf was 
captured, he thought his captors wanted inside information on the Reich that he 
could provide.  What he did not expect was that, true to his personality, known for 
frankness and insufferable honesty, he would divulge so much information that 
eventually it came out that he was an Einsatzgruppen leader. When pressed and 
interrogated, Ohlendorf, matter-of-factly, admitted involvement in the mass murder 
of 90,000 Jews and partisans.  In addition to the trial, Ohlendorf’s appeals process is 
briefly mentioned, along with the idea that he should be tried as part of the 
Wehrmacht, and not as a war criminal.  During the trial, he used this as a defense 
strategy, but this argument has some validity because the Einsatzgruppen were 
mobile killing units, sent in after the invasion of Russia, and were attached to army 




process by and in which many of the Nuremberg perpetrators were tried.  Ohlendorf 
was sentenced to death and his sentence was upheld until after his execution in 
1951.  Most other perpetrators on trial had their sentences commuted.  The politics 
of the Cold War helped influence the decision of the court to uphold Ohlendorf’s 
death by hanging.  
This dissertation details the life and career of Otto Ohlendorf with the goal of 
beginning a more comprehensive biography than previously compiled.  It is just a 
beginning because much more research needs to be conducted in order to create the 
best working biography possible.  Why is studying Ohlendorf important?  It 
demonstrates not only usual trends in the scholarship of Nazi Germany and the 
Holocaust such as perpetrator motivation, but his life also shows a high level of 
dedication to National Socialism as an ideology.  He became an alleged “unwilling” 
perpetrator with the Einsatzgruppen, but nevertheless performed his tasks and was 
able tried to justify the murder of more than 90,000 people, as a loyalist Alter 
Kämpfer.  How could a person of apparently intellect become a mass murderer?  
Outside of the activities of the Einsatzgruppen, Ohlendorf contributed much to 
securing the future of German recovery and success by advocating for middle class 
reform.  He was a reformer and outspoken, probably insufferable, critic of the Nazi 
party and really thought he could fix the problem by addressing issues that were 
significant to the German public.   
Unfortunately, Ohlendorf’s idealistic, purist views of National Socialism were 
a disappointment. He realized he could affect little in terms of party politics.  In fact, 




careers as activist reformers. Whatever good he did for the German economy is 
negated in history because he chose to accept being transferred to the 
Einsatzgruppen and chose to implement the murderous racial policies of the Third 
Reich.  Without excusing these atrocities in any way, this paper intends to 
incorporate more than the heinous parts of his life and career into a singular 
narrative, one that places National Socialist devotion at the center of Ohlendorf’s 




































Chapter 2:  
Ohlendorf and Historiographical Debates 
 
Introduction 
 There are many difficulties in writing a comprehensive analysis of Otto 
Ohlendorf’s life, and few attempts have been made.  This chapter provides an 
overview of what others have written about Ohlendorf’s career outside of the 
Nuremberg Einsatzgruppen trial.  Looking at his life in its entirety shows how 
significant National Socialist ideology was in his career.  At each point in his career, 
Ohlendorf strove to outperform his colleagues, and at times, held them directly 
accountable to the Nazi belief system.  The most condemnable phase in Ohlendorf’s 
activist career was his tenure with the Einsatzgruppen, during which, under his 
command, 90,000 Jews and partisans were murdered.  Even when he directly 
commanded genocide, he performed with the same dedication to National Socialist 
ideology as in all other phases of his career.  Ohlendorf certainly did not foresee 
having to pay for these horrendous crimes with his life.  Even then, though with 
alleged reluctance, he performed his duties with complete fidelity to National 
Socialism.  His activities as Einsatzgruppen commander have yielded the greatest 
volume of analysis on Ohlendorf, and rightfully so.  However, certain points in his 
career have been under-analyzed.  Searching for a more comprehensive study of 
Ohlendorf’s career, as a whole, demonstrates that there is a need for the 
historiography to better tie his Holocaust perpetration to his work in academia, in 




(Reichsicherheitshauptamt, or Reich Security Main Office).  There is no disconnect 
between the phases of his career, and analyzing them together demonstrates that 
the one most significant aspect of his life that transcended his career, personality 
and life is his devotion to National Socialism.  He was, without question, and 
certainly in his mind, the keeper of the Holy Grail of Nazi ideology.  
 There are three parts to this chapter.  Presented firstly is an analysis of Otto 
Ohlendorf in a historiographical context.  The various parts of his life and career 
together gives us something new: insight on the influence of being an Alter Kämpfer, 
how careerism drove Ohlendorf to become responsible for genocide, and how he 
questioned the conduct of the Nazi party and the ideology of National Socialism.  
The analysis follows particular phases in his life and career.  Most of these phases 
have been under-researched, with the exception of the Nuremberg Trials.  The 
objective is to look at Ohlendorf’s life in a more complete way, seeing what parts of 
his career demand further exploration by scholars and why.  Particular questions 
arise in the historiography, mostly concerning gaps in scholarship:  Why has no one 
written a real, complete biography of Ohlendorf?  Are there inadequate, inaccessible 
or possibly destroyed primary sources that cannot be looked at?  What can be 
learned from his academic career?  How does that apply to intellectual trends in the 
Reich? Why is there so little written about the public opinion reports?  Is what 
historians know about Ohlendorf too much based of what he said at Nuremberg and 
in captivity?  Is it meaningful to look merely at the deeds of a perpetrator rather 
than the whole picture and life of a person?  These, and other questions, are what 




historiography of Ohlendorf and to place a study of his life and career into the scope 
of the so-called “intentionalist/functionalist debate.” 
 The second part addresses the historian Daniel J. Goldhagen and the 
intentionalist/functionalist debates.  These important historiographical debates 
sparked a feud in the field of Nazi Germany and Holocaust studies in which 
historians took sides over to specific issues:  whether the Germans who committed 
Holocaust atrocities were “ordinary” or if they were “willing executioners.”  Another 
key issue is the question as to whether a Führerbefehl, or Führer Order, existed: that 
is, a direct order, coming from Hitler, to murder the Jews.  Historians disagree about 
its issuance and timing, implementation, directives, and, for some, whether it existed 
at all.  Because these issues dominate the historiography, this analysis attempts to 
summarize and highlight particular points and relate them to Ohlendorf, asking 
important questions regarding improvised Einsatzgruppen killings, motivations, and 
intent.  What I am looking for are places, and directives, where Ohlendorf, and the 
other Einsatzgruppen leaders, used improvisational tactics to conduct mass murder.  
They were not given a handbook as to how to murder en masse.  There were general 
methods followed but Ohlendorf had to adapt to a variety of conditions, including 
changing local police forces, population numbers, location of the executions, etc.  
Shown in this section is how his Einsatzgruppen acted independently, without 
specific directives, regarding how genocide was carried out; especially Ohlendorf’s 
objection to the use of gas vans as an execution tool. 
Ironically as an undergraduate, Goldhagen wrote a significant study of 




critically acclaimed, but also reviled, book.15  Goldhagen’s work has been widely 
condemned by historians as ahistorical.  One of his central ideas is that over 
centuries, Germany bred a specific kind of “eliminationist anti-Semitism” that 
eventually led to their willingness to participate in the Holocaust.16  Fitting an 
Ohlendorf-specific historiography into the existing general debate demonstrates 
how a participant in genocide committed crimes because of his careerist nature, 
dedication to National Socialist ideology, and how important was the loyalty of a 
Nazi Alter Kämpfer.  Although he was unquestionably anti-Semitic, Ohlendorf’s 
professional goal was not to become a direct perpetrator of genocide.  But he 
became exactly that, and his privileged Alter Kämpfer status bound him to the party 
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(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). 
 
 16 Please note that this is only one of Goldhagen’s debatable arguments, as there are so 
many in his writings regarding his attempt to explain German hatred for the Jews in 
metaphysical terms, his Zionist sympathies, etc. There are numerous scholarly criticisms and 
reviews written about Goldhagen’s Willing Executioners. Some of these are Yehuda Bauer, "On 
Perpetrators of the Holocaust and the Public Discourse," The Jewish Quarterly Review 87, no. ¾: 
1997, 343-50, Christopher R. Browning, "Daniel Goldhagen's Willing Executioners," History and 
Memory 8, no. 1:1996, 88-108, Bernard Rieger, "'Daniel in the Lion's Den?' The German Debate 
about Goldhagen's "Hitler's Willing Executioners,”” History Workshop Journal, no. 43: 1997, 226-
33, Robert Gellately, “Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, by 
Daniel J. Goldhagen,” The Journal of Modern History 69, no. 1: 1997, 187-91, Henry Friedlander, 
“Hitler’s Willing Executioners:  Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust,” German Studies Review 
19, no. 3: 1996, 578-80. Other examples of related works are Geoff Eley, ed., The Goldhagen 
Effect: History, Memory, Nazism, and Facing the German Past (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2000), Norman G. Finkelstein and Ruth Bettina Bird,  A Nation On Trial:  The 
Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1998, F. H. Littell, ed., 
Hyping the Holocaust: Scholars Answer Goldhagen (East Rockaway, NY:  Cummings and 
Hathaway, Inc.) 1997, Dieter Pohl, Die Holocaust- Forschung und Goldhagens Thesen 
(Muenchen: Oldenbourg, 1997), and Normal Finkelstein, “Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s ‘Crazy’ 
Thesis: A Critique of Hitler’s Willing Executioners,” New Left Republic, 1997, 39-88. For examples 
of Goldhagen’s response to criticism see www.goldhagen.com , “Das Versagen der Kritiker’, Die 
Zeit, 2 August 1996, “Motives, Causes and Alibis:  A Reply to My Critics, The New Republic, 




with loyalty.  His reluctance to participate in the killings themselves demonstrates a 
commitment to what he thought was the correct version of National Socialist 
ideology: one where he should not have to be a killer to be a successful Nazi.  
Therefore, he was not born and bred an “eliminationist anti-Semite.”  There is a 
difference. 
Trying to build a foundation from which to study Ohlendorf’s life and career 
proves difficult as the source material available is barely adequate.  If a historian can 
access all of the known surviving documents related to Ohlendorf professional and 
personal life, perhaps then every question can be answered.  The resources accessed 
for the writing of this paper are nonetheless sufficient to draw particular 
conclusions about Ohlendorf’s general thoughts, ideas and perceptions of Nazi 
Germany and the Holocaust.   I will attempt to fill the gaps in the historiography on 
Ohlendorf in this thesis.  Finally, looking at Ohlendorf and the general questions of 
the historiographical debates points to the need for more individual case-studies to 
add to the discussion of perpetrator motivations, lives, careers, and their individual 
roles in Nazi Germany and the Holocaust. 
Historiography of Ohlendorf 
 Deficiencies in scholarship are seen in the literature concerning various 
phases of Ohlendorf’s career.  Firstly, his early years in academia, when he earned a 
degree in jurisprudence, studied Fascism at the University of Pavia, and returned to 
the district court in Hildesheim where he was a practicing lawyer, are an 




academic and future member of the resistance, and two separate university jobs, in 
which he lectured and devised policies regarding middle class economics.17  Little 
has been written about this early phase and if more primary source materials were 
available, they might be able to address significant issues concerning his criticism of 
Hitler’s economic policies, his desire to create a National Socialist utopia, and how 
Fascism played a tremendous role in Ohlendorf’s belief system.  Unfortunately for 
Ohlendorf and the world, his career in academia was cut short. 
 The next phase of his life is in the RSHA, where he was head of AMT III (SD- 
Inland).  Here he set out to “remold the SD into the organization he had thought he 
was joining; he almost singlehandedly built the SD into an efficient and 
comprehensive information gathering organization.”18  He did exactly that, at the 
                                                          
17 Although there has not been much, at least not in English, written on the life of 
Jessen, there are some important facts compiled here and more will be addressed and cited 
later in this essay. Jens Peter Jessen was an academic, economist, professor of Political Science, 
and affiliated with both the Universities of Kiel and Berlin where he led Ohlendorf to attempt to 
create a national German institute for economics. Ohlendorf and her shared the same economic 
vision, beliefs in National Socialism and eventually parted ways because of Jessen’s radical 
affiliation with the Berlin Mittwochsgesellschaft (or Wednesday Society) where intellectual 
opponents of the Reich would meet. Most of the 20 July Plot (or Operation Valkyrie) 
perpetrators and supporters were members of this club. Jessen also was the head of the 
economic section of the Akademie für Deutsches Recht (German Law) who was strongly 
associated with National Socialist ideology. As the war drew nearer, the Nazis acquired more 
power, and persecuted academics, Jessen became a fervent opponent of National Socialism and 
the Nazi Party. More on Jessen and his relationship with Ohlendorf is discussed in this chapter, 
but the majority is in the life and career section of this essay. For more on Jessen’s economic 
affiliations see Keith Tribe, Strategies of Economic Order:  German Economic Discourse, 1750-
1950 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1995), Gerald D. Feldman, Allianz and the 
German Insurance Business, 1933-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Also, 
this website is for the German Memorial Resistance Center and has a small biography of Jessen 
http://www.gdw-berlin.de/en/recess/biographies/index_of_persons/biographie/view-bio/jens-
jessen/?no_cache=1.    
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behest of Himmler.  Ohlendorf’s “opinion reports” were designed to gather 
information on various aspects of German life and report back to the Reich to offer 
criticism and ways in which to fix problems in Germany, with particular care given 
to economics.  This phase lasted, on and off, until June 1941, when he was 
transferred to the Einsatzgruppen because of alleged ideological feuds with Himmler 
and Heydrich.  
 The Einsatzgruppen phase has been recently explored by scholars of history, 
sociology, and the Holocaust.  Ohlendorf’s careerist nature led him to order and 
oversee the efficient extermination of 90,000 Jews and partisans.  Although he 
claimed to have been forcibly transferred, stating many times at the trial that he 
disapproved of these actions, he met his task with the same brutal efficiency as in 
any other phase of his career.  Most of the scholarship dealing with Ohlendorf and 
the Einsatzgruppen tries to answer the question as to how an academic, a man of 
intellect, could condone the murder of 90,000 innocent civilians.  
 After his year in the Einsatzgruppen, Ohlendorf returned to the RSHA and 
again excelled at his career.  He was successful in creating economic plans for the 
phase after Nazi victory, was promoted several times, and finally asked to join the 
Dönitz cabinet in Flensburg.19  Here, he surrendered to the Allies, thinking he would 
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members, and other high-ranking Nazi officials like Himmler and Ohlendorf, fled to Flensburg, 
Germany on the Danish border. This government only lasted three weeks until May 23, 1945. 
For more information on the Flensburg government see Albert Speer, Spandau (New York: 
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Nazi Germany as Revealed Through the Testimony at Nuremberg (Westport, CT: Greenwood 




be given clemency because of his work in intelligence in the Reich.  The information 
he provided to the British was enough to call a set of Nuremberg war crimes trials 
called the Einsatzgruppen case.   
 Clearly, the trial period has been the most studied of all the phases of 
Ohlendorf’s life, leaving his professional successes to fade with history.  The 
testimony Ohlendorf gave in captivity and at the trial serves as the most easily 
accessible and largest quantity of primary source documentation on Ohlendorf’s life, 
imprisonment, and death.  Throughout each phase of his career, the same drive and 
motivation is always present.  Ultimately, his devotion to National Socialist 
principles led him to command mass murder.  Ironically to him, these actions would 
lead to his own hanging.  It is important to remain aware of the achievements and 
gaps in the historiography while seeking a better understanding of World War II, 
Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, how the Nazi party operated, the lack of 
uniformity in National Socialist ideology, the privileged position of Alte Kämpfer, the 
role of the Einsatzgruppen in the Holocaust, and Ohlendorf’s contribution. 
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 There is little written about Ohlendorf’s early life, aside from his affidavits 
and testimony.  Some scholars have been able to piece together facts about 
Ohlendorf’s upbringing and early party involvement but there is no monograph on 
his life.  Hilary Earl’s work on the Einsatzgruppen trials has produced some of the 
most comprehensive surveys of his life and work, with emphasis on the trial.20  In 
her works she points out that his personality shaped the nature of the trial and that 
as key defendant, he revealed how Nazi ideology was manifested in the activities of 
the Einsatzgruppen.  Her studies are significant and important in analyzing the 
motivations of war criminals and the ways that National Socialists framed their 
justification for conducting genocide.  This thesis aligns with Earl’s conclusions that 
                                                          
20 Earl’s most recent work is The Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial, 1945-1958: 
Atrocity, Law and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) where she embarks on 
a lengthy analysis of this particular trial, the defendants, judgments and aftermath. This book is 
significant in relation to studies of the more well-known Nuremberg Trials, where the 24 
defendants were all perpetrators, intellectuals, and Reich devotees. Earl has basically done the 
laborious task of accumulating and analyzing all aspects of this particular trial. Prior work Earl 
has done includes “Scales of Justice: History, Testimony and the Einsatzgruppen Trial,” in Jeffry 
Diefendorf, ed. Lesson and Legacies VI, New Currents in Holocaust Research, 325-351 (Evanston, 
ILL: Northwestern University Press, 2004), where she analyzes the validity of Ohlendorf’s 
testimony. “Biographical Method and Historical Analysis: Explaining Perpetrators’ ‘Route to 
Crime’ using War Crimes Documentation,” in Simone Lässig and Volker Berghahn (eds.) 
Biography Between Structure and Agency: Approaches to German History, 162-181 (New York: 
Berghahn Books and Oxford University Press, 2008). Here she discusses how testimony reveals 
particular similarities in the character and personalities of the accused. “Confessions of Wrong-
doing of How to Save Yourself from the Hangman? An Analysis of British and American 
Intelligence Reports of the Activities of Otto Ohlendorf, May-December 1945,” in David Bankier, 
ed. Secret intelligence and the Holocaust, 301-326 (New York and Jerusalem: Yad Vashem and 
Enigma Books, 2006). Each piece that Earl has done provides more insight into Ohlendorf’s 
actions, activity in the Einsatzgruppen, and through testimony and trial records, makes 
important connections about how Ohlendorf’s Nazi ideology never waned from his early life to 





Ohlendorf’s trial testimony provided important insights into his transformation 
from National Socialist ideologue to mass murderer and this reveals how the Nazis 
manipulated even the most intelligent Germans into “effective instruments” of 
genocidal policy.21 
 Dr. Leon Goldensohn’s post-war interviews with Ohlendorf serve to fill in 
some gaps in his upbringing, National Socialist ideology, and anti-Semitic beliefs.22  
He served as prison psychiatrist at Landsberg and used a gentle approach to try and 
understand the “pathology” of the Nazi war criminals and was interested in 
analyzing their “depravities.”23  Noting that the persons interviewed were either on 
trial, about to be, or had been already sentenced, Goldensohn attempted to coax 
Nazis like Ohlendorf to reveal character traits, details that he used to write 
character assessments.  About Ohlendorf he made the general observation that “he 
tends to speak precisely, but his manner is of a man who is expected to be insulted 
at any moment and is being defensive about it.”24  He delved into Ohlendorf’s 
upbringing, family, education, views on anti-Semitism, and religion.  The importance 
of this work is that it is a biographical sketch of Ohlendorf, including his own words 
as analyzed from a psychological and moral standpoint.   
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 Another valuable work on Ohlendorf’s early life is from an unpublished 
honors thesis written by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen.25  Prior to his monumental study 
of perpetrator motivations, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, Goldhagen’s thesis, “The 
‘Humanist,’” draws on significant trends in Ohlendorf life.  He includes a biography, 
analysis of motivation and Nazi ideology, and Ohlendorf’s weltanschauung (or world 
view).  The evidence he utilized is the most noteworthy part of his paper, drawing 
on the interviews, private letters and documents provided by Ohlendorf’s widow, 
Käthe Ohlendorf.  In addition to archive research, Goldhagen’s father Erich 
personally interviewed Mrs. Ohlendorf and acquired privileged primary source 
documentation, most of which were her husband’s papers.26 Daniel Goldhagen’s 
thesis serves as a significant study on Ohlendorf’s life, National Socialist philosophy, 
and anti-Semitic ideology. 
 Cited in the vast majority of works written about any phase in Ohlendorf’s 
life and career is Heinz Höhne’s Order of Death’s Head.27  Höhne, like Goldhagen’s 
father, conducted interviews and acquired copies of personal documents, including 
private letters, from Mrs. Ohlendorf.  He was a German historian specializing in the 
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Schutzstaffel (SS), of which Ohlendorf was a member.  His book analyzed not only 
trial documents, but also these personal documents and reveals that the SS was not 
an organization that ran with military precision.  In fact, he discussed Ohlendorf’s 
life and career in the SS as problematic, pointing out that his utopian visions of the 
party were “shattered” when he joined their ranks and that he concluded that their 
version of National Socialism was faulty.28  Höhne was sympathetic to Ohlendorf, 
pointing out that at each phase of his Nazi career, he was constantly disappointed, 
especially in his feud with SS-Reichsführer Himmler.  Höhne’s work is frequently 
referenced in works on Nazi Germany and the Holocaust for analyzing people like 
Ohlendorf who, he argued, ended up buying into a flawed ideology. 
 There is a consensus in describing Ohlendorf as straightforward, contentious 
when questioned, careerist, professional, intellectual, and a Nazi ideologue.  The 
common thread in all of the secondary literature on Ohlendorf is the question of 
how someone with apparent intellect became a mass murderer.  This dissertation 
cannot definitively answer the question, but his intellectual prowess is beyond 
question.  However, utilizing his loyalty and Alter Kämpfer status as a thread 
connecting all phases of his life and career brings a better understanding of why he 
participated in genocide.  Further analyzing Ohlendorf’s early life may shed more 
light on his anti-Semitic tendencies, elucidating whether he was a violently anti-
Semitic from his upbringing as Goldhagen asserts.  The scholarship has most 
recently turned to analyzing Ohlendorf in the context of his generation of Nazis.   
                                                          




 In his early life, Ohlendorf was not self-grooming for a career in the Nazi 
government.  Ohlendorf was an academic who studied Fascism in Italy and assumed 
important roles at the University of Kiel and in the establishment of the Center for 
Applied Economics in Berlin.  He was associated with Dr. Jens Jessen, most known 
for his association with Operation Valkyrie, and together they attempted to create a 
National Center for Economics.  There is little written about Ohlendorf as an 
academic and what has been done is basically chronicling his career, derived from 
his own statements in captivity.  He was associated with economic theories that 
were not in line with Nazi economic policy.  Earl touches upon this part of 
Ohlendorf’s life, and Höhne mentioned how Jessen helped with Ohlendorf’s 
academic career and induced him to join the Sicherheitsdienst (SD).29 However, 
there needs to be a major undertaking that analyzes Ohlendorf in the larger realm of 
academics in the early Third Reich.  Much has been written about the persecution of 
academics and 1944 some of them plotted against the Reich in Operation Valkyrie.30  
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In these works, nearly nothing is written of Ohlendorf, nor have his lectures or 
speeches while in academia been studied in any depth.  Conceivably, if documents 
exist, they may reveal whether Ohlendorf was directly associated with any anti-
Third Reich rhetoric. 
 Already written are a wealth of analyses concerning the economics of Nazi 
Germany.  Götz Aly’s Hitler’s Beneficiaries, is an excellent study of how the Nazi 
economy was run.  He argues that the Holocaust and the war together fueled the 
German economy through the war years.31  He delves into important connections 
between the Volksgemeinschaft ideology, Nazi philosophy and anti-Semitism, the 
economy and ultimately, the collapse of Nazi Germany.  Aly’s focus is on the Nazi 
campaign of theft.  The Holocaust and German occupation of land, which provided 
money, slave labor, booty, and plunder of valuables and property through taxation. 
This increased German wealth and stimulated the German economy.   
In addition, Adam Tooze’s Wages of Destruction also offers insight into the 
Nazi economy by arguing that Germany made itself into an industrial power, only to 
be challenged by the United States during the war, and did so by involving large-
scale corporations in the plan to invade the Soviet Union.32Ironically, expanding the 
war into the Soviet Union for raw materials cost Germany the war, not because they 
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were lacking in manpower, but because their lack of raw materials meant that they 
could not sustain the Eastern Front.33  Germany underestimated the strength of 
Soviet resistance to their invasion and could not produce enough munitions to fight 
longer.  Also, these two works critically analyze the role of corporations not only in 
Nazi economic policy, but in their philosophy of expansion, shedding new light onto 
a badly functioning Nazi government: one where corruption was rampant.  In 
Tooze’s estimation, racial policy was inseparable from the goals of World War II 
German aggression. 
 Ohlendorf, however, is scarcely written about as an economic functionary.  
Ludolf Herbst’s Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft (The Total War and 
Order of the Economy) offers a broad analysis of the war and Germany’s post-war 
economic plans.34  Included here is one of the few analyses that discussed 
Ohlendorf’s economic plans, noting that he and Speer had major ideological 
differences concerning production and cooperation with big businesses.  In addition, 
Herbst argued that the Nazis had no clear economic goal for the public could 
support.35  In Der Totale Krieg¸ Herbst provided a brief analysis of Ohlendorf’s life 
and analyzed his work on the political economy, something scarcely studied since.  
This work, along with Hanno Sowade’s “Otto Ohlendorf: Non-Conformist,” focused 
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on Ohlendorf’s criticism of the Nazi economy and his espousal, from early in his 
academic career, of a strategy of economic growth centered around small and 
medium-sized enterprises.36 
 Hanno Sowade took much of Herbst’s work on Ohlendorf and the economy 
and placed it in the context of his early academic efforts, arguing that Ohlendorf won 
the support of trade unions and the middle class by openly favoring the “lofty 
promises the regime had made to the middle class when it seized power,” promises 
that the Nazi regime  had reneged on.37  According to Sowade, the primary 
beneficiaries of Nazi policies were war manufacturers like Daimler-Benz.38  
Ohlendorf continually criticized corporate self-interest and recommended 
reforming the distribution of consumer goods, thus promoting prosperity for the 
Volksgemeinschaft (people’s community).39  It was well-known to Ohlendorf that 
people like Hermann Göring were conspicuously profiting from rebuilding the 
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economy, reaping growing profits during the war, and taking  bribes from certain 
corporations to increase their personal wealth.40 
 Where the scholarship has most recently trended is in studying Ohlendorf’s 
generation of Nazis.  In addition to Goldhagen, Earl, and Höhne, Michael Wildt’s An 
Uncompromising Generation details how Ohlendorf and his contemporaries in the 
RSHA were defined by the Great War: they lived through defeat, humiliation, 
Weimar, and post-war economic ruin.  Thus, the time period of his upbringing 
defined his career and willingness to submit to a Nazi belief system.41  Germany’s 
circumstances bred a culture of vengeance intent on overthrowing the Treaty of 
Versailles.  Ohlendorf and his contemporaries joined the party and found positions 
in the Nazi government in order to be a direct part of policymaking and change for 
Germany.  Wildt’s Generation shows an important comprehensive approach to 
studying Ohlendorf as part of a whole group of like-minded Nazi intellectuals.  
Rather than attempting to point to Ohlendorf as a singular agent of Nazi crimes, 
analyzing the environment in which he and his contemporaries were raised and 
their belief system demonstrates how Nazi culture, ideology and practice were 
fueled by Germany’s defeat in the Great War. 
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 Like Wildt, Christian Ingrao’s Believe and Destroy gives more of an in-depth 
analysis of the generational challenges facing Ohlendorf, and the Einsatzgruppen 
leaders, studying eighty German educated people who mostly ended up serving in 
the Reich and became perpetrators in the Holocaust.42  Similar to Wildt, Ingrao 
reinterprets the motivations of the Einsatzgruppen in light of how men like 
Ohlendorf were raised, educated, and their career paths, saying he has “tried to 
understand how these men came to believe [sic], and how their beliefs led them to 
destroy [sic].”43 He and Wildt, together, provide analytical data that shows most of 
the SS, SD, RSHA, and Einsatzgruppen leaders were somehow molded into 
perpetrators of the Holocaust by so deeply believing in Nazi ideology.  Ingrao’s book 
shows that Nazi activism was a result of the conditions under which Ohlendorf, and 
others, were raised and educated, and argues that this activism gave the 
perpetrators of the Holocaust a “soothing system of beliefs.”44  Where Ingrao goes 
beyond Wildt’s analytical scope is in part three of his book.  He critically analyzes 
justifications for war and genocide by tying together Ohlendorf’s National Socialist 
ideology and how that manifested in the murder of 90,000 people.  This thesis 
attempts to contextualize some of the same major themes undertaken by Ingrao and 
Wildt and apply them, in a larger scope, to Ohlendorf’s life, career, and belief system. 
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 Arthur L. Smith explored another under-researched aspect of Ohlendorf’s 
life: the Meldungen (public opinion reports).45  A major part of Ohlendorf’s career in 
the SD, then in the RSHA, was to collect intelligence reports and conduct public 
opinion polls on a variety of issues in Germany.  The Meldungen aus dem Reich, as 
they are called, were carefully conducted surveys of regular German people’s 
opinions on propaganda, economics, war, newspapers, general sentiments, and a 
myriad of other aspects of everyday life in Germany.46  These reports were created 
by Ohlendorf, with a hand-picked, large staff.  Data was collected by informants, who 
had Reich security clearances, and statistics were compiled and sent to Ohlendorf’s 
superior, namely Himmler.  Smith argued that these reports contained important 
information vital to the survival of the Reich.  Often, Ohlendorf was chastised 
because the reports were negative and criticized many aspects of Hitler and the 
Reich.  Ohlendorf’s reputation for thorough and honest work upset Himmler to the 
point where he refused to allow Hitler to see the reports and disbanded the 
Meldungen completely by 20 July 1944, the day of Operation Valkyrie.47  There is 
certainly a need for more study to be conducted on the impact and results of 
Ohlendorf’s reports. 
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 Ohlendorf’s time with the Einsatzgruppen has been widely studied, but 
mostly in general terms.  Richard Rhodes’s Masters of Death is an excellent study of 
the development and function of the Einsatzgruppen and how they were generally 
made up of “ordinary” Germans who enacted mass murder.48  By “ordinary,” Rhodes 
does not mean average citizens forced to participate in murder, but rather recruits 
whose occupational and economic background was “ordinary,” rather than that of 
trained, highly specialized killers.  He argues that local groups were instrumental in 
exterminating the Jews and that the genocidal actions on the Eastern Front 
facilitated the creation of extermination camps.49  Another book significant to the 
study of Ohlendorf in the Einsatzgruppen is the Einsatzgruppen Reports, or 
Operational Situational Reports, USSR.50  These reports were dispatched from the 
Einsatzgruppen back to Berlin with details concerning the date, place, division, 
number of people executed with a breakdown according to gender, race, religion, 
ethnicity, and sometimes age.  Compiled in this work are not only statistics from 
Ohlendorf’s Einsatzgruppen (and the other divisions as well), but the editors offer 
commentary on discrepancies and accuracy of figures reported.  These reports were 
the basis for the Einsatzgruppen trial. 
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 In addition to Ingrao, Höhne, and Earl’s extensive work on piecing together 
Ohlendorf’s life in general, there are significant sections of their books that focus on 
Ohlendorf’s role in carrying out the executions.  A recurring theme in these studies 
concerns the issue of Ohlendorf’s transfer.  According to his Nuremberg testimony, 
he twice refused to be transferred to the front but capitulated because of personal 
pressure from Heydrich and Himmler.  Also addressed are issues concerning the 
process by which an educated person like Ohlendorf became a mass murderer.  
Wildt and Ingrao analyze this extensively, discussing the culture of Nazi activism in 
Ohlendorf’s generation of Nazi officials. 
 There are numerous volumes and articles written about the Einsatzgruppen, 
too many to mention them all, and others are specifically referred to in other 
sections of this dissertation.  In addition to what has already been referenced, 
Roland Headland’s Messages of Murder further addresses key issues with the reports 
in a significant study of the Einsatzgruppen.51  French MacLean’s The Field Men, 
offers an excellent analysis of the Einsatzgruppen and demonstrates a thorough 
statistical analysis of the Einsatzkommandos and their work in the Soviet Union.52  
Many different studies have shown novel analyses of perpetrators, directives, and 
the activities of the Einsatzgruppen.  The only thing lacking is a complete biography 
of Ohlendorf.   
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 Andrej Angrick recently published the first work that examines, in its 
entirety and completely, the activities of Einsatzgruppe D and its leader, Otto 
Ohlendorf.53  So far, his book stands alone as the foundational study of the Holocaust 
in the Ukraine and explores Ohlendorf’s role in the indoctrination of his “soldiers,” 
which centered on the proposition that the survival of Germany was dependent on 
the extermination of men, women, and children.  Additionally, he argues that there 
was a communication breakdown between the Einsatzgruppen and the Reich and 
that most of the killings they performed were improvised.  All of the work Angrick 
has painstakingly compiled is of the utmost significance to this study and future 
studies regarding perpetration, the Holocaust, Nazi policies and bureaucracy, and 
Ohlendorf.54  His study reveals that “ordinary Germans” became perpetrators in the 
Holocaust through improvisational killings.  This confirms what has been written 
about the atrocities committed in other Einsatzgruppen, for instance Einsatzgruppe 
C’s massacre at Babi Yar.55  
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 The historiography of Ohlendorf and the trial is almost as extensive as the 
work done on the Einsatzgruppen’s reign of terror.  Telford Taylor, Chief prosecutor 
at the first set of Nuremberg trials, Benjamin Ferencz, Chief prosecutor at the 
Einsatzgruppen Trial, and Chief Justice of the Einsatzgruppen Trial, Michael 
Musmanno, have all written excellent analyses of trial procedures, defense 
strategies, contemporary issues in law and justice, and about the character of 
Ohlendorf.56  Much of the literature trends with Earl who, in her analysis of the 
Ohlendorf case, has reevaluated the procedures and process of the trial and 
conviction of the Einsatzgruppen perpetrators, finding that this trial was both too 
reliant on Ohlendorf’s so-called “truth telling” and on the political climate of the 
Cold War.  Earl addresses important questions relating to U.S.- German relations in 
the post-war era, with particular emphasis on how the impending Cold War 
impacted the outcome of the trials.  She analyzes how sentences were carried out, 
commuted, overturned, and how some of the convicted were altogether freed of 
responsibility because there was a strong German contingent in society who backed 
the perpetrators.  Thus, the American captors and adjutants were pressured into 
both being lenient and strict with their punishment.  Part of the legacy of 
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Nuremberg is that it imposed death sentences on men like Ohlendorf to set an 
historical precedent for the illegality of genocide.  Finally, she discusses a major 
tension between history and law.  Chief Justice Musmanno sought to gain “truth” in 
history from the trial, over which he presided.  The organizers and planners of the 
Einsatzgruppen trial named “historical truth” as a specific goal of the entire trial, a 
fact Earl unabashedly rejects.57Finding out the “truth” from reports can be 
successful, but coupled with the biased testimony of condemned men ready to lie to 
preserve their lives is questionable. 
 As demonstrated above, there also needs to be more analysis of how 
Ohlendorf served as an economic functionary.  He fought for middle class oriented 
economics, against the corporate will of the Reich (where big businesses hugely 
profited from the Nazi regime while the middle class was cast aside), and more 
attention should be paid to his policy proposals.  Maybe this gap exists because the 
documents are either gone or unobtainable.  A better understanding of Ohlendorf’s 
economic theories will show a greater continuity in his life and career and will help 
provide a clearer definition of his personal National Socialist ideology. 
 Although there are studies of academia and academics during the Nazi era, 
they tend to focus on subversion of policy or, in the case of Jessen, how the Reich 
was met with intellectual resistance.  Dissociating Ohlendorf from his crimes is 
impossible, and would be inexcusable.  However, notwithstanding his time in the 
Einsatzgruppen, his career was based on challenging what he thought were corrupt 
acts and institutions in Germany.  In his own mind, he certainly was an activist, and 
                                                          




so were his generation of Nazi officials.  His connection to activism, especially to 
Jessen and other academics, is an area of Ohlendorf’s life that needs further 
research.  Piecing together a biography of Ohlendorf may help address some of the 
gaps and issues in the historiography.  The next section examines the so-called 
intentionalist/functionalist debate, which looks at the actions of perpetrators like 
Ohlendorf, in part, in terms of the existence, or lack thereof, of the Führer’s 
extermination order. 
The Intentionalist/Functionalist Debate 
 In the 1980s, the historiography of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust changed 
as the focus shifted to whether or not there was a predetermined order or plan to 
murder the Jews of Europe.  The intentionalist viewpoint asserts that Hitler planned 
the Holocaust while the bureaucracy carried it out. In Ohlendorf’s Nuremberg 
testimony, he claimed to be a mere functionary of Hitler, who led Einsatzgruppe D in 
exterminating Jews and partisans, located at the extreme end of the southern front 
in Ukraine and Crimea.  All of this fell under the purview of a specific Hitler order.  
However, many historians have maintained that the Holocaust unfolded out of 
conditions on the ground.  This would mean that leaders such as Ohlendorf did not 
just carry out policies, but in fact designed them. 
 At the Einsatzgruppen Trials, prosecutor Colonel John Amen asked Ohlendorf 
“in what respects, if any, were the official duties of the Einsatz groups concerned 
with Jews and Communist commissars?” Ohlendorf replied “the instructions were 




Soviet political commissars, were to be liquidated.”58  Questioned by the prosecutor, 
Ohlendorf asserted that the liquidation order came from Hitler, who gave the order 
to Himmler to put in place, although it is known Ohlendorf falsified this fact.  
However, he also asserted that the eleventh Army was not made aware of the details 
of the liquidation orders.  If the Wehrmacht was not aware of how the mobile killing 
units operated, despite the attachment of Einsatzgruppe D to the Eleventh Army, 
then this demonstrates a communication breakdown.  Either there was a disjointed 
formal plan for killing the Jews, one side blatantly lied, or both sides were misled.  
But, if there was a communication breakdown and the plan for killing was 
disjointed, this could also mean the initiative went over to forces on the ground.  
This could mean that the Holocaust was the result of a cultural consensus.   
 In the 1990s, historians were practically forced to publicly confirm or deny 
the thesis that the Holocaust was solely the product of Hitler’s will, and to answer 
the question as to whether there were other factors contributing to the 
implementation and success of the Holocaust.  Predating the debate, historian Tim 
Mason, who coined the terms intentionalist and functionalist, warned other scholars 
of the responsibility of every historian to report as objectively as possible on the 
Holocaust.59 Mason cautioned historians against leaning to a particular side in the 
Holocaust debate.  However, his words were ignored. 
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 In “Intention and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the 
Interpretation of National Socialism”, Mason rejected previous works that over-
emphasized Hitler’s role in the Holocaust with little importance given to the 
functionality of the collective Germany and individual Germans.  Although his 
argument was functionalist, he was successful in objectively outlining analytical 
flaws on both sides of the historical analysis.  He pointed out that intentionalists 
view functionalism as apologetic to National Socialism.  Mason further asserted that 
a major pitfall of the intentionalist position is that they concentrated too much on 
individual capacity for “evil” and murder, rather than how the bureaucracy and the 
public perpetuated the Holocaust.  His disdain for bias is clear when he declares “if 
historians do have a public responsibility, if hating is part of their method and 
warning part of their task, it is necessary that they should hate precisely.”60 Despite 
Mason’s words of warning, Goldhagen began another important historiographical 
debate. 
 In 1996, Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust began the debate over how to appropriately study the perpetration of the 
Holocaust.61  Among many significant theories in his book, the core of his argument  
centers on a historically ingrained “eliminationist anti-Semitism” that motivated 
ordinary German enlistees to willingly commit mass murder.62  He attempts to 
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dispel what he calls “myths” including that the German people were unaware of the 
Holocaust as it happened but argues that regular Germans willingly participated in 
mass murder.63  Most importantly, Goldhagen argues that the Nazi brand of anti-
Semitism is unique in world history because German culture inculcated Germans 
with a commitment to genocide.  He not only subscribes to an intentionalist 
perspective that views the Holocaust as formally planned, but stakes out an extreme 
intentional viewpoint according to which all of Germany was anti-Semitic, leading to 
their mobilization and participation in the Holocaust.  According to Goldhagen, “the 
German perpetrators, namely those who themselves killed Jews or helped to kill 
them, willingly did so because they shared a Hitlerian view of Jews, and therefore 
believed the extermination to be just and necessary.”64 
 For Goldhagen, Nazis leaders like Ohlendorf were all part of the grand 
eliminationist anti-Semitic ideological scheme.  When Ohlendorf was in Landsberg 
prison, Dr. Leon Goldensohn, an American physician and psychiatrist, asked 
Ohlendorf about his assignment to the Einsatzgruppen.  He spoke of the liquidation 
orders not in terms of anti-Semitism but “rather the Jews in Russia were said to be 
the main carrier of Bolshevism there.  It was against my will that I was ordered to an 
Einsatzgruppe in Russia.”65  However, his alleged unwillingness to be on the Eastern 
Front, at all, is expressed here.  This is contrary to Goldhagen’s intentionalist 
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scheme.  But Goldhagen points out that Ohlendorf, an intellectual and “an unusually 
decent man, even…an idealist within the Nazi movement…believed in its vision of a 
harmonious utopia.”66  In the next few sentences he argues that Ohlendorf was 
ultimately one of the “demonological” visionaries who accepted genocide as the 
solution to the Jewish problem.67  This is the epitome of the Jekyll and Hyde 
caricature that Judge Michael Musmanno painted of Ohlendorf, although calling 
Ohlendorf a “demonological visionary” is problematic and assumptive.68  Goldhagen 
raises useful questions, but does not take into account the individualistic and 
impromptu nature of mass murder.  At least, not in the Ohlendorf case.  He was not 
an eliminationist anti-Semite, born into a several centuries old culture of pent-up 
hatred for the Jews that culminated in his willingness to enact mass murder.  The 
truth is, Ohlendorf was an anti-Semite, National Socialist ideologue, and proponent 
of the genocide.  But Musmanno’s reference to Jekyll and Hyde characterized 
Ohlendorf from a superficial standpoint.  Further analysis does not reveal two 
entirely different Ohlendorfs: there was only one with a consistent dedication to 
Nazi ideology. 
 Radical intentionalist views are not alone relegated to Goldhagen.  Holocaust 
historian Lucy Dawidowicz argued that the origins of the Holocaust must be traced 
back to November 11, 1918, the exact time when the Great War ended.  According to 
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Dawidowicz, this was the precise moment the Holocaust was born into Adolf Hitler’s 
mind.69  Her controversial arguments stem from the standpoint that there is no 
connection between perpetrator and victim in the Holocaust.   In reality, there is a 
connection between the “ordinary” perpetration and victimization where, for 
instance, the local authorities were responsible for rounding up and at least helping 
execute the Jews of their hometowns.  For her, the master plan of the Holocaust was 
Hitler’s alone, and those who enacted the anti-Semitic policies bought into Nazi 
indoctrination.  She also believed that functionalists, who did not trace the origins of 
the Holocaust in the same way, were guilty of ignoring their responsibility to 
historical truth.70  Although her thesis was significant at the time of its publication, 
her viewpoint has now been dissolved into a larger argument that includes more 
dimensions to historical studies.   
 Published in 1992, Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men is based on 
courtroom testimony of survivors who perpetrated the atrocities of Reserve Police 
Battalion 101 in Poland.71  Browning argues these were “ordinary” Germans, from 
all levels of society, who were thrust into a brutal war and forced to partake in mass 
murder.  His conclusions, based on the Milgram experiments, emphasized that the 
soldiers who actually committed the atrocities did so out of peer pressure more 
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than any anti-Semitic bloodlust.72  In Browning’s argument, he stated “according to 
Goldhagen, one question historians like myself should not pose and need not answer 
is how ordinary Germans overcame reluctance and inhibition to become 
professional killers.”73  Browning does recognize that some of the perpetrators 
performed their tasks with “gusto” but doubts that the average soldier or conscript 
volunteered for service to murder based on the deep-seeded “lethal and 
demonological anti-Semitism” Goldhagen describes.74  His views on functionalism 
are moderate and he does not dismiss the role of Hitler in the Holocaust but, rather, 
offers an explanation based on a combination of ideology and governmental 
structure, which allowed atrocities to be committed on such a vast scale.  
 As Raul Hilberg declared, “ordinary men were to perform extraordinary 
tasks.”75 But countering Goldhagen’s definition of “ordinary” and bolstering 
Browning’s definition of “ordinary”, John P. Sabini and Maury Silver point out that if 
the so-called willing executioners were interchangeable machine-like perpetrators 
who were driven to kill by an intense anti-Semitic cause, then why did the nature of 
murder change? In “Destroying the Innocent with a Clear Conscience: A 
Sociopsychology of the Holocaust”, they describe the evolution of camps and murder 
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to include things like gas chambers and vans.76  These tools of execution distanced 
the executioner from the killings due to “…psychological limitation of even the best 
trained and best selected SS men, the most rabid anti-Semites…”77  In Ohlendorf’s 
testimony at Nuremberg, he repeatedly claimed that his soldiers were suffering 
from battle fatigue and was concerned for the emotional strain that execution-style 
killings has on perpetrator and victim alike.  So, he initially embraced the gas vans, 
to lessen the burden of mass murder on his soldiers.  When questioned of their 
utility at Nuremberg, Ohlendorf responded: 
 On the one hand, the aim was that the individual leaders and men should be able to carry out 
the executions in a military manner acting on orders and should not have to make a decision 
of their own; it was, to all intents and purposes, an order which they were to carry out. On 
the other hand, it was known to me that through the emotional excitement of the executions 
ill treatment could not be avoided, since the victims discovered too soon that they were to be 
executed and could not therefore endure prolonged nervous strain. And it seemed 
intolerable to me that individual leaders and men should in consequence be forced to kill a 
large number of people on their own decision.78  
 
The creation of gas vans demonstrates how the use of improvisation on the 
battlefield was necessary to carry out the mass killings.  It also shows that 
“ordinary” German soldiers may not have been fervent enough in their anti-Semitic 
beliefs to handle the pressure of execution-style killings.  The fact that Ohlendorf 
was able to make a judgment call indicates he had a degree of independent ability 
with how Einsatzgruppe D carried out mass murder. 
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 A discussion of functionalist theory is not possible without referring to Hans 
Mommsen.  In From Weimar to Auschwitz, he stressed the so-called machine of 
government in implementing the Holocaust, meaning that the economy, 
manufacturing, the military, and all parts of the government cooperated in 
implementing one particular initiative.  But there was a shift in power structure 
when the end of the war became inevitable.  Initiatives and directives were less 
centralized.79  In other words, although there was a central government in Germany, 
much of how the Holocaust and the war was carried out, was not determined by the 
central government, but by the Einsatzgruppen, the Wehrmacht, and the provisional 
occupied government officials.  He developed a concept of “deliberate dictatorial 
will,” meaning that the Führer consistently supported and called for enacting the 
Final Solution.80  Mommsen argued, however, that ‘will’ was not enough to 
implement such a grandiose, murderous policy. For Mommsen, Auschwitz is not 
only symbolic of “inconceivable crimes” but also represents the “destruction of 
politics” in the Nazi regime.81 Perhaps most importantly, he disputed the idea of 
Hitler having built a totalitarian regime, referring to him as a “weak dictator.”  
“Hitler's role as a driving force, which with the same inner compulsion drove on to 
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self-destruction should not be underestimated.”82  Noteworthy here is that 
Mommsen does not dismiss Hitler’s role in promoting or creating the ideology of 
anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, but he argues that the Holocaust was not 
implemented by Hitler through the totalitarian system. 
 Concerning  Mommsen’s ‘weak dictator’ claim, Ian Kershaw states that “it 
must be recognized that the Dictator was only the extreme exponent of a chain of 
anti-humanitarian impulses set free by the lapse of all institutional, legal, and moral 
barriers, and once set in motion, regenerating themselves in magnified form.”83  In 
agreement with Kershaw’s viewpoint about the culpability of Hitler, Mommsen’s 
thesis of the “weak dictator” underlines the importance of studying people like 
Ohlendorf.84  Without people like Ohlendorf to implement and carry out Hitler’s 
murderous policies, the Holocaust might not have been so successful. 
 Hans Mommsen and Martin Broszat co-created the structuralist viewpoint, 
according to which internal rivalries, not the Hitler initiative, unleashed the 
Holocaust.  In Der Staat Hitler, Broszat examines how the Nazi regime was plagued 
with power struggles between itself and the traditional German state.85  This friction 
fueled the duality Germany faced and instead of the Third Reich being a totalitarian 
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regime, it was indeed polycratic, meaning that Nazi Germany was governed by many 
contradictory forces, rather than just run by Hitler.  Broszat argued that irreparable 
fissures in the years after the Versailles Treaty, seen in discontent with Weimar and 
an economic depression, led the Nazis to radicalize, and Weimar and its supporters 
retaliated, creating an environment of violence. Written as a reaction to Holocaust 
denier David Irving’s Hitler’s War, Broszat dismissed Irving’s insistence that Hitler 
was unaware of the Holocaust, a thesis based on the lack of a written order.86  In 
“Hitler and the Genesis of the Final Solution”, Broszat argued that Hitler provided 
the basic ideological principles behind the Holocaust through the concept 
Lebensraum, the expanded living space required to repopulate the pure Aryan 
race.87 Hitler ordered the deportation, and later extermination, of Jews but gave no 
real plan as to how this would be accomplished. As the Eastern Front expanded, 
Broszat suggests that the Einsatzgruppen liquidations became “a way out of the 
blind alley into which the Nazis had manoeuvred [sic] themselves”.88  Without 
functionary perpetrators, such as Ohlendorf, Hitler’s obsession with Lebensraum 
and the Jews would have remained just that: an ideology. 
 A more recent contributor to functionalist thought is Götz Aly, historian of 
economics and the Nazi Germany.  His arguments are a bottom-up viewpoint on the 
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evolution of the Holocaust, wherein he views Hitler as a vague figurehead in the 
overall construction, means, and actions of Holocaust perpetrators.  Aly’s focus is on 
Poland but describes how the soldiers themselves, along with their superiors, were 
the driving force behind extermination.  In Final Solution: Nazi Population Policy and 
the Murder of the European Jews, Aly argues that the RSHA, Gauleiters and other 
lower-level officials were constantly trying to amend policies based on economics, 
the desire to relocate non-Aryans, and the quest for Lebensraum, rather than a 
purist anti-Semitic ideology.89  Critics condemn Aly for not paying enough attention 
to anti-Jewish beliefs.  For Aly, however, the eternal quest for Lebensraum was what 
drove the ethnic cleansings of Eastern Europe.  While Goldhagen and Dawidowicz 
emphasize anti-Semitism as the driving force behind the Holocaust, Aly’s bottom-up 
approach places this ideology second.   
 In Hitler’s Beneficiaries, Aly argues that German financial policy was shaped 
firstly by Lebensraum and then by the enormous financial acquisitions inherited 
from the Reich, which basically cleaned out Eastern Europe.90  Never denying 
fervent anti-Semitic beliefs which existed as a motivation for plunder, Aly asserts 
that the war fattened the German economy in such a way that the majority of 
Germans would benefit.  And they did.91  Because of the acquisition of money, from 
plunder, Germany saw an extremely fast accumulation of wealth.  Over-inflation was 
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the result of the expedient incorporation of wealth back into the German economy.  
Germans did benefit from the war and the Holocaust.  Aly’s book represents new 
ways in which to analyze the intent and perpetration of the Holocaust.  
 The previously held view was that the Wannsee Conference was when the 
Final Solution was implemented.  This view is now historically discredited but 
historian Robert Gerwath asserted that Wannsee marked where the plan to 
systematically exterminate the Jews became Reich policy.92  The meeting, led by 
Reinhard Heydrich, agreed on a plan to execute Hitler’s implicit orders for the 
extermination of all Jews as partisans.  There was intent for genocide shown early in 
the Nazi years with Hitler’s speeches and progressive restrictions on Jews.  The 
highest Nazi officials attributed the Final Solution to Hitler.  However, without a 
series of functionaries believing in the cause enough to perpetrate the Holocaust, it 
could not have occurred.   In Messages of Murder, Ronald Headland suggests that the 
extermination process began slowly.93  This was not because of a lack of knowledge, 
but because of resource scarcity during the Second World War.  He saw the 
capability of the Einsatzgruppen as directly proportionate to their manpower.94  
Although the group was established in 1939 to kill political partisans in eastern 
occupied territories, by the time Ohlendorf took command of Einsatzgruppe D, 
manpower had dramatically increased.  Prior to the official implementation of the 
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Final Solution after Wannsee, Operation Barbarossa demanded the reallocation of 
enormous amounts of supplies and soldiers to the eastern front.  To combat the 
Wehrmacht’s increased mobilization on the Eastern Front, the Einsatzgruppen were 
given more directives, and indiscriminate killings of partisans were committed en 
masse.  
 How can surviving documents help to sort out the 
intentionalist/functionalist debate?  Despite the escalation of Einsatzgruppen force 
power in the east and according to the testimony from most Einsatzgruppen Trial 
defendants, Heydrich and Himmler gave a certain degree of discreet power to the 
leaders of the mobile killing units.  Headland argued that the most significant period 
for the Einsatzgruppen was between March and June 1941 which was “a direct 
reflection of Hitler’s determination to ensure that the upcoming conflict would be an 
ideological war of total destruction.”95  However, in the Operational Situational 
Reports, detailed reports of Einsatzgruppen activities reported back to the Reich, 
there was no specific directive on how to universally deal with Jews and partisans in 
the east.  The surviving OSRs are correspondences from the Einsatzgruppen to 
Berlin, not vice versa.  
 The reports usually stated casualties by region and ethnicity and have some 
sort of justification for the ‘liquidation’ of huge numbers of people. For example, 
Operational Situational Report USSR No. 45 from Einsatzgruppe D, 
Einsatzkommando 11a stated “up to this point 551 Jews have been liquidated, of 
                                                          





these 151 for participating in sabotage acts, 400 in reprisal for shooting at German 
medical trucks and for lighting signal flares for Red aviators.”96  However, there was 
no specific instruction given to the Einsatzgruppen as to how the atrocities were to 
be committed, yet Heydrich and Himmler demanded reports back with the utmost 
accuracy of detail and causation.  The Einsatzgruppen acted in indiscriminate ways, 
independent from specific Reich orders.  This shows that although there was 
certainly a top-down “eliminationist anti-Semitism” in Nazi ideology, a functionalist 
view better suits how the Einsatzgruppen actually functioned.  
 Ohlendorf’s transfer from RSHA AMT III to the Einsatzgruppen was allegedly 
due to personal conflict with Himmler and insubordination, and at Nuremberg, 
Ohlendorf maintained he had no other choice.  It is unclear whether he put up any 
resistance, was threatened, or simply willing to go because he was an Alter Kämpfer.  
What can be determined from this is that if he felt begrudged for being sent to the 
front, it may only have been because he either did not want to be away from his 
family, or he knew the guilt of directly participating in genocide could haunt him.  
However, he went to the front and because he was a careerist and Alter Kämpfer, his 
career was filled with promotions, awards and accolades thereafter.  His testimony 
faulted Himmler and Hitler for having the Final Solution as their master plan, and he 
claimed that he, enacting this plan under orders, was merely a soldier following 
orders.  Although Ohlendorf is not specifically mentioned, in Interrogations: The 
Nazi Elite in Allied Hands, Richard Overy asserted that the Nuremberg defendants 
                                                          





were wrong to assume Hitler’s orders were intended to exterminate all of the 
Jews.97  Yet, reprimands were not given for carrying out more killings than originally 
intended.  When testifying, Ohlendorf distinguished between motivation for murder 
and actually committing the murders.  Constantly referring to himself as a soldier, 
he described how he led the Einsatzgruppe and led the murder of 90,000 people but 
claimed the responsibility should lie with Hitler.98  He acted on orders from Hitler 
and Himmler and ultimately the fault was theirs, he asserted. 
 Like other defendants, Ohlendorf continued to testify that there was intent 
and an original liquidation order that came from Hitler, enforced by Himmler.  When 
the prosecution asked about the order, Ohlendorf responded by recounting his 
conversation with Himmler in late summer 1941 at Nikolaev, Ukraine: “He 
assembled the leaders and men of the Einsatzkommandos, repeated to them the 
liquidation order, and pointed out that the leaders and men who were taking part in 
the liquidation bore no personal responsibility for the execution of this order.  The 
responsibility was his, alone, and the Fuehrer's.”99  Culpability for these atrocities 
ultimately lay with Ohlendorf despite his and other defendants’ attempts to distance 
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themselves from the Einsatzgruppen’s crimes.  Interestingly, throughout his 
testimony he continually asserts that he did not necessarily want to partake in mass 
murder while simultaneously taking responsibility for it.  Unlike Goldhagen’s views 
of Ohlendorf, he was most likely driven to kill because he believed that a war against 
the Jews was essential to the preservation of Germany, rather than because he was 
driven by fervent anti-Semitic ideology. 
 Trying to bridge the gap between the intentionalist/functionalist debate, 
Omer Bartov’s Germany’s War and the Holocaust: Disputed Histories demonstrates 
that the solution to fixing the analytical gap lay somewhere in the middle.100  To 
Bartov, there is no longer a need to have such mutually exclusive approaches to 
studying the Holocaust. Although he is a functionalist-leaning historian, he notes 
that the value in analyses like Goldhagen’s is in bringing the debate back to one of 
underlying anti-Semitism.  For Bartov, anti-Semitism was the driving force behind 
the Holocaust.  However, he fuses together an argument where ideology, intent and 
function all have a place in Holocaust studies.101  Like Bartov, Saul Friedländer has 
combined both schools of thought into a more moderate, workable form of historical 
analysis.  In “The Extermination of the European Jews in Historiography Fifty Years 
Later,” Friedländer merges the schools of thought into one greater picture of the 
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Reich, with Hitler’s anti-Semitic views in the forefront.102  He suggests that there are 
inseparable dichotomies within the Reich deserving of equal attention from 
scholars: modernity and myth.  To Friedländer, analyzing the historical background 
shows the “meeting of logic” regarding modernity in Nazi Germany coexisting with 
“irrational thinking” where anti-Jewish feelings were part of the “myth.”103  
However, he also stresses that historians cannot sever the ties in these modern-
myth relationships, and rather than giving in to a view of this relationship as 
antagonistic, historians should view it as symbiotic.104  For example, treating 
eugenics and anti-Semitism separately is not an inclusive analysis.  The debate over 
how to interpret the Holocaust has evolved into more relevant, complex discussions 
about interpretation of the Nazi party, its inner-workings, and functionality.   
Conclusion and Final Thoughts  
Finally, and most significantly, the historiographical analyses of today are 
much less polarized.  Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands serves as a bridge connecting 
intent and function in several ways.105  The so-called bloodlands were the territory, 
previously protected by the Soviet Union, first reached by the Einsatzgruppen, 
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where large populations of Jews and partisans had not been evacuated.  These 
people had already been subjugated and persecuted by the Soviets and shipped 
inland toward the Molotov-Ribbentrop line.  With the Barbarossa invasion, these 
populations were left completely exposed to slaughter, hence the term 
bloodlands.106  Snyder asserts that this small overlapping zone of disputed territory 
was where more than a quarter of Holocaust victims were exterminated.107  He 
asserts that the Holocaust was the result of the clash of two empires on their 
peripheries.  Thus, blame and intent have become more open to interpretation.  He 
argues that the Holocaust was the ultimate result of this clash and the ensuing 
descent into mayhem, which was contingent upon adaptable and ill-defined the 
borders and actions.  Bloodlands is a very influential, modern interpretation of 
genocide that casts away historiographical labels from the past.  This is the future of 
the historiography: showing the shift from strict definitions of motivation, 
perpetration, intent, function, and organizational murder and reworking the 
Holocaust into a chaotic, spiraling result of the conflict between two empires.    
The struggle to find a unified way of analyzing Nazi Germany and the 
Holocaust is considerable because there is no singular cause.  Christopher Browning 
agrees with Mason, asserting that “Hitler’s participation…was usually indirect”.108  
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For Browning, intentionalism is based on Hitler’s ultimate plan for mass murder.  
Conversely, functionalists maintain that Hitler and the Nazis were not operating 
programmatically toward a premeditated goal.  Heinz Höhne asserts that if it had 
not been for individual initiative from careerists like Ohlendorf, the Nazi 
government would have been stagnant and ineffective.  Höhne said Ohlendorf tried 
to influence the Nazi government and policy with the Sicherheitsdienst (Security 
Service, SD) public opinion polls.  “The SD would have sunk into complete 
insignificance had not Ohlendorf and his people gone on striving to expand their 
sphere of activity, frequently in opposition to Himmler’s declared policies.”109  His 
viewpoint is not to justify Ohlendorf’s actions within the Nazi regime but to point 
out that Hitler and Himmler were unwilling to have themselves or the SS criticized. 
 Nevertheless, revisiting these debates is necessary when studying the 
perpetration of the Holocaust.  Furthermore, Ohlendorf’s career can be analyzed in 
terms of intentionalism versus functionalism.  The point of this analysis is to 
demonstrate how categories of individual experiences must be included in any 
discussion of Holocaust perpetration.  Utilizing general statements about 
perpetrators and victims does not accurately explain the motivations of the 
Holocaust. 
 Lastly, this chapter has woven together a brief historiography of Otto 
Ohlendorf, showing where certain parts of his life have been scrutinized, and where 
there remains a need to further delve into his life and career.  His academic career 
                                                          





needs more focus as Ohlendorf, himself, said his time studying Fascism in Italy is 
where his devotion to National Socialism was solidified and he “returned as a fanatic 
antifascist.”110  There are numerous books written that address the differences 
between Fascism and Nazism, taking into account how Nazis thought the ideologies 
differed.  But, further study is needed here to determine precisely how National 
Socialism and Fascism were defined by National Socialist ideologues like Ohlendorf.  
It would show how his belief system was mostly based on independent knowledge 
and how he sought to perfect the National Socialist system.  Other parts of his career 
demonstrate Ohlendorf’s commitment to Nazi ideology.  Knowing more about why 
he openly criticized Reich policy and what precisely defined his own belief system 
will reveal inconsistencies in how Nazis, themselves, defined National Socialist 
ideology.  Some particular cornerstones of ideology were anti-Semitism, desire for 
revenge for the loss of the Great War and treatment at Versailles, equal rights 
among Aryans, and the maintenance of a strong centralized German government.  
Trying to reveal where Ohlendorf’s ideology broke away from or adhered to the 
ideology of the party is a goal of this thesis. 
 Discussing briefly the intentionalist/functionalist debate in the 
historiography of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust demonstrates how polarizing the 
study of perpetrator motivations is.  There is so much information we still cannot 
know: like the existence of the Führer Order, the timing of Einsatzgruppen 
directives, personal motivations, etc.  This chapter has tried to hash out the debate 
by inserting Ohlendorf’s perpetration into the discussion.  The conclusions drawn 
                                                          




here is that Ohlendorf’s life and career were both typical and atypical of his Nazi 
contemporaries.  He was not only a follower of National Socialism: He attempted to 
perfect the doctrine, and the Nazi party valued his loyalty above anything else.  
Overall, there are deficiencies in the historiography with regard to Ohlendorf.  By 
looking at the whole picture of his life, albeit a picture with its own imperfections, a 






































Chapter 3:  
Otto Ohlendorf: The Nazi Careerist and Disappointed Ideologue 
 
 Otto Ohlendorf’s adult life in Nazi Germany was a complex mix of trying to 
embody his own personal views of National Socialist ideology, while simultaneously 
sustaining a thriving career.  Although he had notorious feuds with notable figures 
such as Himmler and Heydrich, he still managed to successfully maintain an 
increasingly powerful position in Nazi service, including promotions to the highest 
echelons.  This discussion addresses events and experiences that molded 
Ohlendorf’s understanding of National Socialism. His often ornery, cantankerous 
personality and demand for the highest levels of efficiency troubled Himmler in 
particular, especially when Ohlendorf was tasked with the creation of a system of 
public opinion reports.  How did Ohlendorf maintain a flourishing career in the Nazi 
party while openly criticizing it and its members?  The answer lies within his 
steadfast dedication to National Socialist ideology.  He never waned in his beliefs, 
nor with his devotion to what he thought an idealized Nazi Germany could and 
should be.  As the most loyal of the Alter Kämpfer, his behavior was tolerated. This 
carried through his entire adult life, career, and through to his death.  In his own 
mind, he was the truest adherent of National Socialism. 
 This chapter examines Ohlendorf’s economic philosophy in detail, revealing 
its tie to a particular interpretation of Nazi ideology.  It asks how and why Ohlendorf 
was such a staunch advocate for the Mittelstand (middle class), and why he saw 
agriculture as an integral part of the foundations of Nazi society. In the Third Reich, 




preference to the accumulation of corporate wealth and distribution of material 
goods (especially during the war), and did not work well with labor unions.  
Ohlendorf strove to champion the underrepresented segments of Nazi society.  This 
is seen throughout his work in academia, with Reichsgruppe Handel, the National 
Trade Union, and the ministry of economics.   
 In addition to Ohlendorf’s role in the economic realm, this chapter will 
address how Nazis of Ohlendorf’s generation of educated academics rose to the top 
of the RSHA (Reichsicherheitshauptamt, or Reich Security Main Office).  There were 
particular roles and ranks through which Ohlendorf and his contemporaries rose as 
part of National Socialist indoctrination and in the legacy of the Alter Kämpfer.  In 
the case of tasks such as leading the Einsatzgruppen, these assignments served to 
break leaders away from desk jobs to implement the Holocaust as a twisted way of 
proving their dedication to the Nazi party.111  Although Ohlendorf never served in a 
police force or military group, being transferred to the Einsatzgruppen boosted his 
career, and made him even more important within the Reich, especially in the realm 
of economics. 
 Meanwhile, Himmler and others openly and personally disliked and 
distained Ohlendorf.  Why was he never fired, replaced, or asked to leave?  The 
answer lay, at least partly, in the concept of the Alte Kämpfer, and the way in which 
preferential treatment was given to Ohlendorf and his compatriots for their 
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devotion to the party from the early years.  His response to personal criticism was to 
make himself as indispensable as possible to the Nazi regime, and he certainly 
succeeded.  Regarding the public opinion reports, Ohlendorf reported criticism of 
the Reich and its leadership, causing friction between Himmler and himself.  This 
resulted in Himmler allegedly arranging the transfer of Ohlendorf to the 
Einsatzgruppen, in order to put a stop to the negative reports.  Again, it is 
remarkable that Ohlendorf both survived and thrived, despite his criticism of the 
Reich.  Ohlendorf was a National Socialist fundamentalist who built a life, career, 
and name for himself by demonstrating his interpretation of Nazi values and 
ideology.  He was an outspoken advocate for middle class reform and an activist.  
This study begins with Ohlendorf’s academic career, and details how and when his 
ideological views of National Socialism were solidified.  Next, it surveys his career in 
the SD, his promotion to the RSHA, and his extensive influence in the economics 
ministry.  The transfer to the Einsatzgruppen and his activities there is dealt with in 
a separate chapter.  Finishing his career track, an analysis of the nature of 
Ohlendorf’s work in the Reich, his promotions, and eventual surrender comprise the 
conclusion.  Ohlendorf’s life and career were driven by his ambitious careerist 
nature, but also his dedication to and belief in National Socialism.   
National Socialist Beginnings 
 Otto Ohlendorf began his political career at an early age.  In 1923, when he 
was eighteen years old, he joined the Nazi party, twice repeating school years 




diploma).112  According to interviewer Dr. Leon Goldensohn, Ohlendorf claimed his 
political views led him to the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and against the Guelphs, a 
German-Hanoverian pro-Weimar political party. Prior to membership in the SD, 
Ohlendorf was part of the Bismarck Youth, a party associated with the DNVP 
(German National People’s Party) that was established during Weimar, and opposed 
to the Treaty of Versailles and the Weimar Republic.113  Ohlendorf’s affiliation with 
the DNVP was heavily influenced by his father.114  For certain, there is no 
coincidence that young Ohlendorf switched party alliances two years after the failed 
Munich Beer Hall Putsch, the event that put Hitler in jail, and later, in the 
spotlight.115  By 1925, Mein Kampf was published, and unquestionably left an 
indelible impression on the Nazi organization. 
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 A crucial part of Ohlendorf’s life and career, and of particular significance in 
this dissertation, was his identity as an Alter Kämpfer, a phrase coined with clear 
Nazi overtones.116  Because Ohlendorf joined the Nazi party before 1933, and had a 
prized membership number (#6531) below 100,000, he and other early recruits 
within the first 100,000 joiners were part of an elite club, the Alte Kämpfer.  Hitler 
awarded not only medals and chevrons, but rewarded these “old fighters” with 
preferential treatment in employment, along with consistent promotions within the 
party, and favorable government jobs.  This was certainly the case of Ohlendorf’s 
career.  He was promoted annually, once he was established in the RSHA, and 
continued to have a thriving, elite career.  At the end of the life of the Nazi party’s 
power, Ohlendorf was one of the few selected to accompany Dönitz’s ill-fated 
government to carry on the Nazi party, even after Germany surrendered.   
 What is significant about Ohlendorf’s identification as an Alter Kämpfer is 
that his worldview has direct similarities to aspects of the 1920 Nazi party platform.   
Written in Munich on February 24, 1920, “Das Programm der NSDAP” (The Program 
of the National Socialist German Worker’s Party) was drafted and included twenty-
five separate goals of the newly established party.117  Looking back through 
Ohlendorf’s explicit criticisms of the Nazi party when they ascended to power in 
1933, there are certain points of the original party doctrine he fought to uphold.  
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Some of these included: requirements for nationalism (that specifically excluded 
Jews from becoming German nationals), equal rights and duties of German citizens, 
profit sharing in large enterprises, demanding punishment for anyone who would 
harm the “common good,” freedom of religion (Christian religion), and most 
importantly, the “creation and maintenance of a sound middle class.”118  Throughout 
his career, Ohlendorf maintained these values. 
According to Michael Wildt, Ohlendorf and his contemporaries, politically 
active intellectual and university youths, were drawn into the Nazi party because of 
built up resentment from Germany’s defeat in the Great War.  Ohlendorf was too 
young to enlist, so the postwar years of economic scarcity and political instability 
fueled contempt for Weimar and its political institutions.119  Wildt asserts that 
Ohlendorf was part of this “Uncompromising Generation.” Seventy-five percent of 
the future RSHA leaders were born after 1900 and some, like Ohlendorf, eventually 
became Holocaust perpetrators.120 
 The men of the RSHA were born into social classes “whose values they no 
longer accepted” and were raised in the Weimar Republic, and to them, a strange 
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entity imposed on the German people by the Western powers.121  The lure of the SD 
offered men like Ohlendorf a way to voice and address grievances with the Nazi 
government.  In the early years, Ohlendorf and his contemporaries thought that if 
they worked for the Reich, they could “fix” National Socialism from within, and be a 
part of the decision-making process.122  They were critical of the regime because 
their generation was convinced that in order for Weimar to topple and a new regime 
to be successful, they must play a role in not only the creation of policy, but in 
holding the new government responsible to its campaign promises.  The economy 
was depressed, their parents suffered at the hands of a weak, foreign mandated 
government.  In its quest for legitimacy, the Third Reich hired intellectuals and 
experts like Ohlendorf so as to convince the German people and the world that this 
government had infinite capabilities.  Although Ohlendorf’s career took shape much 
differently than he anticipated, the constants that drove him to the top were his 
arrogant, honest character, his immeasurable careerist motivations, and his Alter 
Kämpfer self-righteousness.  
Education and Early Careerism (1923-1936) 
 Ohlendorf’s post-secondary education was similar to that of his RSHA 
contemporaries, some of whom were his fellow defendants in the 1948 
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Einsatzgruppen Trials.  They were university-educated intellectuals, experts in a 
variety of fields, the backbone of the Nazi bureaucracy, and in charge of 
implementing Third Reich policy in Germany.  However, according to Hilary Earl, 
not all of the 1948 trial defendants were of the same “caliber and degree” as 
Ohlendorf, as only 50% of them had completed a university degree.123  Ohlendorf’s 
educational track led him to a degree in jurisprudence at the University of Leipzig.  
He then studied economics at the University of Göttingen.  Although he never 
acquired a degree in economics, in the summer of 1931, he was awarded a 
scholarship to do a two-semester study abroad, in political economics, to the 
University of Pavia, near Milan, Italy.124 
 In Italy, Ohlendorf studied the Fascist system’s philosophy of international 
law, and claimed to have solidified his belief in a purist version of National 
Socialism.125  In retrospect, a general study of Fascist and National Socialist 
ideologies yields some nuanced differences, but to Ohlendorf, the differences were 
very pronounced.126  He said this about studying in Italy: “I returned as a fanatic 
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antifascist.”127  He intended to use his experience in Italy as the beginning of his 
“lifetime’s work,” as he allegedly desired a university academic career.128  However, 
Ohlendorf’s return to Germany meant he proceeded with his legal training and 
qualifications.   Yet Hanno Sowade argued that in 1933, he was saved by Prof. Dr. 
Jens Jessen from an “unwanted career” in law.129  At the time, Jessen was the head of 
the Royal Institute for Maritime Transport and World Economics at the University of 
Kiel, and was recruiting scholars for the 1934 unveiling of the new Kiel Institute for 
World Economics.130  Ohlendorf’s professional drive leaned toward academics, and 
even in 1944, late in his RSHA career, he still gave lectures and wanted to teach. 
 While Ohlendorf’s fanatical anti-fascist philosophy shaped his entire National 
Socialist career, he often incurred criticism for his opinions.  Although National 
Socialism bred a new type of totalitarian regime, it was essentially a fascist state 
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with similarities to the Mussolini regime, both of which were derived from state-run 
dictatorships.  However, Ohlendorf vehemently believed otherwise.  During a 
conversation with Felix Kersten, Himmler’s personal doctor during the war, 
Ohlendorf explained his view that fascism and National Socialism were completely 
opposed to each other, saying “Fascism began by deifying the state and refusing to 
recognize those human communities which were based on nature; but National 
Socialism was itself based on those natural communities and on the men who 
belonged to them.”131  Clearly, Ohlendorf criticized an important element of Italian 
fascism, that Mussolini declared himself the “state” and “godlike”.  
Drawing distinctions between the two ideologies, Ohlendorf reflected on how 
Himmler and others misinterpreted both ideologies, saying “there are men who 
have a great deal to gain from the fascist divinization of the state and who would 
like to put the Führer himself in the place of God.”132  He criticized many Nazi 
leaders for not understanding his version of purist National Socialist ideology, based 
on communal politics, life and economics, calling Göring, a “capitalist “and Ley, a 
Bolshevik sympathizer. According to Felix Kersten, Himmler’s personal physician 
and masseur, Ohlendorf was most concerned with collectivizing the entire German 
                                                          
131 Felix Kersten, The Kersten Memoirs: 1940-1945 (New York and Tokyo: Ishi Press, 
1956), 207. Please note here that what Kersten presents in this publication are pages from his 
diary of dated conversations he had between Reich officials and Himmler. They are to be 
analyzed with the mindset that Kersten wanted to appear favorably to Himmler and his 
reactions to alleged conversations are certainly not without bias. However, his assessment of 
conversations with Ohlendorf prove valuable to studying particular subjects like Fascism and his 
documentation of Ohlendorf’s alleged commentary is aligned with other primary documents of 
Ohlendorf’s conversation-style. 
 





community, but not for individual profit, nor for the empowerment of the police 
state.  He stated that the difference was Germany’s “historic tradition to maintain 
small…businesses…free and independent” while fascist economics demands that the 
state take control of all business and industry.133 
 Kersten’s written response to Ohlendorf’s lesson on fascism was one of 
shock.  “Never before had I received such a lecture on economics and the state.  At 
the same time, I was astounded at the frankness with which Ohlendorf had 
spoken.”134  This statement is not surprising in the least and, in fact, is consistent 
with everything written and documented about Ohlendorf’s character.  Like 
Kersten’s account of Ohlendorf’s fervent anti-fascist sentiment, Dr. Leon 
Goldensohn, the psychologist who interviewed the Landsberg prisoners, in The 
Nuremberg Interviews asked “how could you be in a fascist party and be a fanatic 
antifascist?”135  Ohlendorf replied by saying “It’s regrettable that you think they are 
the same.  There is much difference.  Fascism is a purely state principle…in National 
Socialism, it was the opposite.  People and humans come first, and the state is 
secondary.”  Ohlendorf, for all intents and purposes, was the only Nazi who spoke 
out as such, and although he hoped others would realize these ideological 
distinctions, they did not.  True to his belief in Nationalist Socialism, Ohlendorf 
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became known as the “Gralshüter des Nationalsozialismus,” or the keeper of the Holy 
Grail of National Socialism.136  Despite his zealous loathing of fascism, Ohlendorf’s 
return from Italy took his career in a direction different from academia.  He became 
a licensed lawyer. 
 Between 1931 and 1932, Ohlendorf composed several requests to the high 
court of Germany to suspend his law practicing license for the duration of his time 
abroad.  Having been sworn in on September 15, 1931, he intended to use his law 
degree as a backup career track while pursuing his desire to work in academia.137  
After being awarded the study abroad scholarship, his first leave request was 
granted in September 1931, and he was reinstated by the 
Oberlandesgerichtespräsidenten (regional Court justice) to the courts in August 
1932.  True to his desire to pursue an academic career, when approached by Jessen 
from the University of Kiel to leave the court system in favor of a position in higher 
education, Ohlendorf again requested leave in September 1933.  It was granted, and 
in October 1934, he wrote to the high courts asking for an extension of leave 
because he was conducting “great scientific work” at the Kiel Institute.138  This time, 
the courts denied his leave with an addendum stating that upon his return to 
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service, he would have to restart the application process anew.139  Ohlendorf’s 
career in academia was again put on hold. 
 Upon his return from studying abroad, Ohlendorf was employed as barrister 
at the Hanover Amtsgerichte (District Court), and from April 1933- October 1933 in 
the Hildesheim Landesgericht (National Court).  Following a short-lived law career, 
he was recruited by Prof. Dr. Jens Jessen, head of the University of Kiel’s Institut für 
Weltwirtschaft und Seeverkehr (Institute for World Economics and Maritime Traffic) 
to establish a department for fascism and National Socialism.  Here, Ohlendorf 
served as scientific assistant.140  According to the Combined Services Detailed 
Interrogations Center (CSDIC, United Kingdom) “Prisoner Interrogations” report, 
Ohlendorf stated that he abandoned his academic pursuit of an advanced degree in 
economics to join Jessen in Kiel.141  During the trial, he claimed he and Jessen had a 
falling out with local party officials over their own economic theories and criticism 
of National Socialist policies.142  Interestingly, nowhere is this mentioned except in 
the Appendix of the “Prisoner Interrogations” conducted by the CSDIC (UK division).  
But in the CSDIC’s timeline of Ohlendorf’s life events, they wrote that he claimed to 
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have been “imprisoned” with Jessen, with both forced to resign their positions for 
alleged “anti-Bolshevist” beliefs.143  Ohlendorf said he and Jessen were “forced” to 
resign their appointments in Kiel and found the same type of opposition at a 
different academic venue.144  This indicates that the economic theories they were 
supporting and presenting were not in line with Nazi economic policy.  It also shows 
the totalitarian nature of the regime, even in the beginning years, by revealing this 
type of academic censorship applied to Ohlendorf and Jessen. 
 In November 1934, Ohlendorf and Jessen were invited to transform the trade 
college, Handelhochschule Berlin, into a university for applied economics, 
Wirtschaftshochschule.  The next month, Ohlendorf was named director of the 
Institute for Applied Economics, but by January 1935, he was the director of the 
Department of Applied Sciences.145  Jessen and Ohlendorf’s master plan was to 
create a National Socialist University of Economics; they failed because their 
economic theories and teachings were too radical even for the Nazi party.  Under 
Jessen’s tutelage, Ohlendorf’s time in academia offered the opportunity to put 
economic theory into action, developing what Earl called a “highly personal theory 
of economics.”146  They sought economic reform through “middle-class oriented” 
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economic ideology. Research and public opinion were to be instrumental in spurring 
economic growth.147  Conflict with local party officials caused Ohlendorf to realize 
his career in academia was over.148  The only place an Alter Kämpfer could thrive 
was in the Nazi party and/or Nazi government.  He reactivated his membership in 
the SS (Schutzstaffel, or protection squadron), applied to the SD, and persuaded 
Jessen to take a position there too.  Ohlendorf’s potential career with the Reich was 
not likely because of his continual insistence on his own philosophy, even if 
independent from party politics.149 
 Ohlendorf’s relationship with Jessen soured after he decided to revisit his 
party affiliation, with encouragement from Jessen.150  Since Ohlendorf went to the 
SD and likely feared his academic career would not come to fruition, he further 
indoctrinated himself in Nazi ideology and policy, something Jessen most likely saw 
as a betrayal.  Jessen became an increasingly controversial character in Nazi politics, 
being among the few individuals in academia to continue criticizing National 
Socialism up through 1944, even when he worked in the Army General Staff. 
151Staying in Berlin, Jessen became part of the resistance movement, and was 
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involved in the 20 July, 1944 unsuccessful assassination attempt on Hitler’s life: 
Operation Valkyrie.152  On November 30, 1944, Jessen was hanged for treason, along 
with 100 others on the periphery of association with the Wolfsschanze (Wolf’s Lair) 
plot.  At this time, Ohlendorf was not only RSHA Amt III leader, but also 
undersecretary to the Minister of Economics.  He had enough influence, especially 
after his time served with the Einsatzgruppen, to have bargained for Jessen’s life, but 
he “did not move a finger.”153  Had Ohlendorf done so, his loyalties would have been 
questioned, and his career finished, likely suffering the same fate as Jessen.  Heinz 
Höhne pointed out that Ohlendorf had a “sleepless night” when Jessen was hanged, 
and made a “conscience-stricken promise henceforth to share his salary with the 
Jessen family.”154  Ohlendorf and Jessen shared the same economic ideology and, like 
Jessen, Ohlendorf found many aspects of the Third Reich problematic.  His 
relationship with Jessen was raised in cross-examination at the Nuremberg trials; in 
a New York Times article, he was questioned about the “German economist” who 
was “considered friendly” until 1938, and was a “suspect” in the 20 July plot to 
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assassinate Hitler.155  However, Ohlendorf betrayed his friend, continued to pursue 
his career, and died a war criminal, while Jessen died a martyr of German resistance. 
Sicherheitsdienst (SD)  
 In May 1936, Ohlendorf was offered a position in the SD (Sicherheitsdienst), 
which, in 1939, became RSHA Amt III (SD-Inland), in charge of the domestic 
intelligence service.  At this point, he already had a record of distinguished service in 
National Socialism.156  In 1936, the same year that Ohlendorf joined the SD, Himmler 
became the Chief of German Police, and Heydrich, the Chief of the Gestapo.  
Ohlendorf saw the SD-Inland as “purely an intelligence agency” that was meant to 
assess the “mood and attitude” of the people.  What drew him to the SD was, in his 
words, that it was “the only authority offering criticism within the Reich and 
reporting facts from an objective point of view to top levels.”157  In a totalitarian 
state, reporting on public opinion is controlled, but the Nazi dictatorship 
demonstrated a great deal of interest in what ordinary German citizens thought of 
the regime.  Ohlendorf developed the public opinion service to gather “useful” 
intelligence on enemies in the Reich.158  
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 Ohlendorf was hired to build up the SD’s security service.  At the time, he was 
recruited by Reinhard Höhn, a law professor at the University of Berlin, who felt the 
SD “needed critical intellects like his.”159  Höhn also tried to attract Jessen into 
service in the SD, and though Jessen did not officially join, other intellectuals like 
Franz Six did.160  Under Höhn’s supervision, Ohlendorf became director of the 
Ableitung II (the Economic Division) where data was collected, analyzed and 
reported.  Next, he became section leader of the Central Division (Zentralableitung), 
where he established an agency for collecting intelligence on critical comments.161  
The reports were designed to give feedback to Nazi leaders regarding their policies, 
leadership, and elements of propaganda.  However, this was all done by having 
agents secretly observe regular people’s actions and conversations. Ohlendorf saw 
this as not only an opportunity to analyze the growth of the Nazi regime, but to also 
influence his own research agenda; implementing his own economic theories.  Both 
Ohlendorf and Höhn established the Lebensgebietarbeit, “systematic observation of 
social spheres” and its significance escalated with the creation of the 1939 RSHA.162  
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They both agreed that the SD was their vehicle to influence the development of 
National Socialism.163 
 However, throughout Ohlendorf’s affidavits and testimony, he consistently 
complained that Himmler and other Nazi leaders were displeased with the Reich 
reports he compiled.  For instance, Ohlendorf criticized the rearmament of Germany 
because it drew economic resources away from independent production in favor of 
big business, saying it caused “unparalleled strains” on the economy.164  Ohlendorf 
composed the Meldungen aus dem Reich up through his return from his 
Einsatzgruppe duties.  But in 1936, at the beginning of his career in the Reich, he was 
already notorious for being an opinionated, outspoken intellectual, a 
characterization that followed him throughout his life and career.  He was avidly 
insistent on instilling purist Nazi philosophy through his loyalties as an Alter 
Kämpfer, promoting the Reich, and demonstrating areas in need of improvement, 
that he was viewed as an egotistical know-it-all who, as a British interrogator said, 
“has a host of ideas on every subject”.165 
 When Ohlendorf became an official in the SD in 1936, he had at his disposal a 
“wide variety” of confiscated materials, reflecting “group attitudes” within Germany 
and toward National Socialism and Hitler, which became the basis of the public 
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opinion reports.166  Ohlendorf was approved to hire a staff of twenty-four experts to 
compose, distribute, and analyze surveys of the German people from the beginning 
of WWII.167  Confidential agents were directed to poll certain segments of the 
population, compile their statistics, and report back to Ohlendorf.  Drafts of 
questionnaire poll results were given to Himmler, Ley, and other high-ranking 
officials.  The reports were often negative, pessimistic, and critical about Reich 
economic policy and its future standing, which did nothing to endear them to 
Himmler and others in power.  Ohlendorf said of the SD, “the first disappointment 
was to find that there was no such thing as an SD information organization.”168  
Although the SD was an important professional move for Ohlendorf, at the time he 
was disenchanted and vocal about it.  In this way, he brought attention to himself, 
and was regarded as problematic by Nazi administrators.  In addition, Heinz Höhne 
argued that the Nazi party “bosses did not find the SD men particularly 
impressive.”169  Ohlendorf’s reputation for frankness of character and stubborn 
behavior marked him, despite his impressive and self-driven Alter Kämpfer career, 
complete with prestigious decorations and promotions.   
 Hilary Earl asserts that Ohlendorf’s unorthodox style was appreciated in the 
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post-Depression years, while Sowade argued that he attracted the “enmity” of 
several Nazi officials for his reports. Both agree that he incurred the most wrath 
specifically concerning the Four Year Plan, a proposal to stimulate the economy 
through an increase of corporate jobs.170  This led to amassed individual wealth and 
did not help the middle class. Unfortunately for Ohlendorf, his stubborn, unfiltered 
criticism of Nazi economic policy left him disenfranchised and “out in the cold.”171  
He requested to leave the SD to work in the economic sector, but Heydrich denied 
the request, and Ohlendorf’s work in the SD was reduced to “honorary duties.”172  
Ohlendorf’s wife, Käthe, referred to this as a “temporary halt” in his career, as her 
husband repeatedly tried to either transfer, or leave the SD.  However, Himmler and 
Heydrich refused; Mrs. Ohlendorf said he continued to serve as a volunteer in the 
afternoons.173  However, Ohlendorf admitted in testimony that he had “long 
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negotiations” with Heydrich, who eventually allowed reassignment to Reichsgruppe 
Handel (Reich Commerce Group) in 1938.174  After joining the National Trade Group, 
Ohlendorf devised his small and medium-sized business economic stimulus plan, 
and although his ideas were in opposition to Party economics, he was promoted to 
Chief Secretary by 1939.175  Despite his criticism of other party members and their 
interpretation of Nazi philosophy, he was indeed needed in the Reich because of his 
expertise on economic policy.  Whatever grievances Heydrich and Himmler had with 
Ohlendorf, ultimately, they recognized his value in instituting economic policies.  
From here on, his career prospered through promotions. 
Ohlendorf’s Economy 
 How did Ohlendorf become known as an expert in economics?  The 
connection between expertise in law and economics in his professional career is 
puzzling, at least initially.  He received his advanced degree in jurisprudence, but 
was recruited first to Kiel and then to Berlin to build institutes for economics.  
Academics like Ohlendorf often chose economics as a related subject of study 
associated with law.176  Christian Ingrao argues that economics provided an 
“intellectual bridge” between academics and activism; and here Ohlendorf, and 
other Nazi academics, became activists.177  From this perspective, it is 
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understandable that the Reich recognized Ohlendorf as an economics expert.  
Coupled with his work at the economic institutes in Berlin and Kiel, Ohlendorf was 
viewed as a specialized kind of expert, useful to the Nazi party.  By 1943, Ohlendorf 
assumed his previous role as leader of RSHA AMT III (Reich Security Main Office, 
Division Three), and was the second in command in the Ministry of Economics.  He 
had succeeded in making himself indispensable to the Reich.  
Nazi philosophy and policies dictated every aspect of the Nazi state, including 
the economy.  After the depression, the first step toward German economic recovery 
was to broaden economic growth through technological innovation, in order to 
stimulate the accumulation of physical and human capital.178  Creating jobs by 
employing the state-sponsored workforce of “semi-skilled” laborers, specifically 
metalworkers, would increase production and German labor as it was “rhetorically 
revalorized”.179  For Adam Tooze, Hitler’s aggression and overarching plan for war 
and genocide was absolutely unsustainable from the beginning.  Nevertheless, Nazi 
leadership proceeded with the war and the Holocaust not only because of Nazi 
motivations and drive to do so.  Their economy was based on the principles of 
rearmament, and heavily relied on big business corporations to utilize mass 
production.  An important fusion of Nazi philosophy with economics has concrete 
manifestations in the creation of the so-called Volksgemeinschaft, a community of 
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the people who sacrificed personal interests for that of the greater good of Germany 
and the Aryan race. 
The Mittelstand, or small business section, of Nazi Germany rapidly became 
disenfranchised.  With the rise of the Nazi party and their eventual takeover of the 
German government, an “amalgamation” of economic and military spheres created a 
new class of elites, one which left the middle class by the wayside.180  The middle 
class, from which Ohlendorf came, was thwarted by the need for rearmament; 
independent craftsmen and small-scale manufacturers were restricted by state run 
corporations.181  As industries increased production, employment opportunities 
increased, and many small farmers and artisans relocated to industrial towns to 
pursue employment.  The Reich propaganda machine attempted to blur the lines 
between white and blue-collar work in the “blood and soil” (blut und boden) 
campaign.182  The phrase, coined by R. Walther Darré, had not only venerated the 
farmers, but also attributed to them a status higher than that of the middle or 
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working class, a concept rooted in eugenics and racial theory.  Prior to Hitler’s 
ascendancy to Germany’s chancellorship in 1933, the ideas of “blood and soil” were 
ingrained in the agrarian, rural communities of Germany.  However, as the Nazis 
rose to power, they fashioned the “blood and soil” campaign into an immense 
propaganda measure, targeting the whole of Germany and the creation of the 
Volksgemeinschaft, or people’s community.  The idea of the Volksgemeinschaft was 
one of the most important components of Nazi ideology and economics. 
 In general terms, Ohlendorf fought for a Nazi-run, state controlled system of 
economics that would most benefit the middle class, Mittelstand. The term was 
coined during the Stresseman era, and is literally translated “middle estate,” 
referring to owners of small and medium-sized businesses, clerks, and white-collar 
workers, describing the middle layer of Weimar society.183  By the time the Nazis 
came to power however, this group of people and small-scale farmers were fused 
together into the Mittelstand.  In The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, Jeremy Noakes 
argued that the classification of Mittelstand was “archaic status evaluation” that 
denoted economic status rather than class.184  According to Ludolf Herbst, Ohlendorf 
was one of the “most prominent advocates” of Nazi middle-class policy.185  He was a 
National Socialist of the “purest waters,” because he understood the importance of 
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the middle class in the success of National Socialist ideology.186  When Ohlendorf 
was associated with Jessen and the economic sphere, they both argued for a Nazi 
economic theory based on a domestic market provided by the middle class and 
products.187 
 Ohlendorf’s time in the academic realm offered him the opportunity to 
combine his interests in practical economic theory with that of National 
Socialism.188  As an academic and a contributor to Reichsgruppe Handel, Ohlendorf 
consistently lobbied against state ownership of corporations, which contributed to 
the closing of small businesses.189  He believed that if the government spent beyond 
its means to have state mandated control of big business, as fascist Italy did, there 
would be an end to entrepreneurship, and the Görings of Germany would 
accumulate too much power through corporate wealth.190  In one sense, he 
advocated for a free market, one with a thriving national economy and strong small 
business sector.  This is not to be confused with a true market economy with free 
trade.  The economy would be controlled by the Nazi party, yet regulated in a more 
equitable fashion, with protections for the small business sector.  In promoting 
these ideas, Ohlendorf challenged how big businesses acquired wealth, and 
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advocated for domestic and maritime trade and the middle class, who would be the 
greatest beneficiaries of the measures he supported.  To Ohlendorf, this was 
completely aligned with National Socialist ideology and unequivocally anti-
Bolshevik, even though the Bolsheviks held the working class in greater esteem than 
any other social class.  It was also anti-fascist, which to Ohlendorf was an unjust, 
dictatorial, state-run system that ignored the rights and needs of the people, 
centering the system around the state.  He was completely opposed to the 
“Bürokratisierung der Wirstschaft” (bureaucratization of the economy), which in fact 
did take place, because of the war.191  To Ohlendorf, adding more control and more 
people to regulate the economy was the opposite of a Nazi economy.  However, in its 
need to quickly acquire and accumulate war materials, the Nazi government did not 
share Ohlendorf’s economic theories. 
 At the beginning of Ohlendorf’s career in economics, he aspired to create a 
National Socialist University of Economics.  Near the end of the war, Ohlendorf again 
spoke of how to properly integrate economics, trade, academia, and National 
Socialism under one inseparable entity.192  He sought to create a national archive of 
economics; by gathering intelligence reports from multiple sources, he hoped to 
generate a centralized plan for the national economy.  His goal was to essentially 
design a database for Nazi economic policy that incorporated expert information 
from many subject areas, to be used in the future, specifically in the post-war era.193 
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 Ohlendorf, sharing Hitler’s view, always thought of Germany in a romantic, 
glorified, and utopian way, according to Herbst. He wanted Germany to be an 
agrarian-based Reich.194  This dove-tailed with his ties to the Anthroposophical 
society, and his support of organic, biodynamic farming.195  The theories of 
biodynamic farming, developed by the founder of the Anthroposophical society, 
Rudolf Steiner, combined organic farming techniques with esoteric principles.  
Having been raised on a farm may have ingrained in Ohlendorf the philosophy of 
“green,” organic farming.  Despite the fact that, early on, the Nazis banned all sorts of 
organizations, including religious groups and those not aligned with National 
Socialist ideology, the Anthroposophical society was not banned until later.  
Ohlendorf believed that aspects of the society’s theories, such as biodynamics, were 
applicable to German agriculture and society, and were in line with Nazi philosophy.  
This would create an unequivocal bond between the Aryan race, the soil, and what 
Germany was consuming.196  However, because of the ties between biodynamics and 
Anthroposophy, Himmler and other Reich leaders rejected its tenets.  The Nazi party 
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wanted to avoid being internationally affiliated with farming techniques that arose 
from what they saw as a cult society. 
 Biodynamics was part of a backlash against technology in agriculture, an area 
in which Ohlendorf took issue with National Socialist ideology.  For supporters of 
biodynamics, the use of innovative technology was good for the German economy.  
But using technology in this process and industrializing it would further taint the 
soil.  The Nazi economy was geared to the promotion of big industry rather than the 
protection of small-scale experiments, such as biodynamic farming.  What Ohlendorf 
supported, “handicraft livelihoods of the Mittelstand, “could not survive in an 
economy based heavily on the accumulation of war materials.197  He sought to 
protect the small producers, but could not do so because of his “adherence to the 
mystical biodynamic farming practices of Rudolf Steiner’s anthroposophy.”198  
Anthroposophy became a hindrance for him as the Nazi party not only continued to 
distance itself from Steiner’s beliefs, but also pressured Ohlendorf to dissociate 
himself from the group.  If he had not agreed to quiet his association with 
Anthroposophy, he might have jeopardized his career. 
 Ohlendorf was unimpressed with the manner in which the Nazis practiced 
their economic strategies, and disapproved of their dismissal of practical 
biodynamic farming.  He constantly had to explain his relationship with the 
Anthroposophical society, defending elements of their philosophy, such as 
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biodynamics, to the Reich. His views were overruled, and German rearmament 
became completely industrialized.  However, Germany did not have sufficient funds 
to sustain a war, genocide, and the Third Reich’s thousand-year reign.  In a different 
place and time, Ohlendorf’s conviction that the economy should be slowly built at a 
grass-roots level, might have proven to be right.  But again, the Nazi party’s power 
prevailed, and Ohlendorf, at least temporarily, submitted to the war machine-driven 
economy. 
Reichsicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) 
 As the outbreak of World War II approached, Heydrich reconsidered 
Ohlendorf’s role in the Nazi government.  The RSHA was redesigned to incorporate 
elements of the already existing SD, SS, Gestapo, and other independent Nazi 
government organizations into one larger Reich Security Main Office.  Prior to the 
establishment of the RSHA, the SS and SD, under Himmler’s order and direction, 
were the primary agencies conducting intelligence in the Reich.  As the war drew 
near, and Germany had blatantly violated rearmaments provisions of the Treaty of 
Versailles, it was believed that wartime success would be dependent on 
consolidating intelligence and police groups under a single governmental agency. As 
leader of the newly-formed RSHA, Heydrich carefully selected appointees to head 
the divisions.  When it came to filling the AMT III directorship, he reluctantly turned 
back to Ohlendorf, who was still serving the SD in his “volunteer” capacity.  As head 
of AMT III (German-settled areas), Ohlendorf conducted all public opinion research 




again from June 1942-May 1945.  The gap from June 1941-June 1942 represents the 
time in which Ohlendorf was transferred and assigned to the Russian front.  He 
became commander of Einsatzgruppe D, and under his leadership, 91,678 victims 
were murdered.199 
 The nature of the duties of the RSHA is peculiar.  Wildt argues that it was an 
improvised agency that was not solely a police institution, fusing together the SS and 
Gestapo, but more importantly, was a tangible representation of the 
Volksgemeinschaft, or people’s community.  Combining the ideology of the Volk, the 
state, and racial supremacy made the RSHA into an administrative representation of 
the people.  Every aspect of the RSHA was designed to be one component of the 
greater Nazi “worldview expressed in the ‘will of the Führer.’”200  In this worldview, 
Adolf Eichmann was employed as a specialist in Jewish deportation in the RSHA.201  
This shows increased Nazi urgency in systematically dealing with the Jews as a 
whole.  It is also clear how the Einsatzgruppen grew out of the administration, and 
how effortlessly one branch of the RSHA could be expanded or adapted.  This is 
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most evident in the establishment of the Einsatzgruppen and, in particular, how in 
1941 Ohlendorf was transferred to the front while under the umbrella of the RSHA 
and SS, i.e. Heydrich and Himmler. 
 The RSHA was a flexible institution grounded in, first and foremost, National 
Socialist ideology.  For Wildt, the organization and its leaders had to adapt to 
expanding tasks and changing political situations, so as to be able to enforce the 
“greatest possible influence” in Germany.202  The war provided the opportunity for 
the RSHA to implement any policy it wished, initially demonstrated with the 
invasion of Poland.  Here the RSHA was more than an intelligence-gathering and 
assessment organization, as Nazi racial ideology became government policy.  In 
Poland, the Einsatzgruppen, a new division controlled by the RSHA, eliminated 
political opponents and instituted racial policy on a large scale.203  This aspect will 
be revisited in a later section on the inception of the Einsatzgruppen and Ohlendorf’s 
transfer to the Russian war in 1941.  Most importantly, the flexibility of the RSHA 
was demonstrated in how its leaders were allowed to independently enact policies.   
Regarding the persecution of the Jews, Wildt argues that the National 
Socialist regime wanted “politically dedicated men like Ohlendorf,” not subordinate 
bureaucrats, to implement extermination policies.204  The Reich believed that Nazi 
ideologues were vital; men such as Ohlendorf who would implement and defend not 
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only the so-called Final Solution, but who could also perfectly align it with other 
Nazi rhetoric.  This ability is likely what drove and sustained Ohlendorf’s career.  
Wildt fights against Goldhagen’s argument for “eliminationist anti-Semitism” 
inherent in these particular leaders, saying that there is no evidence in the early 
lives of these men to support this claim.205  Wildt instead emphasizes that the RSHA 
leaders were bred in specific economic and political conditions in the interwar 
period.  They grew up resenting the treatment of Germany, and thus made careers 
out of trying to make their country thrive again. 
 Why was Ohlendorf chosen for the RSHA if he and Heydrich had already 
disagreed on a number of issues, leading to Ohlendorf’s suspension from the SD?  
Heinz Höhne put it simply; Himmler “clung to Ohlendorf,” fearing backlash from the 
party, and Heydrich held onto him for his “expertise.”206  While employed as a 
lecturer with the universities and with the National Trade union, Ohlendorf had won 
the favor of trade unions and those opposed to large corporate wealth in Germany.  
Hanno Sowade argued that one particular reason for keeping Ohlendorf involved in 
the unions was the “lack of economic experts in the SS.”207  This is a recurring theme 
in the historiography: the Nazi quest for building a legitimate government through 
the hiring of “experts” in their respective fields.  By this time, Ohlendorf had made 
himself an expert in economics, and his work experience overrode the lack of an 
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official degree in the field of economics.  His resumé included working with Jessen 
on political science and economics, and in the National Trade Group.  Thus, he 
became a practicing economist with practical National Socialist economic theories.  
Although he never actually attained a degree in economics, the RSHA viewed 
Ohlendorf as an expert in economics and trade, based on his advanced degree in 
jurisprudence and experience teaching economics. Sowade argued that Ohlendorf 
was significant in trade groups and unions and among the middle class because of 
his broad-based economic theories, saying “it was remarkable” that he held three 
offices concurrently: RSHA, Reichsgruppe Handel, and the economics 
administration.208  Even for an Alter Kämpfer, this was extraordinary. 
 Despite what Heydrich and other party members thought of Ohlendorf’s 
demeanor and persona, he brought a much-needed expertise to the newly 
established and ideologically driven RSHA. As the larger picture unfolded, Ohlendorf 
was the ideal candidate for leader of AMT III, especially since the new division was 
derived from his office, SD Hauptamt Zentralableitung II.209  His ruthless honesty 
and careerist drive proved extremely beneficial to the Reich: He provided reports 
that were highly objective by his standards, gathered intelligence, and ensured the 
accuracy of his data to the point of being hyper-critical of all things related to the 
Reich.  About this transition, Ohlendorf said “as the Reichsführer-SS [Himmler] did 
not intend to develop the…[SD] intelligence service…the solution of an external 
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façade was sufficient.”210  While this statement was made in retrospect, at the time, 
Ohlendorf really believed he was making a difference, and helping the German 
people with the reports and thus, helping the Nazi party prosper. 
The Reports: Meldungen aus dem Reich 
 RSHA, AMT III (SD-Inland) was designed to produce honest and nonbiased 
accounts of opinions in the Reich.  The conundrum Ohlendorf had was that Himmler 
forbade him from investigating the Party itself, while at the same time, expecting 
him to cover all “spheres of life.”211  Ohlendorf sent agents out to conduct secret 
polls, accruing data from all realms and areas of society.  He assured Himmler and 
other Reich officials that his “greatest worry” would be to have the German people 
believe the Party was something “negative or hostile,” or to portray Hitler and the SS 
as anything other than a helpful extension of the Volk.212 
 The reports themselves were quite simple in format, such as statistical data 
based on material collected on life in wartime Germany.  Each report began with a 
summary of the event, and stated basic public reactions to it.  The writing style was 
factual and “humorless,” providing figures and individual examples of how things 
like transportation issues affected someone’s everyday life.213  At the conclusion of a 
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particular report, there were recommendations provided, such as “therefore, it is 
suggested…;” “the matter is still under consideration;” and “Police have been 
informed.”214  Each report contained a summary of the problem or issue, an 
assessment of its importance, and why it should be addressed by the Reich. The 
process of data collection was explained to Felix Kersten; “of course we have our 
confidential agents everywhere…but they’re not employees who denounce the head 
of their firm…they report to us how the situation stands in every field and don’t get 
a penny for doing it.”215  Ohlendorf made sure to note these ‘volunteers’ were 
properly screened, and any statistical data that seemed unreliable was dismissed 
along with the agent.216  Specific instructions were given to the secret agents, that 
they were to report on public reaction to particular policies and events such as the 
invasion of the USSR, food rationing, fall of France, etc.217 
 Arthur L. Smith’s “Life in Wartime Germany: Colonel Ohlendorf’s Opinion 
Service” described the scenario of hands-on information collection.  According to 
Smith, in certain areas of Germany, a number of volunteers were sent to gather data 
(questions and topics chosen by Ohlendorf and his team of experts) by “listening in 
his own circle of friends, family, and business associates.”  The agents were glorified 
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eaves-droppers who went to public places and gathered information from schools, 
churches, clubs and the Hitlerjugend.218  Ohlendorf gave “special attention” to rumor 
control, such as those surrounding the 1939 assassination attempt on Hitler’s life, 
but Smith argued that the Goebbels propaganda machine often planted rumors 
preceding a new Reich policy, to test public reaction before it was implemented.219  
This made Ohlendorf’s opinion service and data collection all the more important, as 
his reports showed how the propaganda machine was failing to appropriately 
convey messages.  For instance, public reaction to newspaper articles planted by 
Goebbels often led to having to those papers having to issue apologies for offending 
certain groups in the population.  Since newspapers were forbidden to publish 
crime statistics, Ohlendorf’s reports served as the only means for gathering 
statistical data on criminal acts.220  The reports were successful in that they 
exhaustively documented dissent and public opinion in Nazi Germany.  However, for 
Ohlendorf, as the war drew near and began, the material became increasingly 
depressing, showing the lack of public support for the Nazi Party. 
 Ohlendorf’s steadfast devotion to true National Socialism made him appear 
to his colleagues and superiors as “the archetype of the schizophrenic SS 
intellectual,” an obedient Nazi careerist who, as Gralshüter of National Socialism, 
                                                          
218 Smith, “Colonel Ohlendorf,” 3, and Marlis Steinert, Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen 
(Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag, 1970), op cit., pp. 44-45. 
 
219 Smith, “Colonel Ohlendorf,” 4. 
 





unabashedly hoped the Party would fail.221  Much like Ohlendorf’s dream of having a 
true opinion service in the SD, his RSHA reports on the Reich were met with hostile 
criticism.  As he delved deeper, investigating the so-called “spheres of life,” 
Ohlendorf, “the puritan”, discovered so many problems and mutilations in the Nazi 
system that his utopian faith and belief in National Socialism was destroyed.  He 
even went so far as to say the Party was dying from cancer.222 
 Naturally, Ohlendorf’s enthusiasm for the National Socialist cause began to 
dwindle, not without notice from Himmler.  Felix Kersten, Himmler’s personal 
physician, recalled a conversation about Ohlendorf with Himmler saying “I hope 
you’ll be able to help him; he has trouble with his liver and gall-bladder.  His reports 
are always gloomy; he has the pessimistic outlook which goes with physical 
suffering…I don’t care for the man…he has no sense of humor…”223  Himmler was 
oblivious to the fact that perhaps the results from the polling and reports made 
Ohlendorf feel hopeless and grim.  He saw Ohlendorf as a “school master watching 
over me,” rather than a devoted Reich official who gathered intelligence that 
revealed that the people were turning against his Party.  As the war intensified and 
victory was no longer assured, the reports increasingly began to focus on criticizing 
the Goebbels propaganda machine.  The German people suffered from the usual 
wartime problems like depreciated currency, scarcity of food items and fuel, and 
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shortages of all types of products, which created a depressed Volk.224  A report 
dated 20 April 1944 stated “…desire for a rapid end to the war is everywhere very 
great.”225 
 Disagreements with specific Party officials like Himmler escalated as the war 
continued.  In his testimony at Nuremberg, Ohlendorf recalled Himmler referring to 
him as a “humorless Prussian,” and by 1942, Goebbels, Bormann, and Hans Frank all 
questioned the accuracy, viability, and need for the reports in the Reich.226  
However, none of Ohlendorf’s personal Party feuds or open criticism of the SD 
reports ever led to his dismissal from the SS, although according to Höhne, Himmler 
threatened to have Ohlendorf arrested several times.227  This is probably because 
Ohlendorf was a valuable asset to the Reich, a respected Alter Kämpfer who 
conducted public opinion reports concerning what the German people thought 
about each topic.  It was in the best interest of the Reich to address these concerns.  
Additionally, Ohlendorf’s work with the National Trade Union and Reichsgruppe 
Handel won him the favor of his peers.  However, Himmler refused to show Hitler 
the reports, saying “they would only impair the Führer’s capacity for action,” and 
often, they were returned to Ohlendorf edited and virtually useless.228  Despite Party 
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conflict, criticism of the reports, and remarks about Ohlendorf’s character, his career 
flourished, and he rose ever higher, earning choice promotions and decorations.  
Again, the fact that Himmler clearly disliked him had no great bearing on his career.  
Although this is a contradiction, it must be included to better understand why 
Ohlendorf’s professional success was so extensive.  First and foremost, he was a 
committed, dedicated Alter Kämpfer of Nazi ideology, which bound him to his career, 
the Party, and to Germany.  It is also likely what contributed most to his unexpected 
transfer to the Einsatzgruppen. 
 By the summer of 1943, and a year removed from his service in the 
Einsatzgruppen, Ohlendorf’s SD reports were finally restricted, and by 1944, 
completely banned, with the exception of a special report on the 20 July 
assassination attempt.229  Ohlendorf was enraged and told Kersten that Himmler 
“wants to know the names of the men who drew up the report of those who made 
unpleasant remarks, so that he can hold them responsible.”230  Ohlendorf went on to 
say “I don’t think there’s another intelligence service in the world which has such a 
hard time as we have, constantly at loggerheads with our own chief and 
endangering our own existence simply because we insist on making objective 
reports.”231  Ohlendorf’s reaction was true to his character and temperament: 
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insisting his beliefs superseded everyone else’s, trying to prove himself to anyone 
who would listen.  In this case, Ohlendorf’s outrage at Himmler’s termination of the 
opinion service is justified.  Himmler believed that since the reports became 
increasingly grim and depressing, there was no need to bother to show them to 
Hitler.  He personally could not understand the point of the reports anyway.232  In a 
conversation with Felix Kersten, Himmler said of Ohlendorf and the reports:  
His pet idea is that I should let the Führer see his reports.  But they’re usually so pessimistic 
that this is quite out of the question; they would only impair the Führer’s capacity for 
action…Details which are unhelpful must be kept from the Führer, however important they 
may appear.  His task is to lead us to victory; I must keep him from anything which might 
interfere with this task, even if Herr Ohlendorf does not share this view.  But if you’ll only 
restore Ohlendorf to health and strengthen his nervous system, he’ll soon be looking at the 
world through different eyes.233 
 
Himmler’s approval of the reports was completely dependent on whether or not 
Ohlendorf, and his spies, were reporting progress within the Reich. As the duration 
of the war increased and Germany’s chance to win diminished, dissent heightened in 
the Reich, as seen in the reports.  Himmler’s personal differences with Ohlendorf 
could not allow the reporting to continue, to the point where he suggested that 
Ohlendorf needed medical treatment.  To Himmler’s conversation above, Ohlendorf 
responded in kind to Kersten saying “…tell the Reichsführer that your treatment is 
having its effect, my nerves are improving and my pessimism vanishing.  Then 
perhaps he will take my reports more seriously.”234  He and his staff not only 
recorded reactions to current events, but tried to “chart significant trends” which 
                                                          
232 Smith, “Colonel Ohlendorf,” 6-7. 
 
233 Kersten, Memoirs, 215-216, conversation with Himmler, 18th September, 1943. 
 





are evident in the Meldungen.235  Unfortunately, Himmler no longer wanted the 
reports to continue because, in his mind, they were useless; the reporting was 
stopped in 1944. 
 In retrospect, the reports demonstrate general German discontent with the 
war, a lack of belief in victory, and after the failed invasion of the Soviet Union, a 
push to make peace.236  Despite this, and to combat the pessimism of the reports, 
Ohlendorf said “…I’m always trying to make the consequences of…” not running a 
proper dictatorship …”clear to the Reichsführer, especially to point out to him its 
devastating effects in war-time…What I’m trying to do is to foresee…future 
consequences.”237  He wholeheartedly believed the opinion reports could change 
Germany for the better, and could not understand why Himmler cast them aside. 
Ohlendorf’s frustration was justified, as the reports were not significant to the Reich 
leaders during the Second World War.  Despite regular SD reports continuing to 
brief the leadership on general topics until the end of the war, such as “Stimmung 
und Haltung der Arbeiterschaft” (Mood and Attitude of the Workforce), on July 13, 
1944, the last official public opinion report was issued.238 
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The End of the Reich 
 After Ohlendorf returned from his transfer to the Soviet front as leader of 
Einsatzgruppe D, he resumed his administrative duties as head of RSHA AMT III.  He 
continued with the SD reports, but the unfavorable light cast on the Reich through 
public opinion polling was too much for Himmler to face.  However, Ohlendorf did 
not exclusively focus his careerist ambitions on the RSHA.  Following his 
Einsatzgruppen duties, representatives from the Ministry of Economics attempted to 
“win Ohlendorf for the ministry” because his economic policies opposed Speer’s, and 
favored the small business community.239  This initially failed, but in 1943, 
Ohlendorf became director of the Ministry and deputy to Secretary of State, Dr. 
Franz Hayler.  Hayler’s health had been failing, and the Ministry was faltering under 
the leadership of Walther Funk.  Ohlendorf provided a beneficial solution to the 
stress the war had placed on the economy by creating a “think tank” to try and solve 
problems of rationing, and attempting to restore economic order.   
 While working for the Ministry of Economics, Ohlendorf began to think about 
the post-war economic state of Germany.  He assumed the role of “mediator and 
coordinator” in industrial sectors, and sought to negotiate a transition plan from 
war-time production to post-war recovery.  He utilized his RSHA position to draft 
plans under which individual corporations amassing conspicuous wealth would 
cease to exist, and state control over the economy would be decreased.  He hoped 
these changes would lead to more equitable distribution of wealth in Germany.  
                                                          




Hanno Sowade further argued that Ohlendorf’s post-Einsatzgruppen economic 
policies were so significant that they carried over into the work of future Chancellor 
of the Federal Republic of West Germany, Ludwig Erhard, whose initial ideas were 
brought to Ohlendorf in 1944.240  Ohlendorf’s efforts to create a sound economic 
future for Germany were hastened, yet failed to become a reality because of the 
impending end to the war.  Needless to say, post-war plans and the possibility of the 
Reich losing the war could not be mentioned in public.   
 Looking back on Ohlendorf’s career, his rise in the Nazi Party was nothing 
short of meteoric, despite personal conflict with high-ranking officials like Himmler 
and Heydrich.  This is extraordinary, even in the context of his Alter Kämpfer status.  
Käthe Ohlendorf said of her husband in the last years of his career, he “worked with 
an ardent dedication... [and achieved] growing recognition.241  Here is the list of 
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Date Rank American Military 
Equivalent 
1936 (9 Nov) SS-Hauptsturmführer Captain 
1937 (20 Apr) SS-Sturmbannführer Major 
1938 (9 Nov) SS-Obersturmbannführer Lieutenant Colonel 
1940 (1 Jan) SS-Standartenführer Colonel 
1941 (5 Oct) SS-Oberführer Senior Colonel 
1942 (16 Jun) SS-Brigadeführer Brigadier General 
1944 (9 Nov) SS-Gruppenführer Major General242 
 
He began his career as a Captain and ended as a Major General, an impressive and 
somewhat unusual series of promotions received in a relatively short period of time.  
 During WWII, German officials were subjected to yearly work assessments, 
in much the same way as the modern American military.  Looking at Ohlendorf’s 
promotions, there are consistencies in praise and evaluation of his work ethic, 
despite personal issues with Himmler.243  In October 1941, he was promoted by 
Heydrich from SS-Standartenführer to Oberführer, and it specifically states “Der 
Reichsführer hat mundlich zugestimmt,” meaning Himmler has “orally agreed.”  
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Because of his service in the east, as the leader of Einsatzgruppe D, Ohlendorf 
received the service cross first class with distinction with swords, the Ostmedaille, 
and other awards from the Wehrmacht including a Romanian decoration.244  For the 
work he did in the Reich, he was promoted yearly, and in the one particular 
recommendation for his promotion to SS-Gruppenführer, it reads congratulations for 
the “exceptional work with the SS economic policy.”245  He was also given the title 
“Generalleutenant der Polizei” in December, specifically for his service in Russia and 
as the head of RSHA AMT III.246  Without detailing each of Ohlendorf’s evaluations 
here, it is clear that his transfer to the Einsatzgruppen tremendously assisted his 
career, securing him a promotion to the SS equivalent of General.   
 In late April 1945, as the Allies and Soviets closed in on Germany, Ohlendorf, 
devoted Nazi to the end, was prepared for Germany’s surrender.  Ohlendorf had 
been planning for post-war economic recovery for several years, and at the time of 
the surrender, he was in the elite group of Nazi officials who, for a short period of 
time, were governed by Admiral Karl Dönitz.  In light of the news of Hitler’s and 
Goebbels’ suicides, and the disappearance of Bormann and Eichmann, along with 
many other Reich officials, Ohlendorf stayed with Himmler as they fled to Flensburg, 
on the Danish border.  On May 7th, 1945, Germany surrendered unconditionally.247  
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He now had to strategize his own surrender because the possibility of capture by 
the Soviets was unthinkable to the Germans.  At the time of the surrender, Ohlendorf 
was planning a new “public opinion service” for a new occupied Germany.248  Hilary 
Earl describes the circumstances of his surrender as completely “delusional.” He 
actually thought he could get a job in occupied Germany in exchange for helping the 
Allies.  She does point out that he knew he would be extremely useful as a high-
ranking Nazi official who ran an intelligence department.  However, his arrogance 
clouded his judgment, obscuring from consciousness the significance of his 
association with a criminal organization.  He seriously believed the Allies would 
implement his post-war plans.249 
 In Himmler’s attempted flight to Bavaria, he shaved off his signature 
moustache, donned an eye patch, and with the appropriately forged documents, 
smuggled himself into a refugee/POW camp.  Yet, he identified himself properly at 
the interrogation center in Lüneberg, and while in British custody, Himmler 
ingested cyanide and died shortly thereafter; he was buried in an unmarked 
grave.250  Ohlendorf alleged that he was asked to accompany Himmler on his flight 
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from Flensburg but refused, staying true to the Nazi Party until the end.  According 
to Käthe Ohlendorf, her husband saw Himmler’s flight as an act of cowardice, and 
said he asked Himmler to take responsibility for his actions and stay in Flensburg 
“as he had always assumed he would,” but instead he committed suicide.251  
Ohlendorf and the rest of the Dönitz government housed in Flensberg were each 
given cyanide, in case of capture by the Soviets.   
 The most interesting part of analyzing Ohlendorf’s motivations for surrender 
is that it never appears to have crossed his mind that his Einsatzgruppen activities 
were of any interest whatsoever to the Allies.  This was his most fatal mistake.  Had 
he objectively viewed his career, as a captor or lawyer would have, Ohlendorf 
should have seen that the Einsatzgruppen years would be viewed as a form of 
criminal activity.  Instead, his overconfident demeanor, clouded by careerist zeal, 
created a problem in Ohlendorf’s master plan of surrender to the Allies.  It had not 
occurred to him that the future would bring a war crimes trial whereby he was the 
chief defendant. 
Conclusion 
 Piecing together, analyzing, and reflecting upon Otto Ohlendorf’s career in a 
complete form shows that although the Third Reich is usually portrayed as a 
totalitarian dictatorship, there was room for criticism.  There is no question that 
National Socialist ideology, practice, and philosophy were intertwined and ingrained 
in the German people with the creation of the Volksgemeinschaft, and Ohlendorf was 
                                                          




no exception to this.  Although he was a proud proponent of Nazi ideology, he 
diverged from Nazi party belief in the practical application of National Socialist 
ideology in realms of the economy and public opinion.  He believed more strongly in 
the Nazi utopia than anyone, which led to consistent disappointment when his ideas 
were cast aside in favor of bureaucracy, big industry, and the war.   
 Another issue raised in this document is that of academic legitimacy in the 
Reich, and the high value the Nazi party placed on their government hiring 
individuals with advanced degrees.  The interchangeability of Ohlendorf’s degree in 
law with economics offers an interesting look into how the Nazi party incorporated 
these particular fields of study together in their ideology.  The Reich wanted people 
who could and would implement their policies.  Some knowledge of the subject area 
was needed, but they did not require conventional experts.  Above all, they valued 
loyalty, and whatever Ohlendorf’s level of expertise was, it was overridden by his 
status as an Alter Kämpfer.  Despite learning and analyzing how Ohlendorf so easily 
moved from law to economics, it is still staggering to see how he rose through the 
ranks in the Reich, and was recognized as an expert on a variety of subjects.  Calling 
Ohlendorf’s intelligence into question is not useful, unless tied into the entire 
portrayal of his personality and character.  Nevertheless, it is undeniable that 
Ohlendorf represented a devoted National Socialist ideologue, which is visibly 
demonstrated in his promotions and ranks.  His success was defined in terms of his 
identity as an Alter Kämpfer, his personality, and his level of education. 
 Historians have focused much effort on exploring the strained relationship 




insight into professional and personal relationships among Nazi officials.  Unlike 
some of what was said, especially from the trial, about Ohlendorf merely being 
stubborn and egomaniacal, this dissertation aims to incorporate Ohlendorf’s 
dedication to National Socialism and Alter Kämpfer loyalty into the discussion.  
Ohlendorf’s devotion to a variation of Nazism centered on the common man not only 
drove his career. He used it to justify his actions in the Holocaust to himself, the Nazi 
party, and when on trial.   
 Why did Ohlendorf fail to maintain a career in academia, something he 
openly strove to achieve?  The explanation may lie in his personality. He was 
described as a know-it-all whose frank, deliberate, and abrupt nature may have 
steered him into trouble, evidenced by the unclear conditions under which he 
moved from Kiel to Berlin with Jessen.  However, there may be a simpler 
explanation.  Ohlendorf wanted to be an agent of change of National Socialism, and 
the place he could affect the most change, he believed, was in the SD first, and then 
the RSHA.  When he came to work with the SD, he was unable to leave for two 
reasons: The Nazi party valued Ohlendorf’s ability to provide expertise and the 
implementation of policy, and secondly, he believed he could best serve the aims of 
National Socialism as a public servant. Despite his effort to decline his transfer to the 
Einsatzgruppen, ultimately this drew him into the mass murder of more than 90,000 
people.  For Ohlendorf, reconciling right from wrong was not an issue; to question 
any alleged order to kill would have been to question his dedication to and belief in 
National Socialist philosophy.  Although this part of his career, that of front line 




that the Jews and partisans of Europe must be eliminated in order to have a thriving 
Aryan race.   
 Upon his return from the Einsatzgruppen, Ohlendorf devoted immense effort 
to help the Nazis retain control of Germany, despite his open pessimism about the 
potential for a German victory.  He was correct, and more importantly, prepared. 
After six years in captivity and being found guilty on three counts of war crimes, 


































Chapter 4:  
The Einsatzgruppen: Otto Ohlendorf’s “Unexpected” Career Path 
 
 In June 1941, Otto Ohlendorf was appointed commander of Einsatzgruppe D, 
a mobile killing unit attached to the 11th Army (Wehrmacht) assigned to the Ukraine 
and Crimean territory.  Under the leadership of Reinhard Heydrich, Ohlendorf 
assumed this new leadership role and held the title “Commissioner of the Chief of 
the Security Police and the SD attached to the 11th Army”.252  Here, for ten months, 
Ohlendorf commanded and enforced the murder of 91,000 Jews and partisans.  
There are differing opinions as to why Ohlendorf received this particular 
assignment, as he was one of the educated, high-ranking Nazi officials in charge of 
AMT III- SD Inland, or national intelligence service.  The unpopularity of the 
previously mentioned public opinion reports, his affiliation with the 
Anthroposophical society, general brutal honesty, steadfast opinionated character, 
and personal criticism of Nazi colleagues are all reasons that contributed to the 
transfer.  Each of these motives alone seem more than sufficient to warrant the 
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reassignment.  Although Ohlendorf appealed the transfer process, he assumed 
responsibility of Einsatzgruppe D, embarked on a six-week military training process, 
and performed his leadership role in much the same way as every other 
governmental and academic position he held previously: with dynamism and 
excellence.253  However, in this case, the major difference was that the job entailed 
being directly responsible for enacting military and governmental commands to 
perform massive population liquidations.  
 This dissertation not only outlines the genocidal actions of Otto Ohlendorf as 
leader of Einsatzgruppe D, but attempts to create a narrative of how and why he was 
reassigned, as well as exploring from whom directives were initiated, how murder 
was enacted, how his Einsatzgruppen were affected (according to testimony), and 
how his leadership ended.  This discussion raises questions about several curious 
circumstances of Ohlendorf’s involvement in the Einsatzgruppen, as well as his 
career motivations.  Previous points in this paper point to significant factors of 
motivation, including Ohlendorf’s zealous careerism, his anti-Semitic beliefs, and his 
dedicated utopian radicalism.  This chapter focuses on underlying issues addressing 
how and why Ohlendorf was transferred, how his commitment to National Socialism 
shaped his leadership of Einsatzgruppe D, and how his status as an Alter Kämpfer 
influenced his career path.  
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 The difficulty Ohlendorf posed for the Reich with his public opinion reports 
(Meldungen aus Dem Reich), is well known, as they displayed to the highest Nazi 
officials an unwanted, unflattering, and unfavorable review of their performance, 
rated by the German populace.254Popular criticism was expressed regarding 
leadership styles, war-mongering, economic issues, policies in the east, and 
character evaluations.  According to his testimony, Ohlendorf claimed he was 
repeatedly reprimanded (for continuing with the fault-finding reports), and felt he 
was sent to the Einsatzgruppen as a punishment. However, because he was an Alter 
Kämpfer, Himmler and Heydrich needed a devout loyalist they could trust to 
perform the duties of leading the Einsatzgruppen.  But, Ohlendorf and other 
Einsatzgruppen leaders claimed Blutkitt (the bond of blood) in defense of their 
collective responsibility in committing genocide.  According to Michael Dudley and 
Fran Gale, Blutkitt is the “collective commission of crimes contrary to one’s personal 
values, confirmed extraordinary service in the greater cause, or sacred mission, 
proving and reinforcing party allegiance and loyalty.”255  In other words, Blutkitt 
was the sacrifice a Nazi careerist like Ohlendorf was expected to make.  Since he was 
an “old fighter” in the Party, he was most likely expected to willingly assume this 
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role.  Yet because he was an Alter Kämpfer, he probably could have refused the 
transfer and been reprimanded only slightly. Although Ohlendorf’s career had not 
prepared him to be a mass murderer per se, he claimed that Party allegiance 
overrode his ability to decline his transfer.  At the same time, Ohlendorf’s anti-
Semitic beliefs should not be discounted, as he was a true believer in National 
Socialism. However, his careerist motivation was the most significant driving force 
in taking the leadership role of the Einsatzgruppen.  Psychiatrist and scholar Leo 
Alexander described Blutkitt as “an age-old method used by criminal gangs 
everywhere: that by making suspects of disloyalty clear themselves by participating 
in a crime that would definitely and irrevocably tie them to the organization.”256  
Essentially, this suggests that the Nazis demanded that Germans implicate 
themselves in crimes so that they could not escape association with those crimes. 
 In the Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial 1945-1958: Atrocity, Law and 
History, Hilary Earl delves deeply into the issues surrounding Ohlendorf’s transfer 
from RSHA, AMT III (Hauptstrumführer) to the Einsatzgruppen forces.257  From age 
18 and prior with his youth group in Hoheneggelsen, Ohlendorf was the 
quintessential Nazi and National Socialism’s most fervent member and supporter.  
This made him an ideal candidate to rise through the ranks, although he claimed 
reluctance to directly participate in genocide, nor was he obedient to the leaders of 
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the Party.  In fact, Hilary Earl argues that his transfer to the Einsatzgruppen is not 
surprising at all, especially as an Alter Kämpfer.258  She states that his transition 
from Nazi economics to the Einsatzgruppen is a “good example of how the Nazis 
were able to involve even the most free-thinking members of the Party into mass 
murder.”259  To Earl, it is likely he was recruited because of his career ambition and 
Alter Kämpfer loyalty, despite his continual open criticism of many aspects of 
operation of the Nazi regime.  Ohlendorf lived as an advocate for National Socialism, 
and was constantly disappointed by how Party politics interfered with the will of 
the people.  Although there is no record of recruitment techniques, there is direct 
evidence that Himmler personally selected his Einsatzgruppen leaders.260 
 To lead the Einsatzgruppen, Himmler and Heydrich sought out men who 
were “excellent” and could carry out independent decision-making in the face of 
mass murder.  Their resumés were expected to include an ability to negotiate 
between the Wehrmacht and the RSHA, to implement Reich directives, and to 
“improvise in the face of unforeseeable difficulties and problems.”261  Ohlendorf was 
                                                          
258 Hilary Earl, “A Judge, A Prosecutor and a Mass Murderer:  Courtroom Dynamics in the 
SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial,” In Kim C. Priemel and Alexa Stiller (eds.) Reassessing the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals: Transitional Justice, Trial Narratives, and Historiography (Oxford and New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2012), 49-50. 
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an ideal Nazi, whose resume demonstrated all of the traits Himmler and Heydrich 
expected in an Einsatzgruppen leader, and an Alter Kämpfer. 
 According to Ohlendorf’s wife, he went to the front to redeem his reputation 
with Himmler.262  That he desired to restore his standing (and further his career) by 
going to the front is absolutely correct.  The dynamics of the feud between Himmler 
and Ohlendorf is certainly questionable, given that most of what is known of the 
alleged feud came to light under the pressures of the trial.  In An Uncompromising 
Generation, Michael Wildt argues that our perception of what kind of person a killer 
should be is in contrast to the view of Ohlendorf, the careerist, who probably saw 
reassignment to an Einsatzgruppen as a positive professional move.263  Wildt adds 
that anything Ohlendorf and others stated at their trials that indicates that this 
transfer to the front was a punitive measure is, in his mind, a complete fabrication.  
Like Wildt, George Browder asserts that Ohlendorf pushed the Blutkitt too far, 
because he was rationalizing himself as a “brutalized executioner trying to explain 
his own failure” and fear to decline the position.264  Although the careerist drive of 
Ohlendorf and his colleagues certainly steered them toward the war front, they 
were academically groomed, and probably believed that putting in their time 
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enacting genocide was the only way to impress their superiors and uphold their 
Alter Kämpfer reputations.  
 Contrary to what historians like Earl have argued about Ohlendorf’s 
reluctance in being transferred to the front, Ohlendorf and his wife Käthe were 
particularly adamant that he was compelled by Himmler and Heydrich to assume 
Einsatzgruppe D’s command.  At different times, Ohlendorf dismissed his 
involvement with the Einsatzgruppen as something that was not part of his career.  
In her letter to David Irving, she refers to this period as the “10 months in service” 
and is unconcerned with his actions. Rather, in writing a sort of résumé of her 
husband’s career, she showcased the “good” he created “before” and “after” the ten 
months.265  Likewise, when Ohlendorf was first interrogated by the British, he 
initially did not offer any information about the Einsatzgruppen.  After two separate 
interrogation sessions, his infamous forthrightness about the Einsatzgruppen was 
put forward only when the British interrogators found out that he was more than 
simply a high-ranking Nazi official.266 
 Perhaps this was because Ohlendorf viewed his role in the murder of 90,000 
people as normal, right, or dutiful Blutkitt.  More likely is that he viewed these ten 
months as an interruption in his RSHA career.   Thus, in his mind, the Holocaust was 
not part of his career, not a portion which propelled him into the elite and involved 
intellectually challenging and fulfilling work.  In his testimony, statements, and 
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affidavits, Ohlendorf denied willingness to be transferred.  However, it is unlikely 
his post-Einsatzgruppen career would have thrived through various promotions (all 
the way to Gruppenführer) had he truly displayed any significant objection to being 
transferred to the front.  Ohlendorf and his wife’s post-war claims of vengeance and 
mistreatment by Himmler and Heydrich were most likely made to distance himself 
from responsibility.  
 Although it is clear that Ohlendorf’s career benefitted from his transfer to the 
east, there are aspects of his employment record that corroborate some of 
Ohlendorf’s claims of unfairness from Nazi leaders.  Hanno Sowade notes that 
during Ohlendorf’s time with the SD (while he was simultaneously working at the 
Kiel Institute for World Economics and Maritime Trade), in 1938 he was reduced to 
volunteer or “honorary” duties for speaking out in favor of economic policies that 
would benefit the middle class.267  This evidence demonstrates that although he held 
the privileged status of an Alter Kämpfer, he was not completely immune to 
reprimand.  While on leave from his normal employment in the SD in 1934, 
Ohlendorf was recruited to a lectureship at Kiel by Jens Jessen. Here he acquired 
letters of recommendation to renew his leave of absence in order to commence his 
lectures and research.  However, he was told that he had exceeded the maximum 
time away, and had to reapply to be a member of the SD, and for his license to 
practice law.268  He was forced to leave the university prematurely, and once he 
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returned to the SD, Ohlendorf was, according to Hanno Sowade, “left out in the 
cold.”269  There was certainly tension, perhaps even resentment from Ohlendorf 
when he resumed his position in the RSHA.  According to Goldensohn’s interview 
with Walther Funk, he said “I always had the feeling that Ohlendorf was spiritually 
depressed…Ohlendorf must have been depressed on account of that experience…I 
thought he had something in his soul which bothered him.”270  It is unclear whether 
Funk was referring to before or after Ohlendorf’s time in the Einsatzgruppen.  If 
after, this statement could reflect a degree of unhappiness about overseeing the 
horrific killings.  However, Ohlendorf was most comfortable being transferred back 
to the RSHA, and continued to promote middle-class economics while developing a 
secret post-war economic plan.271  Ohlendorf’s work with middle-class economic 
stimulation gained him popularity with union workers, however he became less 
overtly critical of Reich leaders after being transferred to the front. 
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 In addition to feeling slighted by being forced to curtail his tenure at the 
university, and to return to the Nazi political economy, Ohlendorf delved more 
deeply into the public opinion reports. In September 1939, Ohlendorf was made 
head of the RSHA AMT III (SD-Inland) in charge of all research and public opinion in 
Germany.  Sowade argued that Ohlendorf was an anomalous character in the Reich: 
a National Socialist ideologue that was targeted for being critical of the Nazi party.  
Ohlendorf was “troublesome in many respects” to this position.272  The problem 
with this representation of Ohlendorf is that it does not include his Alter Kämpfer 
status.  Regardless of the criticism he gave or received, he was protected by his 
membership.  He just happened to have an arrogant, self-righteous personality, 
serving the Reich while being critical of Himmler, Speer, and others who did not 
adhere to what he deemed to be pure National Socialism. The public opinion reports 
were designed to operate as an “early warning system” to demonstrate weaknesses 
in the Reich, and their policies, through polling the public.  The researchers were 
members of the secret police and conducted the surveys in a way that Himmler 
disliked.  Ohlendorf said of Himmler’s opinion of him, “[to him] I was the 
unbearable, humorless Prussian, an unsoldierly type, a defeatist, and damned 
intellectual…Himmler disliked order…273  Of course this alleged description of 
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Ohlendorf from Himmler was only given during Nuremberg testimony.  Certainly, 
there was bias inherent, but Sowade, Earl, and many other historians call on this 
segment of testimony (and Ohlendorf’s description of Himmler’s character) to 
demonstrate the possible feud.  Sowade did argue that Himmler’s disdain for 
Ohlendorf never resulted in his being forced to leave the SS.274  An example is the 
testimony of Felix Kersten, Himmler’s private doctor, who also spoke of strife 
between Ohlendorf and Himmler. 
 In addition to Nazi concepts of Blutkitt, Ohlendorf’s connection to the 
Anthroposophical Society was another part of his self-defense, but only appears as 
an afterthought.  Established by Rudolf Steiner in 1922, Anthroposophy is a 
Christian-based, humanistic belief system popular in Nazi Germany as an alternative 
religion with ideas compatible with National Socialism.275  In 1933, the 
Anthroposophical Society was banned, along with numerous other religious and 
new-age societies, as part of the consolidation of the Volksgemeinschaft.276  
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However, Interior Minister Frick temporarily reinstated the Anthroposophical 
Society due to their belief in organic biodynamic farming, only to have the 
organization banned again because of its threat to the successful chemical 
industry.277  Although the association of the Nazis and the occult is well-known and 
has been written about extensively, the Nazi Party was suspicious of other 
alternative belief systems gaining strength in Germany.  Anthroposophy posed a 
greater problem for the Nazi party because lead party officials like Hess and 
Ohlendorf advocated lenient treatment of this particular society, against the wishes 
of Himmler and Heydrich.  
 Ohlendorf’s ties to Anthroposophy can be traced back to his childhood. His 
older brother, Heinrich, joined the society in 1929.278  Throughout his adult life, he 
was associated with the society, having chosen an anthroposophical doctor, Dr. 
Werner Haverbeck, as his personal physician, personal and religious consultant in 
Landsberg prison, confidant, and family consoler.  In 1951, Dr. Haverbeck 
performed the last rights and burial of Ohlendorf.  According to his wife, Käthe, 
Haverbeck even helped comfort her mother-in-law after Ohlendorf’s execution.279  
In Käthe’s letter to David Irving, she refers to her husband as having “fought” for 
Anthroposophy and that with his death, the society “had lost their protection.” She 
                                                          
 
277 Staudenmaier, Between Occultism, 131.  
 
278 Staudenmaier, Between Occultism, 105. 
 





said this despite the end of the Nazi era, in order to point out how significant his 
devotion to the society was, as well as to criticize the new system. 
 A high-ranking official being associated with Anthroposophism is significant 
for two reasons.  Not only was a group banned by the government as subversive and 
at odds with Nazi beliefs, but additionally, the movement was also associated with 
the Jews. In the beginning, Steiner’s vision of the society was much more utopian, 
displaying a wide diversity.  As more criticism amassed against Anthroposophy, 
Steiner was forced to denounce Jewish membership and beliefs.280  Naturally, as the 
Nazis slowly instituted Jewish bans and exclusions, this society was targeted.  
Whatever were the ties to the Jewish faith and membership in the 1930s, Ohlendorf 
was still a proponent of the society.  This would definitely have incurred criticism 
from Himmler and Heydrich as well.  In a desperate attempt to clear her husband’s 
name and reputation, Käthe Ohlendorf wrote to David Irving “he still fought for 
them…both the Jews and the Anthroposophists.”281  This statement seems 
exaggerated to make Ohlendorf appear as if he were a martyr for a cause.  Käthe 
goes on to write how it was a “good opportunity” for Bormann, Ley, and Heydrich to 
make trouble for her husband. It is also noteworthy that in modern 
Anthroposophical literature, Ohlendorf was named as a proponent of the belief 
system, whereas in other Ohlendorf biographies, his association is downplayed.  
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Reich leaders, like Heydrich, certainly took note of Ohlendorf’s Anthroposophical 
ties, especially since the Reich banned their practice.  If Himmler and Heydrich were 
looking for motives to transfer Ohlendorf to the front, his questionable ties to the 
Anthroposophical society did him no favors. 
 Was Ohlendorf’s reassignment to Einsatzgruppe D a disciplinary transfer?  
The preceding discussion was constructed to point out the lack of a simple answer 
to the question.  Hanno Sowade discussed Ohlendorf’s steadfast, bullheaded 
character, and problems with Himmler and Heydrich, but also points out that when 
he was assigned to the Einsatzgruppen, he voluntarily stayed longer than any 
Einsatzgruppen colleagues who took up their duties at the same time as he did.282  In 
fact Sowade says he “emphatically refused” to leave Russia early, when offered an 
opportunity.283  According to Sowade’s sources (letters from Ohlendorf to his wife 
from the front), Ohlendorf felt “accomplished...” with a “feeling of being right” 
concerning his transfer and actions there.284  Yet in the next paragraph, Sowade 
argues that “the attempt to make him [Ohlendorf] more docile by involving him in 
mass murder in the USSR had failed.”285  If the plan to transfer Ohlendorf was to 
make him more submissive by sending him to the front, Himmler and Heydrich’s 
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efforts were futile.286  Ohlendorf did not want to be transferred (or was bullied into 
it), but the careerist complied, and excelled at it.  He finally returned home a 
decorated war hero who would be promoted to Lieutenant General (Gruppenführer) 
by the end of the war.  His career continued to flourish until his surrender on May 
23, 1945. 
 Certainly, taking into account the public opinion reports, the alleged hostility 
with Himmler and Heydrich, Blutkitt, the Anthroposophical society, and his 
vocational trajectory, it is clear that there were complex circumstances surrounding 
Ohlendorf’s transfer.  Like Wildt, Earl and other historians have said that (on trial) 
Ohlendorf was probably desperately trying to find any method to expunge guilt in 
his Einsatzgruppen activities.  However, downplaying his willingness to assume the 
leadership of the Einsatzgruppen does not make career sense, especially for an Alter 
Kämpfer.  He knew this assignment would help his career; being transferred showed 
he was able to improvise, demonstrate superior critical thinking, and implement 
central directives.287  That is what Himmler and Heydrich wanted.  Without 
question, to an academic like Ohlendorf, inexperienced in participating in warfare or 
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Einsatzgruppen: Inception and Directives   
 The Einsatzgruppen arguably performed some of the most violent, heinous, 
and horrific crimes of the entire Holocaust.  Men, women, and children, Jews and 
partisans alike were slaughtered in pogroms involving being shot and thrown into 
ditches, en masse, or being loaded into gas vans where women and children were 
slowly murdered over the course of ten to fifteen minutes.  This section covers a 
basic history of the Einsatzgruppen and details how Otto Ohlendorf’s position in the 
Nazi party led him from being a desk-job intellectual to the leader of a mobile killing 
squad that murdered 91,678 people.  There are two main questions to be resolved 
regarding the Einsatzgruppen.  First, was there an execution order prior to 
Operation Barbarossa?  Second, why did the Reich pass on unclear directives to 
minimally trained leaders like Ohlendorf, to brutally murder nearly two million 
people?   
 Prior to September 1, 1939, the Einsatzgruppen, created by Reinhard 
Heydrich (SS- Obergruppenführer), were specialized military units who operated 
under control of the SS (Schutzstaffel).288  With the smaller subgroups, 
Einsatzkommandos¸ the Einsatzgruppen were a paramilitary group designed to take 
control of buildings, confiscate important documents, and question suspicious 
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activities of people and groups.289  It was not until the preparation for Operation 
Barbarossa that the nature of Einsatzgruppen morphed into the infamous killing 
units who enacted mass murder in Soviet occupied territory.  In “The 
Einsatzgruppen,” Joseph Tenenbaum argued that prior to Barbarossa, partisan 
opposition in areas where the Einsatzgruppen were assigned was directed by the 
Wehrmacht, which had its own field police, and were constantly at odds with 
Himmler’s “ambition to play general.”290  By 1941, the Einsatzgruppen were under 
the direction of the RSHA (Reich Security Main Office), and Ohlendorf was AMT III, 
SD-Inland, leader.291  Therefore, transferring Ohlendorf to Einsatzgruppe leadership 
was not a complicated task.292 
On September 27, 1939, the heads of the RSHA and Einsatzgruppen met to 
discuss measures for engaging these units after the Wehrmacht swept through 
                                                          
289 In the beginning, the Einsatz groups were sent into Austria after the March 11, 1938 
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best translated as “Task Force”. Later they are most frequently referenced as “Mobile Killing 
Units,” although this is not a direct translation. This evolution took place over less than two 
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290 Tenenbaum, “Einsatzgruppen,” 45. 
 
291 There are numerous organizations that overlapped in authority with regard to the 
Einsatzgruppen. The Sicherheitsdienst (SD, Security Service), SS (Schutzstaffel), SiPo 
(Sicherheitspolizei, Security Police), OrPo (Ordnungspolizei, order police) were all drawn from to 
acquire personnel for the Einsatzgruppen. Depending on what time and to where the 
Einsatzgruppen are referred, the associated groups change. For the time period of this essay, 
1941-1942 was Ohlendorf’s tenure as leader of Einsatzgruppe D. He was under the direct 
command of RSHA leader Heydrich and SS/Reichsführer Himmler.  
 
292 For one of the best accounts of the early activities of the Einsatzgruppen in Poland 
(1939-1941) refer to Jürgen Matthäus, Jochen Böhler, and Klaus-Michael Mallman, War, 
Pacification, and Mass Murder, 1939: The Einsatzgruppen in Poland (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 





Poland.  Heydrich, Eichmann, Ohlendorf and a dozen other officials discussed the 
Führer’s approval to, among other things, relocate Jews and Gypsies, ghettoize the 
Jews, and make itinerant laborers of the Poles.  From this meeting, the minutes 
prove there were set goals, but how they were to be achieved and what the specific 
tasks were remained unclear.293  However, the Einsatzgruppen acted on them and 
did so with the unsaid approval of the Reich leadership.  What changes dramatically 
with the invasion of the Soviet Union is that there are clear orders to kill: the 
Commissar Order and the Barbarossa Order.  The Wannsee Conference also made it 
clear that the orders were coming from on high. Despite understanding these 
directives, the act of genocide remained largely improvisational, and the 
Einsatzgruppen leaders were given little guidance regarding technique and logistics.
 Having already discussed the conditions of Ohlendorf’s transfer, he and the 
other Barbarossa Einsatzgruppen leaders were sent to the police academy in the 
town of Pretzsch for training prior to their full transfer to the front.  Käthe 
Ohlendorf wrote that her husband “…who was not a soldier…” went through a six-
week training.294  Richard Rhodes pieced together training accounts, describing the 
period as three weeks during which novices fired a weapon, listened to lectures, and 
not much more.295  He points out that since the men had to be inoculated and were 
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weak from fever, rigorous training could not occur at this time.  Near the end of the 
“training”, the assignments were given and the men, including the Einsatzgruppen 
leaders, found out where they would be deployed.  Ohlendorf received notice he 
would command Einsatzgruppe D, attached to the Eleventh Army in Bessarabia 
(southwestern Soviet Union, including Crimea, Simferopol, and Sevastopol). After 
June 1942, he was succeeded by SS Colonel Walther Bierkamp.296 
By 1941, there were four Einsatzgruppen (A, B, C, D) that were in charge of 
following the Wehrmacht, as Operation Barbarossa spread the Germans eastward.  
They were ordered to clear the German-occupied Soviet territory of Jews, partisans, 
Commissars, and other subversive groups.  Each Einsatzgruppe was assigned to 
clear territory, north to south (A-D), and liquidate the inhabitants.  With assistance 
from local police, paramilitary groups, anti-Semitic citizens, etc.… the 
Einsatzgruppen rounded up the wanted persons, and transported them to another 
location.  Here, men were shot, military execution style, and thrown into pre-
excavated mass graves.  As Operation Barbarossa expanded, so did mass murder by 
the Einsatzgruppen.  Within six months of the invasion, the killing included women 
and children, employing gas vans to disastrous effect. Pogroms like Babi Yar messily 
and chaotically annihilated more than 33,000 people in two days.297 
                                                          
296 For more on Bierkamp, see Angrick, Besatsungspolitik und Massenmord. Note that he 
committed suicide May 15th, 1945, a week after the surrender, and a week prior to Ohlendorf 
surrendering to the Allies. Thus, he was never tried.  
 
297 Babi Yar was the result of Einsatzgruppe C’s liquidation efforts. Under the command 
of Dr. Otto Rasch (and Sonderkommando leader Paul Blobel), in Kiev 33,771 people were 
murdered over a 2-day period. For more information on the Babi Yar massacre see Richard 
Rhodes Masters of Death, p. 170-180. Only 10% of the victims of the massacre have been 




After the Wannsee Conference, the “Final Solution” became official Reich 
policy, and the Einsatzgruppen forces were increased to accompany Operation 
Barbarossa.  Although historians had previously given much importance to the 
January 20, 1942 meeting at Wannsee, there is little evidence to support its 
uniqueness. The Einsatzgruppen had already been active for nearly eight months.  
The realization of this fact has generated new questions concerning the actual 
purpose of the conference.  For Mark Roseman, Wannsee changed little regarding 
the Einsatzgruppen or the Holocaust.  It did outline numbers, and documented the 
systemization of killing and procedures at camps and on the eastern front.  For 
Heydrich and Eichmann, both present at the meeting, which they initiated and 
controlled, it also provided confirmation that the fifteen leaders from different 
offices and divisions supported the transition from mass murder to genocide.298 
Already in place were directives for the Einsatzgruppen. Unfortunately, 
documenting the directives has become a contentious matter, prompting historians 
to take sides. 
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298 Mark Roseman, The Wannsee Conference and the Final Solution:  A Reconsideration 
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The debate over intent and function had dominated the historiography for 
nearly two decades.  As Michael Wildt points out, Goldhagen revisited the question 
of whether the men murdered “because they had to or because they were allowed 
to”.299  In the case of Ohlendorf, Goldhagen argues that Ohlendorf killed Jews 
because he was an eager, violent anti-Semite.300  While there is no question he was 
anti-Semitic, it is doubtful his desire was to commit the atrocities themselves; at 
least until he was transferred to the Einsatzgruppen, and he implemented orders to 
enact murder.  The crux of the intentional/functional debate is the question of 
whether Hitler was at the center of genocide or whether it was improvised as it 
unfolded.  This debate has already been previously addressed and analyzed in the 
historiographical section. Without reexamining the entire debate, in brief, it is 
centered on orders and historians grouped into two extremes.  One camp argues 
that there was a Führer order from the beginning.  The other maintains that “the 
Holocaust was the result of chaos and improvisation.” Although today there is a 
historical center at which both extremes meet, agreeing that there probably was a 
Führer order (or at least intent), but escalating the Holocaust was a result of 
improvisation.  Among those who improvised by enforcing and interpreting these 
orders were people like Ohlendorf.   
The Einsatzgruppen’s activities are well-known and researched, thanks in 
great part to the very detailed records the Nazis kept.  This did not inhibit Ohlendorf 
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and other defendants from contesting validity of the numbers at the Nuremberg 
Trials.301  Calling statistics into question was a tactic used by Ohlendorf to try and 
argue that the reports were not as accurate as they seemed.  When questioned, he 
argued that the number of casualties had been exaggerated, but was able to come up 
with a figure of 90,000, which is startlingly close to the figures in the reports. He 
stated “the figures which I saw of other Einsatzgruppen are considerably larger…I 
believe that to a large extent the figures submitted by the other Einsatzgruppen 
were exaggerated.”302  While on trial, he deduced that because his figures were 
lower than those presented by the other three Einsatzgruppen, they must have 
inflated their casualty numbers.  The accuracy of Ohlendorf’s numbers was 
corroborated in the Operational Situational Reports, U.S.S.R.303  These reports were 
sent to the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service, where the compiled 
numbers were checked by each Einsatzgruppen commander from information 
gathered by each Einsatzkommando and Sonderkommando.  Meticulous at 
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302 TWC, Ohlendorf Testimony, January 3, 1946, p. 319.  
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recordkeeping, each commando reported to their Einsatz division, and reports were 
delivered by radio, teletype, and in written summaries to Berlin.304  In Berlin, they 
were evaluated by RSHA AMT IV Office for Communism.  According to Ronald 
Headland, Ohlendorf’s estimate of 90,000 was remarkably close to the 91,678, noted 
in OSR 190 and submitted as evidence at Nuremberg.305  Where he was trying to 
show exaggeration, his object was to demonstrate how other Einsatzgruppen were 
not as meticulous as his division.  He also clarified that he, himself, did not keep a 
tally, but recalled the number 90,000 from reading the reports compiled from his 
Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos.  His purpose may have been to steer 
responsibility downward, instead of demonstrating trust in his section leaders to 
report with accuracy.   In this Operational Situational Report, number 190 dated 
April 8, 1942, it reads: 
 
Location: Simferopol…there are no more Jews, Krimchaks, or Gypsies” in Crimea.  It gives 
statistics from the second half of March with a breakdown of those killed by category and 
says “to date, 91,678 have been shot.306 
 
OSR 190 is the report that stated the total number killed under Ohlendorf’s 
command; other trial evidence aside, this is the document that officially condemned 
him to death. The Einsatzgruppen were responsible for an estimated 1,400,000 of 
all Holocaust casualties, although this figure varies from one million to two million, 
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depending on what groupings and regions are included in the death toll.307In The 
Destruction of the European Jews, Raul Hilberg points out that at particular times 
“these formations [Einsatzgruppen and local police forces] seemed to justify their 
existence with numbers.”308  By Hilberg’s calculation, Ohlendorf’s command of 
Einsatzgruppe D killed approximately 6.4% of all Einsatzgruppen casualties. While 
other defendants may have tried to deny their statistics, at the trial, Ohlendorf 
casually mentioned what he thought were the number killed in his command with 
relative ease and accuracy.309  More on Ohlendorf’s behavior and testimony during 
the trial will be discussed in a later chapter; however, the way in which he 
nonchalantly conveyed that he was responsible for murdering 90,000 Jews and 
partisans astounded the courtroom. According to Otto Ohlendorf, and all except for 
one Einsatzgruppen Trial defendant, there was a clear order that the job of the task 
forces was to eliminate Jews and partisans on the eastern front, following the 
Wehrmacht’s advance through Operation Barbarossa.  In “The Tasks of the SS 
Einsatzgruppen,” historian Alfred Streim analyzed testimony of defendants 
concerning directives.  He concludes that there was no order in the beginning, but 
                                                          
307 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 3 Volumes, 3d ed (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2003), 1320. See also a painstakingly researched and 
chronicled breakdown of casualty statistics in the chapter entitled “Statistics of Jewish Dead.” 
The Einsatzgruppen Trial’s opening and closing arguments estimated 2,000,000 killed. See 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum transcript, Court II, Case 9 The United States v. Otto 
Ohlendorf, et.al. RG-06. 024 *19 Otto Ohlendorf 1948 Apr. 8. 
 
308 Hilberg, Destruction, 1303. 
 





there was some procedure in place for enacting murder.310  Evolving policies began 
with the call to eliminate draft-aged men, and quickly escalated to orders to kill any 
man, woman, and child of particular ethnic and religious identities, as well as any 
person deemed to be a Reich enemy. Fear of revenge for those killed was the 
defense’s way to justify murdering women and children after Barbarossa.311  
Specifics on murdering women and children will be addressed later in this 
dissertation.  
 Ohlendorf’s affidavits, pre-trial, and trial testimonies indicate that from the 
beginning, there was a standing order for “liquidation.”312  Ohlendorf, an 
experienced lawyer himself, possibly had two goals in adopting the “we were 
following a clear military directive” defense.  Firstly, Ohlendorf’s defense strategy 
was to distance himself from Reich orders.  He did this by testifying that soldiers do 
not question orders. Secondly, he assumed he would be given a military trial, or at 
least treated as a soldier carrying out orders.  To his mortification and chagrin, this 
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312 In the British Intelligence Reports of POW interrogations (CSDIC), there is the first 
documented case of Ohlendorf claiming there was a standing order, preceding his assignment to 
the Einsatzgruppen. He never faltered from this statement, and when repeatedly asked 
(especially on 3, Jan. 1946, [339, 353]) of the nature of the orders, Ohlendorf made the court 
aware of how the nature of the order changed, depending on the date. For instance, he noted 
that the liquidation order came to include women and children (332) and that in 1942, women 
and children, specifically, were allowed to be executed in gas vans, in an attempt to make killing 





was not the case.313  Thanks to the testimony of Erich von Manstein, commander of 
the 11th Army, and the myth of the “Clean Wehrmacht”, paramilitary groups like the 
SS or Einsatzgruppen were tried much more hastily and severely punished.314  If the 
Wehrmacht were aware of the activities and directives of the paramilitary groups, 
their leaders and soldiers pretended they had no knowledge.315  Presumably there 
was knowledge of particular objectives or directives given that, in the case of 
Einsatzgruppe D, they were attached to the 11th Army.  The Army would have to 
know why, if not how and by whom, Einsatzgruppen orders were implemented.  
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Einsatzgruppen. The Ohlendorf’s both felt he had been wrongly tried with the Einsatzgruppen 
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he should be tried in the same way as military personnel.  
 
314 Manstein was sentenced to 18 years in prison for nine criminal counts, and was 
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Wehrmacht) denoted the myth that the Army was superior to and had no knowledge of the 
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WWII without extra blood on their hands, as it were, the Holocaust. Therefore, their reputation 
remained untarnished and leaders unscathed. For more information on “clean Wehrmacht,” see 
Wolfram Wette’s The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2006). 
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The goal of examining the disputed relationship between the Wehrmacht and 
the Einsatzgruppen is to demonstrate not only how Ohlendorf and the 
Einsatzgruppen believed they were essentially military personnel acting on orders, 
but to point out how the Reich’s inability to accurately define roles in the war and 
the Holocaust created the need for frequent improvisation. In this case, how the 
Einsatzgruppen were defined by Himmler and Heydrich, either to the groups 
themselves or to the Army, was done so poorly that it caused Ohlendorf a great deal 
of confusion.  He was given military rank and commendation; however, he was tried 
as a civilian perpetrator.  This demonstrates how ill-defined the Einsatzgruppen 
were, even to its own leaders.  Unfortunately for Ohlendorf, his defense strategy 
backfired, and he was not granted the military trial he hoped for.  But the 
relationship between the Einsatzgruppen and the Wehrmacht was, indeed, 
cooperative.  In at least one documented case (Kamianets-Podilskyi, Ukraine) the 
Wehrmacht “systematically cooperated” with the Einsatzgruppen to destroy Jewish 
communities.316 
Process and Procedure 
Conducting mass murder was similar throughout each of the Einsatzgruppen 
divisions.  There were improvised aspects involving the killing of women and 
children that Ohlendorf testified to utilizing, such as employing gas vans 
(Gaswagen), ordered by Himmler in 1942.317However, in towns that were to be 
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cleared out, the methods were similar throughout Einsatzgruppen territory.  Under 
the pretext of resettlement, notices were posted for the Jewish population to meet at 
a certain point with a day and time to be registered, to have stock taken of their 
valuables, and to await relocation.  On January 3, 1946, Ohlendorf described how the 
killings were carried out to American prosecutor Colonel J. H. Amen.  Although he 
testified only to have been present at two of Einsatzgruppe D’s mass liquidations, he 
said for “purposes of inspection,” he relayed details of other round-ups: 
COL. AMEN: Will you explain to the Tribunal in detail how an individual mass execution was 
carried out? 
 
OHLENDORF: A local Einsatzkommando attempted to collect all the Jews in its area by 
registering them. This registration was performed by the Jews themselves.  
 
COL. AMEN: On what pretext, if any, were they rounded up?  
 
OHLENDORF: On the pretext that they were to be resettled. After the registration the Jews 
were collected at one place; and from there they were later transported to the place of 
execution, which was, as a rule, an antitank ditch or a natural excavation. The executions 
were carried out in a military manner, by firing squads under command. They were 
transported to the place of execution in trucks, always only as many as could be executed 
immediately. In this way it was attempted to keep the span of time from the moment in 
which the victims knew what was about to happen to them until the time of their actual 
execution as short as possible. They were obliged to take off their outer garments 
immediately before the execution. The bodies were buried in the antitank ditch or 
excavation. The unit leaders or the firing-squad commanders had orders to see to this and, if 
need be, finish them off themselves. All valuables were confiscated at the time of the 
registration or the rounding up and handed over to the Finance Ministry, either through the 
RSHA or directly.318 
 
As told by Ohlendorf, this part of the process was similar for all the 
Einsatzgruppen.  Prior to entire communities being eliminated following Barbarossa, 
the earlier directives were still valid and used, but expanded to a level with little 
room for survival.  Ohlendorf’s description of an Einsatzgruppen mass extermination 
                                                          
 





incident is aligned with survivor testimony.  Dina Pronicheva, a Babi Yar victim, 
testified to the process occurring in a similar fashion to Ohlendorf ’s version.  Other 
accounts describe Einsatzgruppen perpetration in full gruesome detail.  “The 
execution area was a terrible sight.  The ground round the well was covered in 
blood; there were also bits of brain on the ground which the victims had to step 
in…but it wasn’t at that point that they first realized what lay ahead for them.  They 
could already hear the shooting and screaming from the place where they were kept 
waiting.”319  A member of Einsatzgruppe C, instructed to perform his first killing 
session said “…I only managed to shoot about five times.  I began to feel unwell, I felt 
as though I was in a dream.  Afterwards I was laughed at because I couldn’t shoot 
anymore.”320  An account from Anton Heidborn (Sonderkommando 4a) said after a 
mass execution “the next few days were spent smoothing out banknotes belonging 
to the Jews that had been shot…totaled millions…It was packed up in sacks and sent 
off somewhere.”321  Having eyewitness accounts proves significant to studying the 
Einsatzgruppen for figuring out systemization, directives, and mechanization of the 
Holocaust on the eastern front. More importantly is the insight it provides into the 
psychology of killers. 
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The mission of the Einsatzgruppen did evolve from its inception to the 
invasion of the Soviet Union.  What carried over from the Einsatzgruppen 
procedures of 1939 in Poland was the shooting of civilians.  In the beginning, 
political groups were targeted in order to make the regime, town or village 
collapse.322  The Einsatzgruppen of 1941 still singled out political functionaries, 
intellectuals, and prisoners of war, but in a telegram from Heydrich, dated 2 July 
1941, he listed the main targets of execution and mentioned the elimination of other 
“dangerous elements.”  What were dangerous elements?  Snyder, in Bloodlands, 
argues that the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommando groups had difficulty 
recognizing Soviet military insignia to eliminate the prisoners of war as directed.323  
Snyder also analyzes how from the time of the successful invasion of the Soviet 
Union, the task of the Einsatzgruppen had been to kill Soviet elites and quicken the 
Soviet collapse, without specific directives to eliminate Jews.324  However, 
Ohlendorf’s argument concerning the orders is incorrect because by August 1941, 
Himmler endorsed the complete extermination of Jewish communities.   
There was a pre-existing directive to eliminate large Jewish populations.  
Likewise, many historians argue that there was an order from the beginning and 
that it most likely evolved into the systematic mass extermination of all Jews and 
partisans.  If there had not been any order prior to Barbarossa, the Einsatzgruppen 
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were sent to follow the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front for what reason?  This 
makes little sense. For men like Ohlendorf, present as RSHA AMT III leader at the 
1939 Heydrich “protocol” meeting, this was already known.  Ohlendorf testified, “on 
the question of Jews and Communists, the Einsatzgruppen and the commanders of 
the Einsatzkommandos were orally instructed before their mission.”325  Although 
there was no written Einsatzgruppen order that said “eliminate all Jews from 
German-occupied areas”, the anti-Semitic quest for Lebensraum was understood and 
implemented, beginning in 1938.  Götz Aly argues that Lebensraum, clearing out 
German-occupied areas to make room for the ever-growing Aryan population, was 
the precursor of mass murder.  The ultimate goal was to eliminate social 
competition and provide relief for the German people.326  The quest for Lebensraum 
became focused against the Jews, escalating into the Holocaust. 
There are numerous details about the Einsatzgruppen killings that are clear.  
For instance, there are detailed reports of Einsatzgruppen movements, and 
documents directing the groups to eliminate political threats and prisoners of war.  
Also documented were the numbers of casualties by city, region, race and religion, 
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and how each Einsatzgruppe followed as attachments to the Wehrmacht in 
Operation Barbarossa.  Despite what Ohlendorf and other defendants said of 
number exaggerations, the Einsatzgruppen were extremely effective.  However, it 
remains unclear to what extent the actions of each Einsatzgruppe were improvised, 
and how much of the murder was mandated by the Reich.  Ohlendorf’s testimony 
revealed that there was no real, set way to carry out the murder of Reich “enemies.”  
In meetings, Heydrich gave logistical suggestions and the leaders were in contact 
with each other throughout their assignments, so there is no doubt someone 
developed a pattern for mass murder at some point prior to the Soviet invasion.  
This included digging a large trench, lining up victims at the edge of the grave or 
lying on the ground, and then shooting victims in the neck.   
Einsatzgruppe D: Committing Genocide in the Holocaust 
 Between June 1941 and June 1942, Ohlendorf commanded Einsatzgruppe D 
where he coordinated and implemented the murder of 91,678 Jews and partisans.  
The following summary of Ohlendorf’s Einsatzgruppe D was given at the trial... 
 
…During the first nine months of Ohlendorf's year in command of Einsatzgruppe D, this force 
destroyed more than 90,000 human beings. These thousands, killed at an average rate of 340 
per day, were variously denominated Jews, gypsies, Asiatics, and "undesirables". Between 16 
November and 15 December 1941, this Einsatzgruppe killed an average of 700 human 
beings per day for the whole 30-day period…327  
 
Under Ohlendorf’s command, Einsatzgruppe D was assigned to the southern Ukraine 
and attached to the Eleventh Army and, as such, conducted liquidations in major 
                                                          





cities along the route eastward.  From Piatra-Neamt, Romania, Einsatzgruppe D 
launched a two-fronted assault going north through Černovitce Mogilev-Podalski, 
meeting the EK and SK at Odessa and Nikolayev.  There, they branched through 
Ukraine to Stalino and cleared out Yalta and Simferopol in the Crimean Peninsula.  
The most significant number of casualties occurred at the major cities, while the 
smaller towns were likewise purged along the way.  Although under Ohlendorf’s 
command, Einsatzgruppe D killed 90,000 people, they killed fewer people than the 
other Einsatzgruppen.  This is likely because the invading Wehrmacht had cleared 
the southern Ukraine before the Einsatzgruppen were deployed. 
 Historian Andrej Angrick has written the most comprehensive study of 
Einsatzgruppe D in Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord: die Einsatzgruppe D in der 
südlichen Sowjetunion 1941 – 1943.  He focuses on details of the 600 men in this task 
force, which he calls “badly understaffed,” and discusses unit selection, ideology, 
structure, and murder.328  Most importantly, Angrick shows that although their task 
was murder, they were not given much direction as to how to execute the so-called 
“Final Solution,” and the shootings were mostly improvised.  Einsatzgruppe D 
formed Sonderkommando (SK10a and 10b) and Einsatzkommando (EK11a, 11b, and 
12) to spread out from the battlefront to the rear of the Army.  The SK and EK 
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groups also found the time to comb through asylums and hospitals to liquidate 
handicapped or mentally ill men, women, and children.329 
 Ohlendorf’s Einsatzgruppe D also performed mass liquidations on scales as 
large as Babi Yar, although not necessarily as quickly.  While the total for 
Ohlendorf’s command was 90,000, there were massive executions at Piatra-Neamt 
(Romania), and Simferopol (Crimea); 35,782 were killed at Nikolayev (Ukraine), 
military execution-style, between September 16th and 30th 1941.  Ohlendorf faced 
many challenges with his Einsatzgruppe division, namely the distinction between 
Crimean Jewish communities.  
330 
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 In Crimea, the Ashkenazis, Krimchaks and Karaites were, for the most part, 
resettled groups which had origins in Southern Russia and Central Asia, and held 
anti-Communist beliefs.331  There was so much confusion over how to appropriately 
identify these Crimean Jewish groups that Ohlendorf wrote to Berlin to temporarily 
exempt them until the Reich could determine how to deal with them.332  By 
December 1941, Berlin had written back, particularly regarding the Karaites, who 
“have nothing in common with the Jews except the confession.”333  This answer 
arrived after an incredibly detailed investigation of the ethnic history and migration 
of each group was compiled by the Reich.334  Warren Green argues that preferential 
treatment was given to the Karaites, who were evacuated as a Soviet-Turkic group, 
and notes that five to six hundred Karaites served in the Wehrmacht.335  The 
Askenazis and Krimchaks were eliminated, but the Karaites received a dispensation 
from the Nazis because the old tsarist system recognized them as non-Jewish.336 
 Both Ohlendorf’s issues with the Crimean Jews and how the Reich dealt with 
identification was bizarre.  The Reich expended tremendous effort in determining 
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ethnic origins of the Crimean Jews, and although the Karaites had converted to 
Judaism centuries earlier, they were given a free pass because some of the 
population enlisted in volunteer units with the Tatars.337  Even so, Green notes that 
despite records of Crimea being judenrein (clean of Jews), German reports show 
some Askenazis and Krimchaks survived the pogroms and lived in hiding.  He views 
contradictions in data as indicative of the need for further research.  One solution to 
the question of why particular time was spent sparing the Karaites is that, among 
other counter-examples, the Germans took extra consideration for “negative 
repercussions” of murdering ethnic groups who held allegiance to Germany.338 
 In the three years after Ohlendorf’s tenure with Einsatzgruppe D was 
finished, the Red Army slowly advanced into Crimea, and the Karaites had to face 
the wrath of the Soviets for collusion with the Germans.339  Uncertainty over the 
ethnic origins of these particular groups troubled Ohlendorf, the efficient careerist; 
the Germans were “baffled” as to how to deal with the “Islamized” population of 
Jews in Crimea.340  For instance, the Tatars practically welcomed the Germans as 
liberators. Crimean Muslim groups fought alongside Ohlendorf and Einsatzgruppe D 
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against the Soviets.341  Their language was not Yiddish, Hebrew, or Russian, nor did 
they appear to the Einsatzgruppe to dress like Jews or practice the Jewish religion.  
Additionally, none of the other Einsatzgruppen had to deal with this particular 
problem, so Ohlendorf was left to initially improvise on unclear Reich orders.342 
Aside from Ohlendorf’s problems distinguishing between ethnic groups in Crimea, 
there were instances of exemptions given to particular individuals.  In an extensive 
part of his testimony, Ohlendorf was questioned about working through the city of 
Nikolaev where there were numerous Jewish farmers.  He had made a 
determination that these particular farmers need not be liquidated, as they proved 
specifically valuable, saying in his defense:  
I considered it more correct not to kill these Jews because the contrary would be achieved by 
this, namely, in the economic system of this country everything would be upset, which would 
have its effect on the operation of the Wehrmacht as well.343 
 
As the prosecution pushed Ohlendorf to further explain himself, Judge Michael 
Musmanno tried to point out a contradiction in Ohlendorf’s leadership and 
character.  He was in charge of Jewish mass murder, but made the choice to exempt 
a group of farmers.  The economic expert had justified to himself that these 
producers were essential to the survival of the Army in Crimea.  Perhaps it was 
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because Ohlendorf was raised in a peasant farm family, and his upbringing made 
him more aware of their necessity.  Either way, the court rightfully asserted a 
paradox in Ohlendorf’s leadership, eventually leading to Judge Musmanno calling 
Ohlendorf “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.”344 
Women and Children 
Some of the most heinous Einsatzgruppen activities concerned the treatment 
of women and children.  When Ohlendorf was questioned about the necessity of 
killing women and children, he clearly stated that he found it reasonable and self-
evident that German forces had to murder the dependents of enemies of the Reich 
so as to protect the German nation.  Ohlendorf, husband and father of five children, 
tried to explain how he justified murdering women and children:  
I believe that it is very simple to explain if one starts from the fact that this order [of Hitler] 
did not try and achieve security [temporarily] but also permanent security, because the 
children would grow up, and surely being the children of parents who had been killed, they 
would constitute a danger no smaller than that of the parents.345 
 
Angrick adds that the Freikorps of WWI expressed the same sentiment, and to them, 
murdering Jewish Bolshevik offspring was “a prophylactic act of national self-
defense in the face of future menace.”346  This was not a novel way of thinking by the 
time Ohlendorf and the Einsatzgruppen had to deal with the prospect of murdering 
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children.  However, the emotional strain felt by Einsatzgruppen soldiers was 
something Ohlendorf considered when he said “…I never sanctioned shootings by 
individuals…I always gave orders for several people to shoot simultaneously, in 
order to avoid any individual having to take direct, personal responsibility.”347  The 
Reich dealt with this problem by employing Gaswagen, gas vans.   
 Ohlendorf’s testimony revealed that gas vans were sent to the 
Einsatzgruppen in early 1942, on Himmler’s orders.  They were “just like a box car” 
with no windows, heavy doors, and able to hold fifteen to thirty people.348  
According to Ohlendorf, this method was utilized to ease the burden of soldiers 
personally having to kill women and children execution-style.  This is significant, as 
it reveals that white-collar Nazi officials like Himmler seemed completely out of 
touch with the actual psychological effects troops experienced when committing 
genocide, let alone recognizing any effect on the people being murdered.  Likewise, 
if Ohlendorf had not been transferred to the front, he would have undoubtedly 
thought the same way as Himmler.  Ohlendorf claimed that Himmler issued the 
order for killing in gas vans to lessen the trauma for victims and soldiers alike, 
where “women and children were not to be exposed to the mental strain of the 
executions; and thus, the men of the Kommandos, mostly married men, should not 
be compelled to aim at women and children.”349  He described the details as such: 
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The actual purpose of these vans could not be seen from the outside. They looked like closed 
trucks, and were so constructed that at the start of the motor, gas was conducted into the 
van causing death in 10 to 15 minutes. The vans were loaded with the victims and driven to 
the place of burial, which was usually the same as that used for the mass executions. The 
time needed for transportation was sufficient to insure the death of the victims. They were 
told that they were to be transported to another locality. [It took] about 10 to 15 minutes [to 
be killed]; the victims were not conscious of what was happening to them. [They held] about 
15 to 25 persons. The vans varied in size.350 
 
Ohlendorf later argued in affidavits and testimony that the gas vans were not 
reliable, and would often malfunction.  To avoid the stress of his soldiers having to 
see the deceased victims before burial, the clean-up was left to local police groups 
and volunteers.  
  Therefore, the Reich transferred “specialists in extermination by gassing” 
like August Becker, Ph.D., a chemist in the RSHA, to inspect the use of gas in large-
scale operations.351  He said that in 1941 and after, the Einsatzgruppen were 
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“complaining” about the stress of employing firing squad shootings.  “I know that a 
number of members of these squads were themselves committed to mental asylums 
and for this reason a new and better method of killing had to be found.”  He flew to 
Einsatzgruppe D to meet with Ohlendorf in January 1942, staying for three months 
to observe the use of the gas vans in Nikolaev and Simferopol.  At that meeting, 
Becker said “I gave orders that all men should stand as far away as possible from the 
van during the gassings, so that their health would not be damaged by any escaping 
gases.” Understandably, the vans emitted lethal toxins to the outside, and anyone 
within a certain range could be harmed and suffer permanent damage. Dr. Becker 
reported that the men operating the vans suffered from headaches and trauma 
(post-traumatic stress) when they unloaded the vans themselves.  After his 
inspection, he reported back to Berlin and “voiced criticism about the fact that the 
offenders had not been gassed but had been suffocated because the operators had 
set the engine incorrectly.  I told him that people had vomited and defecated.”352 
 Ohlendorf was critical about the apparently complicated use of gas vans, and 
showed resentment for the Reich deploying them to his division as a “fix” for 
emotional stress and trauma for not only his soldiers, but the victims.  He stated that 
the gas vans would produce too much mental strain, for “the picture presented by 
the corpses and probably because certain functions of the body had taken place 
leaving the corpses lying in filth,” his men would be traumatized.353  He much 
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preferred military-style executions in which individual soldiers had no contact with 
the victim; they fired together and thus, followed orders and were freed of feeling 
guilt. Heinz Höhne argued that the worst possible scenario would have been an 
uproar by the victims, with soldiers forced into “firing wildly” into the crowd with 
chaos ensuing.354  Ohlendorf’s job was to control the conditions of execution to 
maintain calm for victim and executioner alike.  This did not include having to 
perform maintenance on faulty gas vans or unloading them, which revealed the 
“moment of truth from which Ohlendorf wished to save them.”355 
 What Ohlendorf’s experience with the gas vans reveals is twofold.   The way 
he enacted genocide demonstrates the typical efficiency with which he conducted 
himself in other, more ordinary, government and academic jobs.  He preferred the 
execution-style tactic of killing as a way to get the job done as quickly and 
mechanically as possible.  The second issue exposed here is a sense of responsibility 
toward his troops, rarely seen elsewhere.  He appeared to care for the well-being of 
his troops, not only to make sure they killed Jews and partisans, but also to ensure 
that they were spared from experiencing more emotionally traumatizing events, 
such as cleaning up the bodies of dead women and children murdered in the back of 
gas vans.  To preserve order, and perhaps his own sanity, Ohlendorf oversaw a 
system designed to create the calmest possible scenario for victim and soldier alike.  
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Granted, corralling innocent people, requiring them to undress, forcing them to lie 
on top of the already piled up corpses, and then executing them created no calm 
whatsoever.  But for Ohlendorf, keeping the victims unaware of their fate until the 
very last moment was essential for him to establish and sustain efficiency.    
Himmler did not concern himself with how the executions were carried out, 
even if there was no tangible way to control them.   Einsatzgruppen soldiers were 
merely told that there were orders, and they were to be obeyed.   It was in 
Ohlendorf’s best interest to instill in his men how necessary it was to their own 
survival to conduct genocide.  Thinking about how a person could participate in 
mass murder, not to mention kill women and children, historian Andrej Angrick 
asserts, “…to ask such people to understand their own doubts about the legality and 
appropriateness of the executions was beyond the mental horizons of many lower 
ranks.”356 Ohlendorf was well aware of this and, in his mind, made the welfare of his 
soldiers of high importance when conducting genocide.  
Conclusion  
 During Ohlendorf’s leadership of Einsatzgruppe D, he demonstrated similar 
form and function as with his other efficient work in the Nazi government; in other 
words, the Dr. Jekyll persona.  But the Mr. Hyde persona is shown by the fact that 
mass murder is not typical for a careerist.  The conditions under which he was 
transferred, similar to those of the other Einsatzgruppen leaders, provide insight 
                                                          





into Ohlendorf’s motivations and mentality.  He claimed to have twice refused this 
transfer, but in the end, benefitted greatly from it with all of the promotions an Alter 
Kämpfer should receive.  Ohlendorf’s case proves there was a communication 
breakdown seen in ill-defined directives leading to improvised killing tactics.  It 
seems the SS was far more interested in numbers reported, than in how precisely 
and in which ways their unclear orders were enacted.  However, Ohlendorf’s 
association with the Anthroposophical society, personal and professional problems 
with Himmler and Heydrich, and the ill will created by his public opinion reports, 
despite being potentially legitimate reasons for the Reich wanting to send Ohlendorf 
away, are all based on circumstantial evidence. Ohlendorf’s testimony and affidavits 
follow a distinct line of argument concerning his alleged disdain for being sent to the 
east.  It is unclear to what degree he did not want the transfer, and which actual 
steps he took to avoid it.  This information concerning his transfer was addressed at 
the Trial, and knowing that, it is imperative to look at a broader context, beyond his 
testimony.  Examining the circumstances under which Ohlendorf was transferred 
shows that he was needed in the east, he was efficient, and was the ultimate 
careerist, willing to do anything for a promotion.  His loyalty, particularly as an Alter 
Kämpfer, meant he was committed to the cause; this devotion overrode any other 
priorities. 
 Significantly, this study reveals another level of allowing the Einsatzgruppen 
(and military commanders) a fair amount of initiative in trying to attain overarching 
goals.  The directives communicated to the Einsatzgruppen were ambiguous, and 




provided a justification for perpetuating the so-called Final Solution, the way in 
which it unfolded for the Einsatzgruppen was much more problematic for its 
leaders.  For example, Ohlendorf and other Nazis on trial claimed there were 
unwritten orders to which they were bound, and enacting mass murder was 
definitely improvised and evolved over a period of time.  Looking at Ohlendorf’s 
time in the Einsatzgruppen, it is clear that he, like the other leaders, was 
inexperienced with regard to military training and tactics, despite their six-week 
training at Pretzsch.357  Ohlendorf claimed that “in the presence of all the assembled 
Einsatzgruppe and Sonderkommando commanders [he] protested loud and clear 
against the order for mass execution” at Pretzsch.358  Although this is doubtful, on 
trial Ohlendorf tried to capitalize on the persona created by the adjutants, that of the 
cantankerous, oppositional, stubborn Ohlendorf.  Yet, the Reich saw his transfer and 
that of his colleagues in the RSHA as an essential part of their careers, especially 
someone like Ohlendorf who already enjoyed a position of great privilege as an Alter 
Kämpfer.  This fact indicates the contrary to his alleged protesting “loud and clear” 
against mass murder.  So, true to his character, Ohlendorf reluctantly ascended to 
Einsatzgruppe D where, like his careerist objectives in the Nazi government, he 
excelled and successfully performed his “duties,” clearing the southern Ukraine for 
the Reich.  He was so successful, upon his return to the RSHA, the Alter Kämpfer 
ascended through promotions all the way to SS Gruppenführer (Major General). 
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Chapter 5:  
‘Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde’ on Trial 
 
 In 1946, Otto Ohlendorf first officially took the stand as the key defendant in 
a set of subsequent Nuremberg Trials bearing his name, Case 9, The United States of 
America vs. Otto Ohlendorf, et al; also known as the “Einsatzgruppen Trials.”359  To 
Ohlendorf’s surprise, the British Allied forces who accepted his surrender on May 
23, 1945, were very interested in investigating his position in the Reich.  These trials 
were instrumental in unveiling his leadership in Einsatzgruppe D.  Initially, 
Ohlendorf did not offer any information on his career with the Einsatzgruppen, 
although eventually his affidavits revealed that he was responsible for the death of 
91,678 people.  The trial has been extensively analyzed, most recently by Hilary 
Earl.  This chapter will not focus on procedure, but rather on issues central to 
understanding Nazi Germany and its war crimes, such as how racial policy became a 
means to defend enacting the Holocaust.  The trial showcased Ohlendorf’s deep 
ideological commitment to National Socialism. In his own mind, he died a martyr for 
the cause.   
Chief Justice Michael A. Musmanno’s characterization of Ohlendorf as “Dr. 
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” reflects important aspects of Ohlendorf’s character.  His life as 
an intellectual academic led him to a privileged career with the Reich.  However, the 
fact that he was on trial, composed, clear, and never faltering in the face of being 
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condemned to death for war crimes and crimes against humanity forever changed 
his legacy.  Dr. Jekyll was the National Socialist ideologue who believed in reform 
and success for Germany.  Mr. Hyde was the murderous role he assumed when he 
commanded the Einsatzgruppen and led 90,000 innocent people to be slaughtered.  
However, Ohlendorf’s ideological commitment and participation in the Holocaust 
were closely connected, and intertwined with his loyalty to the party.  On June 7, 
1951, after nearly six years in Allied captivity, he was sentenced to death by hanging 
for directing the mass murders committed by Einsatzgruppe D.360 
 It is important to highlight that Ohlendorf is well-known as a trial defendant 
and perpetrator of the Holocaust because legal proceedings and the trial itself have 
been extensively analyzed.   Indeed, this is the aspect of Ohlendorf’s life that is most 
widely referenced, in part because of how easily accessible his affidavits and 
testimony are.  Transcripts have been digitized by the National Archives and 
institutions like the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), Yad 
Vashem, and the Jewish Virtual Library.  Each have website sections where digitized 
copies of original documents exist for anyone to peruse.  In the present digital age, a 
simple internet search of Ohlendorf’s name will yield real trial footage on YouTube, 
as well as other resources in questionable forums.  Ohlendorf at Nuremberg has 
                                                          
360 For some reason, some references state he was executed on June 8th, not the 7th. This 
essay cannot reconcile the discrepancy, but notes there is an issue over the precise date he was 
executed. However, in Nuremberg, Hilary Earl says he was executed “just after midnight” on 
June 7th, 1. Leon Goldensohn notes incorrectly that his birth year was 1908 when it was 1907 
and gives June 8th as his date of death, Gellately, ed., Interviews, 386.    
            
            




been repeatedly studied by lawyers, historians, psychologists, and experts of a 
variety of different fields.  This analysis relies on each of the aforementioned 
transcripts and documents particularly War Crimes Trials Records of Case 9 (WCT), 
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals (TWC), and NARA 
Record Groups 238, M895, and M1019 (microfilm).361 
This study attempts to avoid referring to Ohlendorf’s testimony and 
affidavits as “confessions.”  It is incorrect to designate his statements a confession, 
because he certainly did not believe he was confessing to anything.  Most of what is 
written about Ohlendorf and the trial states in some fashion that he confessed to 
murdering more than 90,000 Jews and partisans.  This is misleading because not 
only did he believe in the moral right of what his Einsatzgruppe did, he never 
perceived these actions as criminal, and therefore never actually made a confession. 
The chief prosecutor Telford Taylor said of Ohlendorf’s testimony that it was “in his 
mind not a confession but an avowal.”362  Trying to define Ohlendorf’s 
acknowledgment of war crimes should be done bearing in mind that he did not 
believe enacting mass murder was a criminal act.  To him, it was a governmental 
policy, albeit unpleasant, necessary and instrumental to the survival of the German 
race.  However, he said “…there was certainly no logic in the leadership for raising 
this nonsense of the master race. The office for racial politics dealing with such 
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racial problems never represented this theory.”363  The perpetuation of the Aryan 
race was at the core of National Socialist ideology and practice, but Ohlendorf saw 
the Holocaust as an act of self-defense, free of any notions of “master race.”  
Ohlendorf was part of the policy-making, meetings, and conversations about the 
survival of the Aryan race, but was frustrated when questioned by the prosecution.  
His frustration reflects his desire to escape condemnation for genocide. 
 Ohlendorf’s entire trial experience was, plainly, peculiar.  The arguably 
handsome, intelligent, composed “Gralshüter” (keeper of the Holy Grail) of National 
Socialism always made an impression on the judges, lawyers, and observers.364  
Judge Michael Musmanno noted peculiarities, such as whenever Ohlendorf was 
called to the stand, he drew a crowd of visitors including “women…some even 
sought to pass him notes offering encouragement.”365  He said this of Ohlendorf’s 
presence at the trial: 
One of the most remarkable persons ever to appear before the public gaze…Handsome, 
poised, suave and polite, he carried himself with the bearing of a person endowed with 
natural dignity and intellect…forty years of age, slender and with delicate features and neatly 
combed dark brown hair, he looked out at the world through penetrating blue-grey eyes.  His 
voice was excellently modulated…and he moved gracefully and self-confidently...the electric 
sensation of absolute authority…never deserted the young major-general… The only blemish 
in the perfection of his personality was that he had killed ninety thousand people.366 
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But not everyone was as impressed with Ohlendorf’s appearance and how he 
carried himself.  Tania Long, of the New York Times, reported Ohlendorf as such: “in 
appearance he is not particularly brutal or inhuman, looking more like a somewhat 
humorless shoe salesman one might meet anywhere.”367  Telford Taylor called him 
“small in stature, young-looking, and rather comely... [who] spoke with dispassion, 
and apparent intelligence.”368 
 At first glance, elements of Ohlendorf’s testimony, including attempts at 
justifying the Holocaust, and the mentality behind his surrender, really do make him 
seem, as Hilary Earl put it, “delusional.”369  Yet this analysis attempts to consider a 
more complete picture of Ohlendorf’s character and thought-process seen in 
particular segments of testimony.  He believed everything he did was moral, right, 
and completely justifiable in light of National Socialist ideology.  Of course, his belief 
in the value of this philosophy must be viewed within the context of the 91,678 Jews 
and partisans murdered under his command.  They were therefore his 
responsibility, as the leader, along with the officers and soldiers under his 
command.  The crimes were his, no matter how he tried to justify them, and he was 
rightfully sentenced to death.  However, whatever wrong he had done, he genuinely 
seemed to believe it was right.370 
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 Upon his surrender, Ohlendorf assumed he could leverage his role as 
intelligence-gatherer in the Reich in a way that would gain him clemency.  He also 
believed that he would assist the Allies in determining the new direction of 
Germany’s government, having drafted a plan for economic recovery in the post-war 
era.  Instead of focusing on elements of Ohlendorf’s distinguished career in the Nazi 
upper echelons, his British captors flushed out his activities with the 
Einsatzgruppen.  As the Einsatzgruppen reports surfaced, dispatches of the mobile 
killing squads detailing the numbers and ethnicities of persons who were deemed 
enemies of the Reich were discovered by a team of investigators, led by Benjamin 
Ferencz.  Coupled with Ohlendorf’s forthrightness in providing any information his 
captors wished, enough evidence was found to bring him and other surviving 
Einsatzgruppen personnel to trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity.  
 When the infamous Göring, Höss, and Speer Nuremberg Trial began, 
conducted by the International Military Tribunal, Ohlendorf was in American 
custody.  He was brought in by the prosecution from that trial to testify against 
Ernst Kaltenbrunner, former head of the RSHA, who in turn claimed Ohlendorf was 
“one of my chief collaborators.”371  Ohlendorf’s tidy appearance and ability to speak 
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precisely contrasted starkly with Kaltenbrunner’s harsh, “ominous-looking” 
appearance. It was a sound strategy to have Ohlendorf testify against 
Kaltenbrunner’s initial denial of the existence of the Einsatzgruppen.  Ohlendorf 
stated they operated under his authority.372  He supposed his cooperation as a 
prosecution witness was winning him favor from his American captors, and at this 
point, it was not certain he would even be prosecuted for anything.  He saw himself 
as more of an “expert witness” than a prisoner.373  That is, until the discovery of the 
Einsatzgruppen Reports, daily correspondences sent from the front detailing 
killings.374 
 As Ohlendorf was interrogated on multiple occasions over the course of 
nearly two years, sometimes for hours at a time, his memory of particular things 
became increasingly clear.  When first debriefed by his British captors, he was 
slightly vague with details, names, and events.  With the passing of months, and 
observing how the Nuremberg Trial was playing out, Ohlendorf merely added to 
what he had already sworn to in affidavits.  Specifically, the more time he had to 
think about answering questions on the Führerbefehl, the more confidently he spoke 
about it, and the more the Americans accepted whatever Ohlendorf said as 
truthful.375  This is part of the Ohlendorf mystique. He was so honest and willing to 
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discuss answers to pointed questions under interrogation, and to give extra 
pertinent information, that the American tribunal appeared to blindly believe 
whatever he said.  His defense lawyer, Dr. Rudolf Aschenauer, would have to adapt a 
defense strategy of having each defendant covered with the same tactic. In other 
words, the other defendants had to amend their testimony to corroborate anything 
Ohlendorf had already said.  This would align the entire defense with one solid 
explanation of their crimes.  Aschenauer and Ohlendorf knew this and thought he, as 
key defendant, would escape punishment.  
 Two sides of Ohlendorf’s personality manifested themselves: the practical 
lawyer, soldier, and devoted servant of the Reich vs. the intellectual lawyer, adept at 
courtroom manipulation.  Unfortunately for Ohlendorf, his arrogant, know-it-all, 
truth-teller, and utopian National Socialist outlook were inescapable elements of his 
character that cost him his life.  Regardless, he could not and would not possibly 
deny his deeply rooted belief in National Socialism, and in his mind, he died a martyr 
for the cause.   
 Ohlendorf’s testimony showcased his careerist nature, idiosyncratic 
personality, and lack of remorse, while also revealing perplexing aspects of the Nazi 
system and National Socialism under Hitler.  The Reich had become a complex and 
paradoxical entity, one that gave promotions for committing atrocities, censored 
public opinion, and murdered the Jews of Europe.  Part of the enigma is in the 
reasoning of those who believed that there was a so-called Führer Order for the 
Holocaust, allegedly handed down to the Einsatzgruppen, who then committed mass 




policy, how was it that ordinary Germans were allowed to exterminate Jews and 
partisans without much of a standard of accountability?  There was a loose chain-of-
command and some top-down oversight.  For example, Ohlendorf was present at 
two mass executions for the purposes of inspection.  What his role in the inspection 
actually entailed is unclear.  What is certain, however, is that as long as the 
Einsatzgruppen reported that they were clearing out populations of Jews and 
partisans, the SS was satisfied.   
 No paper trail survived that actually implicated Adolf Hitler with the 
Holocaust.  Ohlendorf and most other defendants on trial for war crimes named a 
specific order under which they were supposedly instructed to perform mass 
killings.  They claimed they did it because they were ordered to, but no such specific 
order was ever found.376  In fact, the question as to whether or not there was any 
order at all unleashed the intentionalist/functionalist debate in historiography.  It is 
doubtful such an order ever existed directly from Hitler.  If in fact there was an 
order, it was probably given verbally so as to avoid any written proof.  Anti-
Semitism was ingrained as part of National Socialist ideology; policy-makers, 
logisticians, desk managers, and certainly the shooters and their commanders were 
all directly involved in the Holocaust.   
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Reliable Testimony: An Oxymoron 
 Wading into the testimony of a condemned man is problematic.  There are 
numerous reliable accounts contemporary to Ohlendorf and the trial that 
corroborate his continual forthrightness and honesty; Chief prosecutor Benjamin 
Ferencz said “…he was one of the very few men tried at Nuremberg who appeared to 
be telling the truth.”377  Both under interrogation and with the prosecution, 
Ohlendorf’s accounts of events and assessment of the Nazi regime never changed, 
even when he was interviewed while awaiting his execution.  Although the facts 
provided in Ohlendorf’s testimony were little challenged at the time, analyzing what 
he said at the trial and in captivity must be done carefully.  Ohlendorf was educated 
in the law, and thus knew how to best manipulate the system, and how to portray 
his role in particular events in a certain light.   
 Other defendants, like Paul Blobel, leader of Einsatzgruppe C, cracked under 
the pressure of the trial, while Ohlendorf remained calm throughout the entire 
ordeal.  Ever correct in his behavior, he even commended the tribunal in his final 
statement saying “…I will not conclude this final statement without expressing my 
gratitude for the very generous way in which you have treated the problems that we 
have considered important in these debates.”378  Always a polite and courteous 
gentleman to his equals, at this point, Ohlendorf certainly knew he was going to be 
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condemned to death, and yet still thanked the court.  Looking only at this particular 
statement, without understanding the context of his character and personality, one 
could simply assume that he was just another “willing executioner.”  This is why 
investigating parts of his testimony, bearing in mind Ohlendorf’s belief system and 
Alter Kämpfer dedication, provides important insights into studying Nazi Germany 
and the Holocaust.  
 Ohlendorf’s goal was simple and fairly successful: to make himself 
indispensable.  Whether it was simply his character and nature do to so, or as Ingrao 
more critically argues, that every word of his testimony was part of a master plan to 
create a fictional account, the goal was clear.379  Ohlendorf’s testimony was 
perceived as truth in the trial, and was used to measure the level of culpability of 
each other defendant in the Einsatzgruppen Trial, as well the trial of the original 
Nuremberg defendants.  On every subject he was questioned about, Ohlendorf held 
information “of the highest importance in the eyes of his American interrogators” 
and this allowed for him to “at his leisure devise defense strategies to face down the 
accusations.”380  Ohlendorf really did put himself in the best possible position to 
gain leverage, if he were put on trial.  Perhaps he was indeed delusional in 
collaborating so earnestly with his captors to offer information.  There are both 
elements of calculation and honesty in Ohlendorf’s testimony, but the most probable 
explanation of his performance at the trial is that his ego was the ultimate victor.  He 
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never betrayed his loyalty to National Socialism, and said he would commit the same 
atrocities all over again, without regret.  This is what makes him the ultimate Alter 
Kämpfer. 
Defense Strategy and Motivation 
 Ohlendorf held a degree in jurisprudence and was experienced in courtroom 
dynamics, on both the local and regional levels.  Although he chose to testify on his 
own behalf, and represent himself in court, his official lawyer was Rudolf 
Aschenauer.  Among many different themes present in Ohlendorf’s affidavits, 
testimony, and interviews, the one which most stands out is consistency. In The 
Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial, Hilary Earl argues that during the trial, Judge 
Musmanno strove to delve deeper into the religious and moral beliefs of the 
defendants in order to better figure out perpetrator motivations.381  Whenever 
Ohlendorf was asked about his family or personal life, he answered curtly, as if 
irritated by the questions, and doubting their relevancy to the trial.  How could this 
husband and father of five children justify murdering innocent women and 
children?  The answer he provided is simple: first, he never personally killed anyone 
and second, the very existence of those he ordered to be liquidated endangered the 
survival of his own family and country.  A key aspect of National Socialist ideology 
was that the Reich was dependent on the destruction of the Jews.   
                                                          





 A general analysis of defense strategies used by those on trial at Nuremberg 
have been divided into three categories by Earl: ideological soldiers, deniers, and 
conflicted murderers.  The ideological soldiers justified their actions through 
National Socialist racial policy and by arguing that they were following military 
orders.  The deniers devised a strategy of admitting to nothing.  Finally, conflicted 
murderers either showed remorse for their actions, or demonstrated signs of moral 
conflict during the killing process.382  Parts of Ohlendorf’s testimony reveal that 
during the killings, he showed empathy for his soldiers, keeping them in a constant 
rotation, and providing them a sense of collective responsibility so that they would 
not carry the burden of murder alone.   
 Ohlendorf’s defense strategy does not easily fit into one of Earl’s three 
categories.  His testimony, and those of his fellow defendants, heavily rode on his 
notions of “self-defense.”  This is how Aschenauer devised the tactic of 
acknowledging the mass executions, arguing that they were necessary to protect the 
survival of Germany against the threat of Bolshevism.  Aschenauer declared the 
activities of the Einsatzgruppen to be “in presumed self-defense on behalf of a third 
party…under conditions of presumed necessity to act for the rescue of a third party 
from immediate, otherwise unavoidable danger.”383  In other words, the third party 
was Germany, and the Einsatzgruppen leaders were simply trying to preserve the 
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survival of the Reich, and were in compliance with Soviet law.384  The problem with 
this line of defense is that it was never proven that Jews are sympathetic to the 
Bolshevik cause. This argument was similar to the one used to justify Operation 
Barbarossa: It was a preemptive attack in self-defense of Germany.  Therefore, 
killing Jews and their children was an attempt to thwart an inevitable attack against 
Germany and prevent any future revenge killings.  Following this logic, every citizen 
of the Soviet Union should have been subjected to murder, regardless of race, with 
the exception of those who were not members of the Communist Party.385  Clearly, 
this was not the case, and non-Communists were not spared.  
 Another aspect of his trial strategy was that Ohlendorf thought Field Marshall 
Erich von Manstein’s testimony would absolve him from the indictment of crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and membership in a criminal organization.  
Einsatzgruppe D was attached to the 11th Army, and although their directives were 
different in strategy and policy, Ohlendorf thought because of the association 
between the SS and Wehrmacht, that they would be tried in the same manner.  He 
expected to be able to invoke the “Saubere Wehrmacht,” or clean Army, defense just 
like Manstein did.386  He was wrong.   
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 Although Ohlendorf was unable to fight for a military-type trial like Manstein, 
he argued the military defense throughout the trial.  After all, he was given the title 
“Commissioner of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD attached to the 11th 
Army.” He was awarded military decorations, rank, and commendations, so it is not 
difficult to understand why he thought he would be tried as the military were.  This 
is the most convincing part of Ohlendorf’s entire defense.  If he could prove the 
Wehrmacht were aware of and assisted the Einsatzgruppen in their activities, he 
could have served a lighter sentence, or have his sentence altogether commuted, 
again like Manstein did.  
 On trial, Ohlendorf said he received his own “march and command orders” 
from the Army.387  In his testimony, Manstein denied ever having heard of the 
Einsatzgruppen, denied knowing Ohlendorf except for a fleeting moment, and 
refused to admit he was aware of the death of 90,000 Jews.  When asked how he 
could not know, he aloofly claimed that all of this occurred outside of his 
jurisdiction.  This is not entirely true, and surely broke Ohlendorf’s hope of having a 
military-type trial.  However, as time has passed since the trial, there is much 
evidence, apparently inaccessible to Ohlendorf or the trial officials, that the 
Einsatzgruppen had received most of their equipment from the Army.  On the other 
                                                          
For more information on “clean Wehrmacht, “see Wolfram Wette’s The Wehrmacht: History, 
Myth, Reality. Of note, the Americans really helped perpetuate the concept of the “clean 
Wehrmacht” in the 1950s, the war effort of the German military was all but mythologized. See 
Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II, The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in 
American Popular Culture (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 78-79. 
The Einsatzgruppen section of this essay first speaks of the clean Wehrmacht concept. 
 





hand, there was an order issued on Himmler’s authority, which discussed “special 
tasks.” Dictated by Hitler to Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel, “Instructions on Special 
Matters Attached to Directive No. 21” made sure that “SS-Reichsführer” Himmler 
assumed responsibility for the “special tasks,” and that he act “independently and on 
his own responsibility.”388  Despite various connections between the Army and the 
special tasks of the Einsatzgruppen, one could argue that Himmler’s authority 
absolves the Army of complicity.  This may be true, but for the Army to be tried 
completely separately from the Einsatzgruppen is problematic.  There are too many 
connections between the operations of both groups. 
 Richard Rhodes cites several specific meetings between SS leaders that shed 
light on this question.  For example, Walter Schellenberg, Wehrmacht 
Quartermaster General Wagner, and Heydrich all met and decided that the 
Einsatzgruppen were to operate under the supervision of the Wehrmacht on the 
front, although behind the lines they were completely independent.389  The 
Wehrmacht was also to provide fuel, rations, and other supplies to these task forces.  
Nonetheless, despite Ohlendorf and Aschenauer’s best efforts to move for a military 
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trial, and regardless of the evidence supporting their claim, it was a failure.  The 
cloud of Ohlendorf’s war crimes trumped anything else. 
 Lastly, as previously discussed in the Einsatzgruppen section, the 
circumstances of Ohlendorf’s transfer served his own personal defense well.  He 
very aptly played the role of the intellectual who twice refused being transferred, 
and was finally transferred against his wishes.  For Ohlendorf, being an Alter 
Kämpfer helped determine his career path, but at the trial, he stated numerous times 
that he did not want to go to the Eastern Front. He had fallen into disfavor with 
Himmler and ended up complying “only to avoid the reproach of cowardice.”390  He 
portrayed himself, to an extent, as the victim of circumstance whose ideological 
fanaticism did not give him any desire to murder anyone, yet he was coerced into 
joining the Einsatzgruppen.   
Ingrao argues that Ohlendorf portrayed himself as a party activist who was 
unfairly “marginalized” and his transfer was a means to “destroy him 
psychologically.”391  In direct cross-examination, Ohlendorf insisted that his 
assignment was “involuntary” and ardently stated that disobeying the Führer 
“would have met immediate death.”392  Throughout the trial, the defense was unable 
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to prove this statement either true or false.  Yet, the most pressing issue for the 
prosecution was about the nature of how the number 90,000 came about. 
The Number: 90,000 
 Ohlendorf himself admitted that under his nine-month command in the 
Soviet Union, Einsatzgruppe D exterminated 90,000 people.  In affidavits, testimony, 
and every other time he was questioned, he gave 90,000 as the total figure.  Given 
that, according to the Einsatzgruppen Reports, also known as Operational 
Situational Reports, U.S.S.R., 91,678 was the total number cited to date by 
Einsatzgruppe D, the accuracy of Ohlendorf’s original 90,000 went 
uncontested.393Ohlendorf was asked to verify the figure of 90,000 during cross-
examination by James Heath, who said, “I understood you to suggest to the Court 
that this figure is exaggerated although it appears in an affidavit which you have 
given.”394  Ohlendorf replied: 
In my direct examination I have already said that I cannot give any definite figure, and that 
even the testimony in my affidavit shows that in reality I could not name any figure.  
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Therefore, I have named a figure which has been reported ‘approximately.’ The knowledge 
which I have gained by this day through the documents and which I have gained through 
conversations with my men, make me reserve the right to name any figure and strengthen 
this reservation.  Therefore, I am not in a position to give you a minimum figure, either.  In 
my direct examination I have said that the numbers which appear in the documents are at 
least exaggerated by one-half, but I must repeat that I never knew any definite figure and, 
therefore, cannot give you any such figure.395 
 
Heath, unrelenting, asked again if he exaggerated the reports “which you sent to the 
Reich Security Main Office,” to which Ohlendorf replied “I certainly did not on my 
own initiative, but I had to rely on those things which were reported to me, and I 
know that double countings could not be avoided, and I also know that wrong 
numbers were reported to me.”396  He also explained that his Einsatzkommando 
units reported on killings “carried out by other units.”  Here the prosecution 
attempted to tie Ohlendorf down to the number 90,000.   Ohlendorf stated that his 
units exaggerated the reports with “fifteen to twenty percent double countings,” and 
added this from his previous affidavit on 3 January 1946: “the ‘approximately’ must 
have meant that I was not certain,” referring to previous affidavits recording the 
number 90,000 he cited.  Also from the affidavit, Heath read Ohlendorf’s testimony 
to him aloud;  
It is evident that I mentioned this number of ninety thousand by adding a number of other 
figures.  I do not mention this in order to excuse myself, as I am perfectly convinced that it 
does not matter from the actual fact whether it was forty thousand or ninety thousand.  I 
mention this for the reason that in the situation in which we are today, politically speaking, 
figures are being dealt with in an irresponsible manner.397 
 
                                                          
395 TWC, “Cross-Examination,” 269. 
 
396 TWC, “Cross Examination,” 273. 
 





 The series of questions by the prosecution and responses by Ohlendorf 
demonstrate how initially, while in custody, Ohlendorf’s story became increasingly 
specific.  In the beginning, he was vague, but still was able to rattle off the figure of 
90,000 for the total killed under his command.  However, in the previous dialogue, 
Ohlendorf seems to attempt to extricate himself from being tied to the figure 90,000, 
citing exaggerations and incorrect numbers from the Einsatzkommandos, and 
generally trying to distance himself from the number.  He was unsuccessful, and due 
to OSR 190, Ohlendorf was eternally bound to the statistic 91,678.  He was correct in 
saying forty thousand of ninety did not matter; in fact, it did not.  Because the court 
researchers authenticated the Operational Situational Reports, the figures were 
accepted as true, and no defendant could talk his way out of them.  The introduction 
to the published Einsatzgruppen Reports stated “during the first days of the 
Einsatzgruppen Trial, the authenticity of the reports was established beyond doubt, 
after which the German defendants did not challenge their validity” - except for 
Ohlendorf’s claims of inflated numbers.398 
 Two items are of particular note regarding the number 90,000.  Firstly, 
Ohlendorf was probably correct that the Einsatzkommandos included numbers from 
“other” units.  In fact, the Einsatzgruppen were extremely successful in rounding up, 
registering, and performing executions on a mass scale. Without the help of local 
authorities, this task would have proven more challenging.  The Einsatzgruppen 
enlisted local help, sometimes through voluntarism or sheer brute force and 
                                                          





coercion, to cooperate with mass killings.  For instance, Ohlendorf worked closely 
with the Tatars in Crimea, who assisted in mass murder and did so “freely” by 
offering “their services to the Germans” and “where troops and armed Tatars were 
available, actions were undertaken.”399  There are many other instances of local 
cooperation in pogroms like Babi Yar throughout the documents associated with the 
Einsatzgruppen.  In sum, the killings reported were probably not all performed by 
German SS-Einsatzgruppen draftees and volunteers. 
 The second issue deals more with Ohlendorf’s character.  The quintessential 
careerist had an unblemished record of excellence.  While composing the Meldungen 
aus dem Reich, public opinion reports, or as Reich economic functionary, or even 
with his brief stint in academia, one thing is certain about Ohlendorf: his career was 
founded and sustained on principles of honesty, accuracy, loyalty, and efficiency.  It 
was these qualities that he claimed resulted in having him transferred, as his 
superiors disliked the blunt honesty and meticulousness with which he carried out 
tasks.  There is little doubt Ohlendorf would have taken every possible measure to 
ensure the accuracy of each OSR.  Even if he indeed relied upon his 
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Einsatzkommandos to compile statistics, he would have made certain they knew he 
wanted his reputation for expediency and accuracy to remain intact.  Given that 
Ohlendorf could not physically be present at every single execution, nor count each 
individual corpse, he had to entrust his Einsatzkommando leaders with taking tallies.  
But the fact of the matter is this: if Ohlendorf disagreed with memos and statistics 
sent back to Berlin, with his name and Einsatzgruppe undersigned, his sense of 
professionalism would have prevented him from signing off on such reports.  He did 
not object, and so, performed his tasks as leader of Einsatzgruppe D in accordance 
with the rest of his professional life, with precision, and accuracy. 
Führerbefehl and Conscience 
There is a major flaw in Ohlendorf’s testimony.  Regarding the presence of 
the so-called Führerbefehl, Führer’s order, Ohlendorf lied.  About the Führerbefehl, 
Christian Ingrao argues that Ohlendorf, here, was “setting out a fiction that would 
have a long series of consequences... [and] attributing the guilt to a dead man 
relieved the survivors of their responsibilities.”400  When questioned about 
Einsatzgruppen directives after Operation Barbarossa, he stated that there was a 
prior order in place to murder the Jews, saying “Himmler told me that before the 
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beginning of the Russian Campaign Hitler had spoken of this mission.”401  Also 
mentioned here should be the existence of the Barbarossa Decree and the 
Commissar Order, which prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union, mandated that 
the Wehrmacht kill all Soviet political prisoners and Bolshevik sympathizers.  
According to Ohlendorf, the order said: “…the Security Police and SD, the 
Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos had the mission to protect the rear of 
the troops by killing the Jews, gypsies, Communist functionaries, active Communists, 
and all persons who would endanger the security.”402  Ohlendorf lied, and this was a 
major part of his defense strategy.  After all, he was thought to be fairly honest, and 
because the Americans believed him, they took his definition of Führerbefehl as fact. 
 The difficulty here is that Ohlendorf dictated the “facts” of the trial.  In “Scales 
of Justice,” Earl argues that because Ohlendorf was relatively honest and 
forthcoming in giving testimony, the prosecution and judges cared less about when 
he said the order was issued. For Earl, the issue concerns the willingness of the 
tribunal to accept what Ohlendorf said as fact because “perjury appeared to be 
beneath him.” This made him a credible witness, and historians have traditionally 
accepted his testimony as correct and factual, sometimes including the 
Führerbefehl.403  No one at the trial disputed Ohlendorf’s definition of the 
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Führerbefehl, because his testimony was not subjected to much scrutiny.  Therefore, 
what Ohlendorf said during the trial and his captivity has determined what is known 
about the activities of the Einsatzgruppen and the destruction of the Eastern 
European Jewry from 1941.  However, historians now overwhelmingly reject the 
notion that there ever was a Führerbefehl. 
 A significant issue addressed at the trial was that of the conscience and 
morals of Ohlendorf and the other defendants.  Yet Ohlendorf repeatedly dodged 
any question concerning the morality of the orders to kill.  Analyzing instances of 
the prosecution, together with Musmanno, attempting to draw out Ohlendorf’s 
opinions of the so-called Führerbefehl demonstrate his skill in avoiding emotive 
testimony.  The most significant display of the prosecution’s attempt to gauge 
Ohlendorf’s morality leads back to the line of questioning about the murder of 
women and children.   
 The prosecution repeatedly attempted to force Ohlendorf to make a moral 
judgment concerning the murder of 90,000 innocent civilians.  Regarding the order 
to kill women and children, Ohlendorf constantly avoided making a moral claim 
about it.  Instead, he pointed to the fact that in the war itself, countless children 
were killed by air strikes.  In fact, he tried to distance himself from this aspect of 
Einsatzgruppen activity saying, “I myself never saw children being shot,” but 
acknowledged he knew that women and children were indeed killed when he said 
“the reports also revealed the execution of children.”404  Goldhagen asserts that 
when questioned about judging his own behavior and participation in mass murder, 
                                                          




had he “disregarded the Führer Order, Ohlendorf would have transgressed the law 
as well as his own moral code.”405  As an Alter Kämpfer, Ohlendorf would never have 
compromised his devotion to National Socialism. Inherent in this ideology was the 
inevitability that Germany could not thrive unless “other” inferior groups of people 
no longer threatened the survival and expansion of the Aryan race.   
 Nevertheless, in the quest to understand the mentality of Nazi perpetration, 
the prosecution was unrelenting, and again posed the issue of morality of orders.  
This time, it was regarding the murder of women.  Prosecutor James Heath 
suggested to Ohlendorf “let’s suppose the order had been that you should kill your 
sister.” After Aschenauer’s objection, and Ohlendorf also trying his best to throw the 
question out as irrelevant, eventually he responded in the positive: “If the demand 
would have been made to me under the same prerequisites that is within the 
framework of an order, which is absolutely necessary militarily, then I would have 
executed that order.”406 
 Goldhagen argues that Ohlendorf’s “conscience” dictated how he dealt with 
his own troops.407  At the trial, Ohlendorf reiterated a conversation with Himmler, 
from Nikolaev, Ukraine, saying he directly opposed the killing of civilians.  “…I 
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pointed out the inhumane burden which was being imposed on the men in killing all 
these civilians.  I didn’t even get an answer.”408  When Ohlendorf could not mitigate 
the orders, he found other ways to lighten the burden for his soldiers.  This is 
demonstrated in ideas of collective responsibility, demanding they shoot in tandem, 
and in the use of gas vans.409  Ohlendorf portrayed himself as a sincere and caring 
leader, “a man of conscience and integrity,” who genuinely affirmed the well-being 
of his troops.410  Ohlendorf’s moral conscience was a predicament for him, as 
revealed in an exchange between himself and James Heath: 
Ohlendorf: Well, I believe there is no doubt that there is nothing worse for people spiritually 
than to have to shoot defenseless populations. 
 
Heath: If I may be a little facetious in a grim manner, there is nothing worse than to be shot 
either, when you are defenseless? 
 
Ohlendorf: Since this is meant ironically by you, I can imagine worse things, for example, to 
starve. 
 
Heath: It is not meant entirely ironically.  I have read the whole of your testimony, and I am 
impressed by the fact that not once did you express any sympathy or regret.411 
 
Although Musmanno reprimanded Heath for commenting on Ohlendorf himself, this 
excerpt from the trial perfectly demonstrates two points:  First, Ohlendorf was 
consistent and unwavering in his testimony throughout the entire process.  Second, 
it clearly shows how Ohlendorf committed his careerist nature to the method of 
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murder.  In this process, he cared not for those being murdered, but more for the 
way in which they were killed and the well-being of his troops, their killers.   
 In Ohlendorf’s mind, during his assignment with the Einsatzgruppen, he was 
a soldier, and a leader of soldiers.  In the trial, he wholeheartedly accepted 
responsibility for the actions of his Einsatzgruppe, although he made sure to 
comment that he never personally actually killed anyone.  For Ohlendorf, if the trial 
were to tarnish his reputation, as someone who did much good work for the Reich, 
at least he wanted to be remembered as a devoted leader, one who was sympathetic 
to the needs of his men.  Knowing he followed superior orders, excelling and 
performing as best he could, and believing he served his troops “humanely” and 
with care, by paying for their crimes, “he went down with the ship,” to use the 
Victorian maritime idiom.  
Sentencing 
 The longest closing statement from any witness in any of the Nuremberg-
related trials was Ohlendorf’s, on 13 February 1948.  Like his opening statement, he 
gave a long-winded, carefully constructed speech that touched upon historical 
concepts, Christianity, enemies, and the history and legacy of Germany.  However, 
unlike his opening statement, there is an element of emotion in parts of his speech 
saying: 
…I have said time and again that I was tormented by the fear of punishment which those in 
Germany who were responsible for the historic development seemed to invite by their 
words and deeds.  Their frank ignoring of human lives, and of the basic ideas of their own 
religious and moral conceptions of the people made this fear grow in me, but today my fear 





This passage reveals something in Ohlendorf unseen anywhere else: fear.  When he 
is taking about human lives, torment, morals and punishment, he is reflecting on 
what was wrong with embarking on the Holocaust, although he never calls it that.  
But here he is also maintaining his innocence, and separating himself from “those” 
who ignored “human lives.”  At the same time, he uses the word fear twice.  This is 
credible because although he was a devoted believer in National Socialist ideology, 
he was probably affected by becoming a perpetrator, and this haunted him.  He goes 
on to say… 
…They [the defendants] entered on their task convinced that they were backed by a genuine 
and justified moral force.  They felt that their work was necessary even if it opposed their 
own inner tendencies and interest, because the existence of their people was in deadly peril.  
They were the same good average citizens as you find them by the millions in all countries.  
They never thought of criminal activities or criminal aims…They were in no position to judge 
the methods and necessity of this war…But the passion of their moral existence included the 
metaphysical stipulation that the existence of their people must be preserved…412 
 
Although Ohlendorf is clearly trying to preserve what little he can of himself and his 
deeds, one can at least better understand how he justified his crimes.  He almost 
seems to admit that the perpetration of murder weighed heavily on him--enough to 
speak of conscience and morals.  These passages have a different tone, more like 
that of a condemned man, than any other part of his testimony in the trial.  One has 
to wonder when it actually became apparent to Ohlendorf that he was not going to 
come away from this trial without being sentenced, perhaps even to death.  There is 
a human element to this final statement worth further discussion.  He repeatedly 
referred to “they.”  The “they” here are his fellow defendants, and possibly the 
                                                          





German people as a whole.  Perhaps observing their actions and attitude in court 
convinced Ohlendorf he should speak on behalf of everyone in the dock.  Ingrao 
argues that, by this time, Ohlendorf was clearly aware that he was in “grave 
danger.”413  He knew the possibility of being found guilty at the beginning of the 
trial, but his closing statement reveals he understood this was likely going to be the 
decision of the court. 
 For Musmanno, it was clear that he would have to impose death sentences.  
He noted how his entire career as a defense lawyer he had fought against the death 
penalty: “the thought of ending their [the defendant’s] lives filled him with dread.414  
On April 10, 1948, Ohlendorf was brought in for sentencing.  At this point, he may 
have hoped for some leniency in sentencing, but knew he would surely face 
punishment.  He was indeed found guilty on all three charges, and was sentenced to 
death by hanging.  He did not react outwardly, seemed indifferent, and then bowed 
to show his respect for the court proceedings before he left the courtroom.415  He 
did not know that he would have to wait for more than three years for the sentence 
to be carried out.  
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On Death Row 
 In the three years between the delivery of Ohlendorf’s death sentence and his 
execution, he had ample time to settle his affairs, give interviews, appeal the 
decision, compile evidence of his alleged innocence and write a testimonial.  He kept 
quite busy for a man on death row.  With the help of Aschenauer, Ohlendorf 
appealed for clemency based on the argument that the number, at the time one 
million, of atrocities the court compiled for the whole Einsatzgruppen were inflated 
by more than 50%.416  For Ohlendorf and Aschenauer, if one of the goals of this trial 
had been to gain truth and create an “historical record,” he should be pardoned.417  
This is because the precise numbers were called into question. The defense claimed 
that if the numbers were not correct, this could have a tremendous bearing on the 
validity of evidence submitted by the prosecution, and attested to by other members 
of the Einsatzgruppen trial defendants.  Likewise, the defense argued that not taking 
into account the other tasks of the Einsatzgruppen besides killing was a “distortion 
of the truth.”418  In Earl’s view, the goal of attaining the “truth” was an impossible 
task.  Certainly, there were documents and reports that revealed truths about the 
actions of the Einsatzgruppen.  But Musmanno and the organizers of the trial made it 
paramount that they gain an understanding of the mentality of murder.  In 
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retrospect, Ohlendorf did not tell the complete truth.  Not that he should ever have 
been acquitted from committing heinous, deliberate genocide, but it is important to 
realize the evidence behind the prosecution, in the case of using Ohlendorf’s 
testimony as “truth” was compromised from the very beginning. 
 Not surprisingly, there were people and organizations which came out 
against the Nuremberg judgments, especially the German Catholic Church.419  In fact, 
by 1958, most of the sentences of those tried and jailed in all of the Nuremberg war 
crimes trials were commuted.  Through Aschenauer, Ohlendorf, along with other 
convicted defendants, continued the appeals process over the course of three years.  
John J. McCloy became head of the High Commission in Germany to re-evaluate the 
prisoners, like Ohlendorf, still on death row.420  He established the Advisory Board 
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on Clemency, which was tasked with reviewing and, if warranted, amending the 
Nuremberg prisoner sentences.  McCloy was pressured by German officials and the 
United States government to maintain a good relationship with Germany so as to 
promote German recovery.  He and the board reassessed the defense of the 
Nuremberg prisoners, and in their deliberations, took into consideration their 
physical condition and family situations.421 
  This began in 1950, after Aschenauer’s many failed attempts at appeal, but 
McCloy himself did not review the cases until January 31, 1951.422  The lag in time 
was most likely because of the outbreak of the Korean conflict and increased 
pressure on McCloy to hasten the process of rebuilding Germany as a Cold War ally.  
A New York Times article from 1950 reveals precisely how giving Ohlendorf 
clemency would invoke political repercussions.  Granting “clemency would be oil to 
the Kremlin’s propaganda machine; also, [that] it would have a reassuring effect on 
Nazi front organizations, while weakening the hand of our democratic friends, not 
the least of all Germany.”423  With the recommendations from the Advisory Board, 
McCloy ruled to commute all but five prison sentences from the Einsatzgruppen trial.  
Neither the board members, nor McCloy, were lenient on Ohlendorf.  He was one of 
the five whose sentences remained untouched.  Ohlendorf was furious and said this 
decision would, indeed, make him a “martyr,” since so many other perpetrators 
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were either not tried, not punished, or given clemency.424  Telford Taylor said of this 
decision: “The result of these and related developments was a rapid decrease of 
political interest in war crimes matters and eventually a desire to put an end to 
trials and liberate war criminals still in captivity.”425  That is, except for Otto 
Ohlendorf. 
 After receiving the devastating news that most of his fellow defendants had 
their sentences commuted or reduced, Ohlendorf wrote to Princess Helene Elisabeth 
von Isenburg, and Cardinal Aloisius Muench, two powerful people who were known 
for their sympathy toward the Landsberg prisoners.  Muench was hesitant to 
support Ohlendorf’s claims of being tried unjustly because of the massive amount of 
evidence that he was responsible for killing 90,000 Jews and partisans.  However, 
“Mother Elisabeth” wrote numerous letters back to Ohlendorf and determined that 
“as I got to know him, I was shocked to discover the false picture created by 
propaganda in this case.”426  She also wrote to Aschenauer, had meetings on 
Ohlendorf’s behalf, and was a founding member of the Association for Truth and 
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Justice.  However, the United States thought of this group as an organization of Nazi 
sympathizers.  The fact that Cardinal Muench decided not to help Ohlendorf’s cause 
is indicative of the difficulty for the Catholic Church in being associated with the 
death penalty, the Holocaust, and war crimes.427  Muench acknowledged Ohlendorf’s 
guilt, but the Catholic Church as a whole took a stance against the death penalty 
from the very beginning of the trial process. 
 Ohlendorf’s best attempts to have his sentence commuted failed.  From 
February to June 1951, his appeals for clemency stopped, and he presumably 
focused on settling any unfinished affairs.  He wrote a testament in which he asked 
that the following passage be read at his funeral: “And my last wish: Let no one 
invoke my life or my death for any purpose other than to do good.”428  Leading up to 
his funeral, Ohlendorf wrote this testament, and was visited by clerics, including the 
Anthroposophist minister Dr. Werner Haverbeck, who would perform the burial of 
Ohlendorf in Hoheneggelsen.429  Ohlendorf was executed by hanging. He never 
wavered in his devotion to National Socialism, and believed until the end that 
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everything he did was just, right, and for the greater good of Germany.  In the end, 
he never showed any repentance for the actions of Einsatzgruppe D. 
Conclusion 
 Chief Prosecutor Benjamin Ferencz stated that of the 3,000 members of the 
Einsatzgruppen who should be brought to trial, only twenty-four, two of whom 
dropped out, were tried because that was precisely how many seats they had in the 
block.430  Ferencz made every effort not to have any outside contact with the 
defendants during the trial, most likely because he was Jewish and did not want to 
seem vengeful or biased against them.  However, he went to see Ohlendorf, after he 
was sentenced and read the verdict, to inquire if there were anything Ferencz could 
do, personally, for Ohlendorf.  Ohlendorf replied to Ferencz “the Jews in America 
will suffer for this,” and according to Ferencz, Ohlendorf “died convinced that he 
was right and I was wrong.”431  Given the character and personality of Ohlendorf, 
together with his self-righteous belief in National Socialism, there is little doubt he 
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either whole-heartedly believed his crimes were justified or, if he had any doubts, 
that he would never admit to wrongdoing.   
 The defense argument would have been quite strong, if the defendants had 
all aligned and planned their testimonies to perfection.  This was not the case.  
Ohlendorf’s pre-trial testimony, in which he outlined the mass murder committed 
by the Einsatzgruppen, was basically accepted. This left Aschenauer with little choice 
but to adopt an unusual line of defense, which was also called for because this was 
an unprecedented trial with uniquely devised charges.432  The defense conceded 
that Ohlendorf had committed and led mass murder, but argued that Ohlendorf and 
other defendants were following orders.  These alleged orders superseded the 
ability of the Einsatzgruppen leaders to call them into question.  This argument was 
repeatedly discussed with Ohlendorf, even to the point of admitting he would kill his 
own sister.  The defense thought the “orders” argument was quite sound, at least as 
was uniformly argued by the defendants, until Willy Seibert was questioned as to 
whether he would kill his parents in the name of Führer Orders.  He said he could 
not answer, and as Musmanno recalled: “The faces of the other defendants in the 
dock dropped. ‘Why, you idiot,’ they seemed to say, ‘that is our whole case.’"433  
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Seibert answered in the negative, saying “I would not do so.”434  He had just 
demonstrated to the court that he was not a mindless soldier, that he enacted mass 
murder through decision-making. 
 The testament written by Ohlendorf requires examination.  It is referred to 
by his widow, Käthe, in her “Letter to David Irving.”  According to Mrs. Ohlendorf, he 
compiled a great deal of evidence as to his direct relationship with the Army, 
Manstein, and the Tatars, including photos, written affidavits, and other information 
that point to an alleged unity of purpose in carrying out the Holocaust.  Referring 
back to the fact that Ohlendorf thought the Americans would try him as a member of 
the military, and not as head of the “special” Einsatzgruppen forces, Käthe Ohlendorf 
made it her personal quest to have her husband exonerated.  Perhaps they were 
both correct in thinking the trials were biased against him, given that in comparison 
to other cases, he received the harshest punishment.  Also, in her letter to David 
Irving, a known Holocaust denier, Mrs. Ohlendorf’s motive is to enlist the help of 
Irving by writing to him and providing him with this so-called evidence.    
When Judge Musmanno referred to Ohlendorf as “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,” it 
is simple to understand how he came to that characterization.  Regarding his 
attitude in captivity, arrogance in the courts, and his position as a top-level Nazi, it 
seems he was this dualistic character.  Looking more closely at how he performed 
his job, at every level and every step along the way, Ohlendorf was a careerist, 
driven by his absolutely faithful and untarnished belief in National Socialism.  There 
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is an apparent contradiction between careerism and ideological commitment, but in 
the case of Ohlendorf, these opposing forces were compatible. 
Hanno Sowade perfectly summarized Ohlendorf in life, character, and in the 
trial this way: “the court could not fully make up its mind about this ‘Dr. Jekyll and 
Mr. Hyde’ as the chairman of the Military Tribunal called him – the correct 
economist and civil servant, who had fought selflessly for the interests of the middle 
classes, and the mass murderer all in the person of Ohlendorf.”435  But this 
characterization is only superficially correct.  Taking into account the fact that he 
was an Alter Kämpfer, the Jekyll and Hyde sides of Ohlendorf were not that easily 
separable. From the trial, there are many lessons learned.  Most significantly, the 
amount of weight put on the validity and “truth” of Ohlendorf’s testimony, despite 
the fact that the prosecution had numerous documents as evidence, is staggering.  
Granted, he was well known for his severe honesty, self-righteousness, and fervent 
(or violent in the Einsatzgruppen) dedication to National Socialism.  However, why 
would he not lie, even a little?  Taking the word of a perpetrator unabashedly and 
using it to wield the power of life and death in a trial is careless; the process should 
be further scrutinized.   
 
  
                                                          




Chapter 6:  
Conclusion 
  
 Otto Ohlendorf was an economist, lawyer, Nazi party functionary, National 
Socialist ideologue, and perpetrator of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 
purpose of researching the life of Ohlendorf is to understand and appreciate, in the 
greater picture of motivation, the patterns in his life and personality that lead to the 
greatest crime of his career: his leadership of the Einsatzgruppen.  In composing an 
analysis comprised of different aspects of his life, much is gained in learning about 
what his criminal motivations may have been.  His crimes were heinous and so 
significant that he was executed for them.  Central to this study is examining 
perpetration on an individual level, considering biographical and psychological 
characteristics of the Ohlendorf.  This is more significant than simply stating that 
Ohlendorf was a typical German, who like all others, wanted to kill Jews; this is an 
irresponsible claim. 
Despite Ohlendorf’s criticism of Nazi policies, ultimately, he was responsible 
for the deaths of 90,000 people. Like most Nuremberg defendants, he asserted that 
they had an inability to act otherwise, a statement cited numerous times.  Goldhagen 
views this as a perpetrator speaking for all others, “what else could we have done?” 
Instead, it should be treated as an individual viewpoint, rather than a collective ‘one 
size fits all’ explanation.436  In the end, it is less significant from whom the orders 
came, and when.  Ohlendorf’s guilt is absolutely undeniable, but placing him into a 
                                                          




general category of perpetrators is misleading.  He was an Alter Kämpfer, elitist and 
privileged in Nazi Germany.  This entire dissertation focuses on how the conditions 
of his life, career, and personality together led to his role in the perpetration of the 
Holocaust.  The one theme present in all of these conditions is Ohlendorf’s identity 
as an Alter Kämpfer.  In order to better study perpetrator motives, Browning’s 
approach leads to clearer understandings of how, why and under what conditions 
the Holocaust unfolded, especially in the Soviet Union.  Case studies are extremely 
important in comprehending the greater picture of not only the enactment of the 
Final Solution, but also in showing how Nazi Germany, the supposedly well-oiled 
machine, was in fact deeply dysfunctional.  How can anyone begin to understand 
how a particular person enacted mass murder without first trying to comprehend 
the motivations, their career, and life conditions of the accused?  This case study 
featuring Otto Ohlendorf has been fruitful. 
 The motivations of Ohlendorf have become more clearly defined.  Although 
anti-Semitism was a major aspect of National Socialist ideology, Ohlendorf enacted 
mass murder because he was a careerist and wanted to thrive at each job he was to 
undertake.  Likewise, he claimed the Jews and partisans posed a direct threat to the 
progress and survival of Germany.  He succeeded so much that he received the 
highest of promotions throughout his career, from lieutenant to major general.  
Despite his alleged reluctance to be transferred to the front, Ohlendorf’s career 
greatly benefited from the experience.  Although he attributed the transfer orders to 
some sort of grudge with Himmler and Heydrich, once Ohlendorf accepted the fact, 




He was an Alter Kämpfer and careerist.  If he had not gone to the Eastern Front, his 
career might have faltered. Worse yet, his loyalty could have been called into 
question, a completely unthinkable scenario for Ohlendorf. 
 How could someone so apparently intelligent become a mass murderer and 
think his job was morally justified?  Ohlendorf’s motivations were rooted in 
personal and professional opportunism and a purist interpretation of National 
Socialism.  He truly believed that the murder of 90,000 innocent people was an 
acceptable act necessary to support the Nazi’s ideological war in the name of 
expanding and preserving Germany.   His ideology was centered around devotion to 
the Reich and National Socialism, inseparable from his careerism.  The connecting 
factor was his elitist status as an Alter Kämpfer.  He could not really be reprimanded 
for insubordination, but at the same time, his dedication to the early values of the 
Nazi party made him an unwavering supporter of the ideological cause.  This led 
him to be a perpetrator, a task he most likely did not enjoy as he oversaw the 
murder of tens of thousands of men, women, and children.  Nevertheless, he 
justified it (perhaps only to himself and his soldiers) and deduced that committing 
genocide was absolutely essential to the survival of Germany, National Socialism, 
and his own life. 
 Despite Ohlendorf’s military experience and lack of desire to take up arms, he 
morphed from National Socialism’s ideological soldier to a perpetrator of mass 
murder.  The Alter Kämpfer in him transitioned from academic policy-maker to 
genocidal killer.   Analyzing perpetrator motivation is problematic because general 




dissertation is not to explain why Ohlendorf commanded the execution of 90,000 
Jews and partisans.  It is clear why; he was anti-Semitic and a careerist, as were 
most of his German contemporaries.  Anti-Semitism was not confined only to 
Ohlendorf, only to perpetrators, only to Nazis, or only to Germans.  If that had been 
the case, the Einsatzgruppen in particular would have had much more difficulty 
enlisting the help of local paramilitary groups and citizens of the Soviet Union to 
assist in their gruesome task.  The Einsatzgruppen all used local help in their mission 
to clear the land, persecute, document, and round up the local unwanted persons 
(gypsies, Ashkenazis, Jews, Roma, the disabled, criminals, or other groups), dig the 
mass graves if a ravine did not already exist, escort the victims to their gravesite, 
and execute them.  Without the support of locals in pogroms like Babi Yar, the 
murders at Majdanek and Lublin, etc., the Nazis would most likely have had to 
amass larger forces to support the extensive liquidation activities of the 
Einsatzgruppen.  
 Although perpetrators deserve blame, there is risk in how and to what 
degree blame is placed.  Yes, Ohlendorf should certainly have been tried and 
sentenced for the magnitude of his horrific crimes.  This issue extends into a debate 
over whether Nazis like Ohlendorf were punished enough.  Yet of all the 
Einsatzgruppen perpetrators, only twenty-four were tried.  The Allies felt they did 
not have the evidence, or resources, to manage the conviction of the 3,000 
Einsatzgruppen killers.  
 Concerning future studies related to Ohlendorf, this thesis has exposed gaps 




more exploration and research is necessary regarding the Nazis and Ohlendorf’s 
relationship with the Anthroposophical Society.  Argued here is that the society was 
influential in Ohlendorf’s life, and his involvement with its defense may have 
possibly played a small role in Himmler’s transfer order that placed Ohlendorf in 
command of Einsatzgruppe D.  More plausibly, a deeper analysis could reveal an 
intricate interconnectedness between particular members of the Nazi party and the 
Anthroposophical Society. 
 In addition to Ohlendorf’s ties to the Anthroposophical Society, his link to 
academic radicalism could prove to be interesting.  He was connected with Jessen 
and other members of the universities of Kiel and Berlin who spoke out against Nazi 
policy to the point of anarchy, as Jessen and many other academics were involved in 
the 20 July plot.  Precisely what were Ohlendorf and Jessen lecturing and writing 
about while at the universities, building new departments of economics together?  
Exactly why were they both asked to leave under suspicious circumstances not 
once, but twice?  Was there any backlash against Ohlendorf when Jessen was 
arrested for involvement in the 20 July plot?  Was Ohlendorf questioned about it?  
Why or why not, considering his ties to Jessen?  Why did these two men have an 
apparent falling out after Jessen encouraged Ohlendorf to join the SD?   
 Looking further at the Trial, Hilary Earl has certainly led the way for the most 
recent writing on the Einsatzgruppen Trial.  Where this topic can lead is analyzing 
Ohlendorf’s claims for being tried under the Saubere Wehrmacht defense, and how 
he specifically handled his three years in prison, after sentencing. As the 




three counts.  Other Einsatzgruppen leaders who made it through the trial process 
were all dealt the same sentence. 
Questions about accountability still arise, albeit more infrequently than after 
the war, and with occurrences like Darfur, Rwanda, Bosnia and other genocidal 
incidences of today’s world, they are still relevant.  Because mass murders, pogroms, 
and terrible acts of violence dominate particular areas of the world, scholars and 
legal experts continually look back to the Nazi Holocaust for precedents to set just 
standards of order of the world.  Unfortunately, most often governing bodies such as 
the United Nations are unsuccessful at preventing genocide, despite the continuous 
amount of analyses of the Holocaust. 
The goal of this dissertation is to analyze the life and career of Holocaust 
perpetrator Otto Ohlendorf in a way that demonstrates particular, relevant themes 
in Nazi Germany and Holocaust studies.  Focusing on careerism and National 
Socialist ideology, Ohlendorf’s life and career reveal how he was allowed to flourish 
in the Nazi party and government through the privileges of being an Alter Kämpfer.  
It is difficult to say whether his meteoric rise to the top of the Nazi careerist echelon 
was solely dependent on the Alter Kämpfer status.  But along with the status came 
the responsibility of Ohlendorf to substantiate his commitment to National 
Socialism and the party.  Although Ohlendorf argued against wanting to assume the 
role of mass murderer with Einsatzgruppe During the trial at Nuremberg, there was 
little doubt that his command of the group became a significant determinant of his 




the ideology made him the ideal candidate to have a thriving career in Nazi 
Germany. 
In conclusion, this dissertation concludes with the future in mind.  Why is the 
Holocaust and its perpetrators still a relevant and significant area of study?  If 
genocide still occurs, why bother to analyze perpetrator motivation? If the world 
cannot appropriately legislate racist acts, violence, and war, then it is the job of 
scholars, researchers, and historians to write more, analyze more, and to make more 
people aware of genocide and hate as criminal acts.  Deciding what is moral and 
what just punishment may be is not for me to decide.  Instead, my job is to attempt 
to make sense of perpetration and bring a better understanding of how and why it 
occurs.  The study of Otto Ohlendorf is one more step toward comprehending the 
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